Recession and Tax Impacts On the U.S. Restaurant Industry

1994 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Hiemstra ◽  
Steven T. Kosiba
Keyword(s):  
Restaurant Industry ◽  
The U.S

The Effect of the Tipped Minimum Wage on Employees in the U.S. Restaurant Industry

2014 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
William E. Even ◽  
David A. Macpherson
Keyword(s):  
Minimum Wage ◽  
Restaurant Industry ◽  
The U.S

CEO Overconfidence and the Effects of Equity-Based Compensation on Strategic Risk-Taking in the U.S. Restaurant Industry

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kwanglim Seo ◽  
Amit Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Risk Behaviors ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Restaurant Industry ◽  
Positive Relation ◽  
Comprehensive Understanding ◽  
Strategic Risk ◽  
Strategic Risk Taking ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The U.S

The purpose of this study was to investigate (a) the moderating effect of CEO overconfidence on the relationship between equity-based compensation and strategic risk-taking and (b) the relationship between franchising and strategic risk-taking in the U.S. restaurant industry. Given wide use of a franchise system among U.S. restaurant firms, an understanding of the association between equity-based compensation and strategic risk-taking relative to CEOs’ risk behaviors seems particularly important. We conducted our empirical analysis in the U.S. restaurant industry using a sample of 659 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2013. Our findings showed that (a) overconfident CEOs, while holding equity-based compensation, tended to take on more strategically risky investments, and (b) there was a positive relation between franchising and risk-taking. Considering the behavioral and industry-specific characteristics, study findings could provide a more comprehensive understanding of how equity-based compensation influences strategic risk-taking in the U.S. restaurant industry.

The Effect of Franchising on Establishment Performance in the U.S. Restaurant Industry

2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Sveum ◽  
Michael Sykuta
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Managerial Discretion ◽  
Restaurant Industry ◽  
Retail Trade ◽  
Central Theme ◽  
Work Processes ◽  
Trade Data ◽  
Limited Service ◽  
The U.S

A central theme in much of the franchising literature is that franchising mitigates the Principle–agent problems between the owner of the franchise company and the operator of the local establishment by making the operator the owner-franchisee of the establishment. Despite the centrality of that assumption in the literature, there is little empirical evidence to support it. We use Census of Retail Trade data for essentially all full- and limited-service restaurants in the United States to test whether franchisee-ownership affects performance at the establishment level. We find a strong and robust franchise effect for full-service restaurants but little effect among limited-service restaurants. We argue this difference is consistent with agency costs given differences in work processes and the importance of managerial discretion.

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