A Religious Vaccination? How Christian Communities React to Right-Wing Populism in Germany, France and the US

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Tobias Cremer

Abstract Right-wing populists across Western democracies have markedly increased references to Christianity in recent years. While there is much debate about how and why they have done so, less attention has been paid to how Christian communities react to this development. The present study addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of Christian responses to right-wing populist politics in Germany, France and the US. It relies on quantitative studies, survey data and the qualitative analysis of 39 in-depth interviews with right-wing populist leaders, mainstream party politicians and church officials. The findings of this analysis suggest a potential ‘religious vaccination effect’ among Christian voters against right-wing populism but underline its connection to elite actor behaviour. Specifically, the availability of a ‘Christian alternative’ in the party system, as well as religious leaders’ willingness and ability to create a social taboo around the populist right seem critically to impact religious immunity to populism.

Politics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Lees

This article charts the rise of the ‘Alternative for Germany’ ( Alternative für Deutschland or AfD) from its inception in late 2012 to its unexpectedly strong performance in the 2017 Federal election. In terms of the ‘inward’ aspect of Euroscepticism, the article considers the impact of the emergence of successively more hardline leaderships in 2015 and 2017, which led to a shift beyond opposition to aspects of the European integration process to a more profound critique of German society and politics. In terms of the ‘outward’ aspect, it assesses the significance of these developments in the wider debates around Euroscepticism and populism. The article concludes that the AfD’s Euroscepticism is now nested within an ideological profile that increasingly conforms to the template of an orthodox European right-wing populist party. It argues that the widely unanticipated level of electoral support for the AfD in the 2017 Federal elections and its status as the main opposition party in the Bundestag is a systemic shock and potential critical juncture in the development of the German party system and the contestation of European integration in the Federal Republic.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Decker ◽  
Philipp Adorf

The 2017 federal election illustrated the transformation of Germany’s political party system with six parties managing to enter the Bundestag. With the Christian and Social Democrats finally coming to an agreement almost half a year after the election, a grand coalition is set to govern for two consecutive terms for the very first time. The Alternative for Germany’s success also signaled the definite parliamentary establishment of right-wing populism in Germany. Multiparty coalitions that bridge ideological gulfs as the political fringe has grown in size are a new reality that must be accommodated. The 2017 election and subsequent arduous negotiations point towards a period of uncertainty and further upheaval for Germany’s party system.


October ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 149 ◽  
pp. 181-191
Author(s):  
Paul Chan

In October 2010, I emailed Chris to ask if he was interested in taking part in a special issue of E-flux Journal that art critic Sven Lütticken and I were editing. The issue focused on whether contemporary art had addressed the rise of right-wing populism in Europe, the US, and elsewhere, and how these largely nationalistic, homophobic, and xenophobic movements impacted culture and art. With the ascendance of the Tea Party, Sven and I wondered if it were possible to chart a genealogy of right-wing groups on both sides of the Atlantic and illuminate their familial relations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter O. Ötsch ◽  
Stephan Pühringer

Abstract The article compares market fundamentalism and right-wing populism on the basis of its core patterns of thinking and reasoning. Based on an analysis of the work of important founders of market fundamental economic thinking and the arguments brought forward by leading right-wing populist we find many similarities of these two concepts in their "inner images". Thus, we develop a scheme of the similar dual social worlds of right-wing-populism and market fundamentalism and offer some recent examples of market fundamentalism and right-wing populism mutually reinforcing each other or serving as a gateway for each other. We then apply our scheme for the analysis of the recent political developments and its ideological roots in the US under Donald Trump. The main conclusion of this article is that market fundamentalism and right-wing populism together must be seen as two mutually reinforcing threats to democracy in the 21st century.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 254
Author(s):  
Tobias Cremer

Right-wing populists across many western countries have markedly intensified their references to Christianity in recent years. However, Christian communities’ reactions to such developments often vary significantly, ranging from disproportionate support in some countries to outspoken opposition in others. This paper explores the role of structural factors, and in particular of Church–State relations, in accounting for some of these differences. Specifically, this article explores how Church–State relations in Germany and the United States have produced different incentives and opportunity structures for faith leaders when facing right-wing populism. Based on quantitative studies, survey data, and 31 in-depth elite interviews, this research suggests that whereas Germany’s system of “benevolent neutrality” encourages highly centralised churches whose leaders perceive themselves as integral part and defenders of the current system, and are therefore both willing and able to create social taboos against right-wing populism, America’s “Wall of separation” favours a de-centralised religious marketplace, in which church leaders are more prone to agree with populists’ anti-elitist rhetoric, and face higher costs and barriers against publicly condemning right-wing populism. Taking such structural factors into greater account when analysing Christian responses to right-wing populism is central to understanding current and future dynamics between politics and religion in western democracies.


