What makes a parent in surrogacy cases? Reflections on the Fjölnisdóttir et al. v. Iceland decision of the European Court of Human Rights

2021 ◽  
pp. 096853322110434
Author(s):  
Julian W März

The present commentary analyses and discusses the Fjölnisdóttir et al. v. Iceland decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) of 18 May 2021. The case concerned an Icelandic couple who had been recognised as the legal parents of a child born by a surrogate mother in California. In contrast to most other surrogacy cases decided by the ECtHR, however, the child had no biological link to either of the intended parents. The ECtHR thus found that a ruling of the Supreme Court of Iceland which had rejected the recognition of the legal parenthood of the intended parents under Icelandic law had not violated Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, despite the fact that joint adoption by the intended parents was not possible in this case. The present commentary argues that this decision overexaggerates the importance of the biological link, creating injustices at the expense of the child concerned. In conclusion, the commentary calls for a more consistent and holistic framework to protect the best interests of the child and to prevent abuses of transnational commercial surrogacy.

Land Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 593-629
Author(s):  
Chris Bevan

This chapter examines the relationship between land law and human rights. From a distinctly land law perspective, the human rights discourse has given rise to much debate, which continues to fuel much academic commentary including recent examination of the availability of horizontal effect in McDonald v McDonald in the Supreme Court and in the European Court of Human Rights. The chapter focuses chiefly on the two most pertinent provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for land law; namely Art. 1 of the First Protocol and Art. 8 and reflects on the, at times, difficult relationship between land law and human rights.


Author(s):  
Dickson Brice

This chapter examines the engagement of the Irish Supreme Court with the European Convention on Human Rights. It reviews all of the occasions on which decisions of the Supreme Court have been reviewed by the European Commission or Court of Human Rights, cases such as Lawless, Norris, Open Door, Keegan, Heaney, Murphy, Independent News, Bosphorus Airways, McFarlane and O’Keeffe. The argument is made that, like the UK Supreme Court, Ireland’s top court has not been as committed to adopting the ECHR’s standards as it might have been and that the Court is still not adapting its own judgment-writing to take proper account of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. That Court has frequently highlighted the inordinate delays which plagued the Irish Supreme Court in the 1990s. More could be done to integrate the European Court’s thinking into the way the Supreme Court goes about developing Ireland’s human rights law.


Author(s):  
Alla Radzivill

Law enforcement practice of the Supreme Court in cases involving torture in the light of the standards of the European Court ofHuman Rights. The article is devoted to the study of individual legal positions of the Supreme Court, their coordination with the practiceof the European Court of Human Rights. The author emphasizes that the decisions of the European Court should serve as precedents,which will make it impossible to produce diametrically opposite decisions on similar categories of cases. Analysis of the problem ofcriminal responsibility for torture allows us to form conclusions and suggestions that are important for the development of the theoryof criminal law and the improvement of law enforcement practice.The article deals with the issues related to the peculiarities of the interpretation and application of Article 3 of the European Conventionon Human Rights of the European Court of Human Rights. In particular, the scope of Article 3 has been analyzed; it has been de -fined, what is necessary to understand under concepts of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Substantive and proceduralaspects of violations of the prohibition of torture have been revealed, as well as positive and negative obligations of a state to providethe effective protection of the right. The standards of the appropriate assessment of ill-treatment and the main aspects of judicial qualificationof a particular form of mistreatment as torture have been analyzed. The procedural guarantees, which must be provided for each personat the stage of pre-trial investigation, non-observance of which leads to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention, have been determined.Creation of the effective system of protection of human rights and its efficiency is analysed in relation to the crime of “torture”in the context of European Convention on human rights, which must be in future stored and taken for basis for a further improvementand systematization of the single European standards in area of human rights.


Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.


Author(s):  
Bohdan V. Shchur ◽  
Iryna V. Basysta

In present-day Ukraine, there is no unanimous answer to the question of the essence and consequences of the ECHR decision to refuse to waive immunity under Article 1 of the Protocol No. 6 either in the national criminal procedural legislation, or in the theory of criminal procedure, or among judges, investigators, prosecutors. Therefore, the purpose of the present paper is to try to attempt to formulate individual approaches to address this issue. The relevance of the subject under study is conditioned upon its theoretical and practical components. The former is that there this area is heavily understudied, and judicial practice, among other things, requires a certain scientific basis to formulate individual positions in their unity. The dilemma proposed in the title of this study was also addressed by members of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Supreme Court, who were approached by judges of the Grand Chamber for scientific opinions, emphasising the urgency and necessity of feedback from practitioners. To formulate the individual approaches serving the purpose of this study, the authors employed such general and special research methods as dialectical, induction and deduction, Aristotelian, system-structural, sampling method, comparison, and legal forecasting. Notwithstanding the fact that the ECHR decision to refuse to waive the immunity stipulated in Article 1 of the Protocol No. 6, adopted by its plenary session in accordance with Article 4 of the Protocol No. 6 to the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe, is “procedural”, it was proven that the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court has the authority to conduct proceedings on the application of such a person to review the judgment precisely in exceptional circumstances. It is emphasised that the ECHR decision should be considered as one that does not aim at the final assessment of criminal proceedings, so it cannot be equated with the decision of an international judicial institution, which would state Ukraine's violation of international obligations in court and the order of its execution will differ. The authors also address the fact that the consequences of the ECHR decision to refuse to waive the immunity stipulated in Article 1 of the Protocol No. 6 are critical. After all, such a decision of the European Court of Human Rights is the “bell” for Ukraine, which, among other things, may hint at the probability that the Court will identify the facts of human rights violations


Author(s):  
Lucy Jones

This chapter discusses the English court system, civil disputes, and alternative dispute resolution. The courts in England and Wales form a hierarchy. At the lowest level are the Magistrates’ Courts and the County Courts, then the Crown Court and High Court, then the Court of Appeal, and finally the Supreme Court. The chapter considers the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in interpreting EU law within Member States. It explains the position of the European Court of Human Rights, which deals with allegations of state breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights. Civil disputes arise in every area of business. An explanation of the civil procedure rules from commencing a claim to enforcement of a court judgment is provided. The chapter concludes with a discussion of alternative methods of dispute resolution including arbitration, mediation, and conciliation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-494
Author(s):  
Bríd Ní Ghráinne ◽  
Aisling McMahon

AbstractOn 7 June 2018, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSCt) issued its decision on, inter alia, whether Northern Ireland's near-total abortion ban was compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). This article critically assesses the UKSC's treatment of international law in this case. It argues that the UKSCt was justified in finding that Northern Ireland's ban on abortion in cases of rape, incest, and FFA was a violation of Article 8, but that the majority erred in its assessment of Article 3 ECHR and of the relevance of international law more generally.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-604
Author(s):  
Alex Ruck Keene ◽  
Xinyu Xu

Abstract How (if at all) can the right to liberty of a child under Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) be balanced against the rights of parents, enshrined both at common law and under Article 8 ECHR? Is there a limit to the extent to which parents can themselves, or via others, seek to impose restrictions upon their disabled child’s liberty so as to secure their child’s interests? This case considers the answers to these questions given by and the implications of the decision of the Supreme Court in September 2019 in Re D (A Child) [2019] UKSC 42.


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