scholarly journals Collective narcissism and the weakening of American democracy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Keenan ◽  
Agnieszka Golec

The storming of the US Capitol and voter intimidation by Trump supporters has marked significant upheaval in American democracy. In three cross-sectional studies, we test the proposition that collective narcissism is associated with support for a populist leader to the point of disregard for democratic procedures and hostility towards others. In Study 1, conducted just before the 2020 Presidential elections, we examined the association of American collective narcissism with support for Trump’s presidency even if Donald Trump was to violate the democratic procedures while securing the re-election. In Study 2, conducted just after the Capitol attack, we examined the association between American collective narcissism and support for the attacks. In Study 3, we examined whether collective narcissism was associated with support for a populist leader, disregarding democratic procedures, in a minimal group setting deprived of any associations with particular political context. The results of the three studies converge to indicate that collective narcissism is most strongly (beyond variables commonly implicated in support for right-wing populism) associated with populist leadership to the extent of disregarding democratic norms. The narcissistic conception of the national ingroup is essential to our understanding of right-wing populism and its reactionary movements.

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter O. Ötsch ◽  
Stephan Pühringer

Abstract The article compares market fundamentalism and right-wing populism on the basis of its core patterns of thinking and reasoning. Based on an analysis of the work of important founders of market fundamental economic thinking and the arguments brought forward by leading right-wing populist we find many similarities of these two concepts in their "inner images". Thus, we develop a scheme of the similar dual social worlds of right-wing-populism and market fundamentalism and offer some recent examples of market fundamentalism and right-wing populism mutually reinforcing each other or serving as a gateway for each other. We then apply our scheme for the analysis of the recent political developments and its ideological roots in the US under Donald Trump. The main conclusion of this article is that market fundamentalism and right-wing populism together must be seen as two mutually reinforcing threats to democracy in the 21st century.


2021 ◽  
pp. 073112142110246
Author(s):  
Adam Mayer

In the last few decades, the United States has experienced several related and significant societal trends—the transition of the energy system away from coal, the intensification of partisan polarization, and the rise of a populist right-wing political ideology, perhaps best exemplified by the election of Donald Trump. We build Gramling and Freudenberg’s little-explored concept of “development channelization” to argue that nostalgic right-wing populism, grievances directed toward the federal government, and partisanship converge to potentially thwart efforts to transition and diversify rural economies. Populist nostalgia and blame are associated with support for expanding the collapsing coal industry but do not predict support for other types of development. There are patterns of partisan polarization in support for extractive industries and wind power, but many development options appear to be relatively nonpartisan. We discuss these findings in terms of populism, nostalgia, partisan polarization, and the potential for rural renewal in the United States.


2018 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 733-753 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos de la Torre

The twenty-first century could well become known as the populist century. No longer confined to Latin America or to the margins of European politics, populism has spread to Africa, Asia, and, with Donald Trump's election, to the cradle of liberal democracy. Even though it is uncertain what impact Trump's populism will have on American democracy, it is worth learning from Latin America, where populists have been in power from the 1930s and 1940s to the present. Even as Latin American populists like Juan Perón and Hugo Chávez included the poor and the nonwhite in the political community, they moved toward authoritarianism by undermining democracy from within. Are the foundations of American democracy and the institutions of civil society strong enough to resist US president Donald Trump's right-wing populism?


2021 ◽  
Vol VI (III) ◽  
pp. 59-71
Author(s):  
Muhammad Nadeem Mirza ◽  
Lubna Abid Ali ◽  
Irfan Hasnain Qaisrani

This study intends to explore the rise of Donald Trump to the White House. Why was Donald Trump considered a populist leader, and how did his populist rhetoric and actions impact the contours of American domestic and foreign policies? The study adopted qualitative exploratory and explanatory research techniques. Specific methods utilised to conduct the study remained political personality profiling. It finds that the populist leaders construct the binaries in the society by dividing the nation into two groups: �us� the people, against �them� the corrupt elite or other groups presented as a threat to the lives and livelihood of the nation. Though populism as a unique brand of politics remained active through most of the US history, yet these were only two occasions that populists were successful in winning the American presidential elections � Andrew Jackson in 1828 and Donald Trump in 2016. Structural and historical reasons became the biggest cause behind the election of Donald Trump, who successfully brought a revolution in American domestic and foreign policies. And if structural issues in the United States are not addressed, there is a clear chance that Trump � who is not withering away � will come back to contest and challenge any competitors in the 2024 presidential elections.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 370-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frances E. Lee

Does populism threaten American democracy, and if so, what is the nature of that threat? In dialogue with the comparative literature on populism, this article considers the opportunity structure available to populist parties and candidates in the American political system. I argue that compared to most other democracies, the US system offers much less opportunity for organized populist parties but more opportunity for populist candidacies. Today’s major parties may also be more vulnerable to populist insurgency than at other points in US history because of (1) changes in communications technology, (2) the unpopularity of mainstream parties and party leaders, and (3) representation gaps created by an increasingly racialized party system. Although no democratic system is immune to deterioration, the US constitutional system impedes authoritarian populism, just as it obstructs party power generally. But the vulnerability of the major parties to populist insurgency poses a threat to liberal democratic norms in the United States, just as it does elsewhere.