Author(s):  
Michael Bayerlein

AbstractThis article answers the question of why certain European mainstream parties have changed their policy positions on the GAL-TAN (Green/Alternative/Libertarian vs. Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist) dimension in recent years. I argue that these changes can be explained through the electoral success of new right-wing populist parties and the ideological proximity of conservative mainstream parties towards these parties. These arguments were tested with econometric models of mainstream parties’ policy positions in 11 Western European democracies between 2002 and 2019. The results indicate that mainstream parties chase the other “populist zeitgeist” by changing their policy positions on the GAL–TAN dimension in response to the electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Mainstream parties respond to this threat by closing the distance to these parties on the GAL–TAN dimension. However, this responsiveness is largely constrained to conservative mainstream parties. The findings have important implications for understanding mainstream party responsiveness towards rivalling right-wing populist parties.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Stier ◽  
Lisa Posch ◽  
Arnim Bleier ◽  
Markus Strohmaier

Previous research has acknowledged the use of social media in political communication by right-wing populist parties and politicians. Less is known, however, about its pivotal role for right-wing social movements which rely on personalized messages to mobilize supporters and challenge the mainstream party system. This paper analyzes online political communication by the right-wing populist movement Pegida and German political parties. We investigate to which extent parties attract supporters of Pegida, to which extent they address topics similar to Pegida and whether their topic use has become more similar over a period of almost two years. The empirical analysis is based on Facebook posts by main accounts and individual representatives of these political groups. We first show that there are considerable overlaps in the audiences of Pegida and the new challenger in the party system, AfD. Then we use topic models to characterize topic use by party and surveyed crowdworkers to which extent they perceive the identified topics as populist communication. The results show that while Pegida and AfD talk about rather unique topics and smaller parties engage to varying degrees with the topics populists emphasize, the two governing parties CDU and SPD clearly deemphasize those. Overall, the findings indicate that the considerable attention devoted to populist actors and shifts in public opinion due to the refugee crisis have left only moderate marks in political communication within the mainstream party system.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1866802X2110051
Author(s):  
André Borges

Although comparative research has relied heavily on electoral volatility as a proxy for party system institutionalisation (PSI), this measure cannot account for the patterns of interparty interactions that are key to determine the degree of party system stability. I develop a new measure – the party bloc volatility (PBV) index – to account for consistency in the ideological positions and in the partisan composition of the government and opposition blocs. I demonstrate the limitations of the index of electoral volatility by analysing the case of Brazil. Although electoral volatility substantially decreased between 1994 and 2010, the patterns of interparty alliances became less and less predictable from 2002 onwards, as party fragmentation increased while interparty ideological differences decreased. In combination with a major economic and political crisis, these trends led to the discrediting of the established parties and thus favoured the rise of the extreme right in the 2018 elections.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 547-563
Author(s):  
Hans Lauge Hansen

The aim of this article is to apply the concept of agonism to the study of migration and migration narratives in order to shed new light upon a complex field and contribute to the countering of neo-nationalist right-wing populism. Following Chantal Mouffe, the author argues that agonistic narrative traits can be found in already existing cultural products that are able to unsettle the existing identity positions of the hegemonic European identity discourse pitting the national citizen against the figure of the migrant, and/or create new identity positions and alliances across the ‘us’–’them’ divide. Agonistic narratives of migration are stories able simultaneously to counter the two complementary and hegemonic discourses on migration, the antagonistic, neo-nationalist discourse representing the migrant as a threat, and the humanitarian discourse representing the migrant as a victim. Instead, agonistic narratives aim to forge alliances through protest and activities against inequality and discrimination.


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