On agonistic narratives of migration

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 547-563
Author(s):  
Hans Lauge Hansen

The aim of this article is to apply the concept of agonism to the study of migration and migration narratives in order to shed new light upon a complex field and contribute to the countering of neo-nationalist right-wing populism. Following Chantal Mouffe, the author argues that agonistic narrative traits can be found in already existing cultural products that are able to unsettle the existing identity positions of the hegemonic European identity discourse pitting the national citizen against the figure of the migrant, and/or create new identity positions and alliances across the ‘us’–’them’ divide. Agonistic narratives of migration are stories able simultaneously to counter the two complementary and hegemonic discourses on migration, the antagonistic, neo-nationalist discourse representing the migrant as a threat, and the humanitarian discourse representing the migrant as a victim. Instead, agonistic narratives aim to forge alliances through protest and activities against inequality and discrimination.

Intersections ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 100-127
Author(s):  
Vera Messing ◽  
Bence Ságvári

In this paper we aim to discuss attitudes towards immigrants in a European context and analyse drivers of anti-immigrant attitudes such as the feeling of control, basic human values, political orientation and preferences related to right-wing populism. Based on data from the European Social Survey, we first describe how attitudes of people in Europe changed throughout a period of almost two decades (between 2002 and 2018). We will show that although attitudes are influenced by a number of demographic and subjective features of individuals, on the macro-level they seem to be surprisingly stable, yet hide significant cross-country differences. Then, we zoom in to the three most significant elements influencing attitudes towards immigrants: the feeling of control, basic human values, and political orientation. Applying a multi-level model we test the validity of three theories about factors informing attitudes towards immigrants—competition theory, locus of control, and the role of basic human values—and include time (pre- and post-2015 refugee-crisis periods) into the analysis. In the discussion we link ESS data to recent research on populism in Europe that categorizes populist parties across the continent, and establish that the degree to which anti-migrant feelings are linked to support for political populism varies significantly across European countries. We show that right-wing populist parties gather and feed that part of the population which is very negative towards migrants and migration in general, and this process is also driven by the significance awarded the value of security vis-à-vis humanitarianism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Alan Busk ◽  

This paper considers the radical democratic theory of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau with reference to the recent rise of Right-wing populism. I argue that even as Mouffe and Laclau develop a critical political ontology that regards democracy as an end in itself, they simultaneously exclude certain elements of the demos. In other words, they appeal to formal categories but decide the political content in advance, disqualifying Right-wing movements and discourses without justification. This ambivalence between form and content reveals the limits of Mouffe and Laclau’s brand of radical democracy for understanding and critiquing the present political conjuncture.


October ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 149 ◽  
pp. 181-191
Author(s):  
Paul Chan

In October 2010, I emailed Chris to ask if he was interested in taking part in a special issue of E-flux Journal that art critic Sven Lütticken and I were editing. The issue focused on whether contemporary art had addressed the rise of right-wing populism in Europe, the US, and elsewhere, and how these largely nationalistic, homophobic, and xenophobic movements impacted culture and art. With the ascendance of the Tea Party, Sven and I wondered if it were possible to chart a genealogy of right-wing groups on both sides of the Atlantic and illuminate their familial relations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter O. Ötsch ◽  
Stephan Pühringer

Abstract The article compares market fundamentalism and right-wing populism on the basis of its core patterns of thinking and reasoning. Based on an analysis of the work of important founders of market fundamental economic thinking and the arguments brought forward by leading right-wing populist we find many similarities of these two concepts in their "inner images". Thus, we develop a scheme of the similar dual social worlds of right-wing-populism and market fundamentalism and offer some recent examples of market fundamentalism and right-wing populism mutually reinforcing each other or serving as a gateway for each other. We then apply our scheme for the analysis of the recent political developments and its ideological roots in the US under Donald Trump. The main conclusion of this article is that market fundamentalism and right-wing populism together must be seen as two mutually reinforcing threats to democracy in the 21st century.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Tobias Cremer

Abstract Right-wing populists across Western democracies have markedly increased references to Christianity in recent years. While there is much debate about how and why they have done so, less attention has been paid to how Christian communities react to this development. The present study addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of Christian responses to right-wing populist politics in Germany, France and the US. It relies on quantitative studies, survey data and the qualitative analysis of 39 in-depth interviews with right-wing populist leaders, mainstream party politicians and church officials. The findings of this analysis suggest a potential ‘religious vaccination effect’ among Christian voters against right-wing populism but underline its connection to elite actor behaviour. Specifically, the availability of a ‘Christian alternative’ in the party system, as well as religious leaders’ willingness and ability to create a social taboo around the populist right seem critically to impact religious immunity to populism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimír Naxera ◽  
Petr Krčál

AbstractThis paper is a contribution to the academic debate on populism and Islamophobia in contemporary Europe. Its goal is to analyze Czech President Miloš Zeman’s strategy in using the term “security” in his first term of office. Methodologically speaking, the text is established as a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) of a data set created from all of Zeman’s speeches, interviews, statements, and so on, which were processed using MAXQDA11+. This paper shows that the dominant treatment of the phenomenon of security expressed by the President is primarily linked to the creation of the vision of Islam and immigration as the absolute largest threat to contemporary Europe. Another important finding lies in the fact that Zeman instrumentally utilizes rhetoric such as “not Russia, but Islam”, which stems from Zeman’s relationship to Putin’s authoritarian regime. Zeman’s conceptualization of Islam and migration follows the typical principles of contemporary right-wing populism in Europe.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Keenan ◽  
Agnieszka Golec

The storming of the US Capitol and voter intimidation by Trump supporters has marked significant upheaval in American democracy. In three cross-sectional studies, we test the proposition that collective narcissism is associated with support for a populist leader to the point of disregard for democratic procedures and hostility towards others. In Study 1, conducted just before the 2020 Presidential elections, we examined the association of American collective narcissism with support for Trump’s presidency even if Donald Trump was to violate the democratic procedures while securing the re-election. In Study 2, conducted just after the Capitol attack, we examined the association between American collective narcissism and support for the attacks. In Study 3, we examined whether collective narcissism was associated with support for a populist leader, disregarding democratic procedures, in a minimal group setting deprived of any associations with particular political context. The results of the three studies converge to indicate that collective narcissism is most strongly (beyond variables commonly implicated in support for right-wing populism) associated with populist leadership to the extent of disregarding democratic norms. The narcissistic conception of the national ingroup is essential to our understanding of right-wing populism and its reactionary movements.


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