Populism ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-115
Author(s):  
Hamzah bin Zaid ◽  
Devin K. Joshi

AbstractWhile many scholars have studied how right-wing populist parties (RWPP) have recently increased their vote shares in national elections in many countries, fewer studies have assessed why some sub-national regions favor RWPP more than others. Addressing this gap in the literature, we analyze regional variation in voter support for one of Europe’s most successful RWPP, the Front National (FN) Party of France which recently made it to the second round of France’s 2017 presidential elections. Our research design examines electoral results across French regions between 1992 and 2017 through the lens of four case studies analyzing regions where the FN has been consistently popular, gained in popularity, declined in popularity, and been consistently unpopular. Comparing these diverse regional cases, our study concludes that regional unemployment, urban support, and to a lesser degree past voting behavior are significant demand-side factors behind regional voting for right wing populism.


Slavic Review ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (S1) ◽  
pp. S57-S65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Oates

The Russian and American media spheres converged to an unprecedented degree during the 2016 US presidential elections when reports of a possible dossier on Donald Trump emerged. This article considers the degree to which the media tactic of kompromat, which is the Russian abbreviation for “compromising material,” can infiltrate the US media ecology.


2001 ◽  
Vol 29 (56_suppl) ◽  
pp. 46-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Weinehall ◽  
C. Lewis ◽  
A.N. Nafziger ◽  
P.L. Jenkins ◽  
T.A. Erb ◽  
...  

Objectives: There is a need among healthcare providers to acquire more knowledge about small-scale and low budget community intervention programmes. This paper compares risk factor outcomes in Swedish and US intervention programmes for the prevention of cardiovascular disease (CVD). The aim was to explore how different intervention programme profiles affect outcome. Methods: Using a quasi-experimental design, trends in risk factors and estimated CVD risk in two intervention areas (Norsjö, Sweden and Otsego- Schoharie County, New York state) are compared with those in reference areas (Northern Sweden region and Herkimer County, New York state) using serial cross-sectional studies and panel studies. Results: The programmes were able to achieve significant changes in CVD risk factors that the local communities recognized as major concerns: changing eating habits in the Swedish population and reducing smoking in the US population. For the Swedish cross-sectional follow-up study cholesterol reduction was 12%, compared to 5% in the reference population ( p for trend differences < 0.000) . The significantly higher estimated CVD risk (as assessed by risk scores) at baseline in the intervention population was below that of the Swedish reference population after 5 years of intervention. The Swedish panel study provided the same results. In the US, both the serial cross-sectional and panel studies showed a >10% decline in smoking prevalence in the intervention population, while it increased slightly in the reference population. When pooling the serial cross-sectional studies the estimated risk reduction (using the Framingham risk equation) was significantly greater in the intervention populations compared to the reference populations. Conclusions: The overall pattern of risk reduction is consistent and suggests that the two different models of rural county intervention can contribute to significant risk reduction. The Swedish programme had its greatest effect on reduction of serum cholesterol levels whereas the US programme had its greatest effect on smoking prevention and cessation. These outcomes are consistent with programmatic emphases. Socially less privileged groups in these rural areas benefited as much or more from the interventions as those with greater social resources.


Author(s):  
Ruta Kazlauskaite ◽  
Niko Pyrhonen ◽  
Gwenaelle Bauvois

This article adopts a comparative qualitative approach to studying the rhetoric of injured pride in the coverage of Independence Day celebrations by the right-wing countermedia in Poland (wPolityce.pl) and the US (Breitbart News) from 2012 to 2018. In both countries, the number of countermedia articles on Independence Day proliferated in the aftermath of the election of the Law and Justice party (2015) and Donald Trump (2016). Based on the analysis of the narrative strategy for affective polarisation, we argue that the countermedia mobilise support from an electorate of ‘the disenfranchised’ by strategically invoking emotions of shame and pride. By positioning the radical right as a political force that shields ‘patriots’ from the leftist ‘pedagogy of shame’, the outlets instrumentalise the mobilising potential of shame by transforming it into righteous anger and pride. This strategy results in a mediated ‘emotional regime’ that offers guidelines for an acceptable emotional repertoire for the members of the nationally bound in-group.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1(S)) ◽  
pp. 36-47
Author(s):  
Daniel Abankwa

Populism in the 21st century became prominent in scholarly circles following Brexit and the 2016 electoral victory of Donald Trump. As democracy and globalization enthusiasts least anticipated these two monumental events in modern history, much emphasis came to be placed on the nature of populism and what conditions led to its manifestation in contemporary times. Working within this background, this study aims to review the ideational, political strategy and discursive approaches to the populism phenomenon and unpack the relative utility of each approach. I offer a thoughtful perspective that while the ideational approach’s “thin-centered” strand has the tendency to blur the boundaries of populism and lead scholars to accept “anything” as populism; it nevertheless enables us to comprehensively capture populism usage in multiple contexts. Further, I advance the notion that the 2020 electoral defeat of Donald Trump should not be misconstrued as the end or weakening of right-wing populism; the present state of American politics makes it ripe for populism resurgence.


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