Flight Deck Task Management: A Cognitive Engineering Analysis

Author(s):  
William H. Rogers

Flight deck task management (TM) is a mostly cognitive function that is not well understood. There is increasing evidence of difficulties in unassisted pilot performance of TM, and it is anticipated that the complexity and scope of TM on future flight decks will increase. This all points to the need for a formal analysis of TM as part of the flight deck design process. To this end, cognitive engineering techniques were used to analyze the mental processes involved in flight deck TM. Normative and operational descriptions of TM were developed based, respectively, on previous analyses and pilot interviews. The two descriptions present interesting contrasts, but they are complementary, and in combination, provide a useful framework for beginning to address TM more formally within the flight deck design process.

Author(s):  
William Rogers ◽  
Kathleen Mosier

Several related concepts, including task management (TM), agenda management, and workload management, have recently been developed to describe a major function performed by pilots on commercial flight decks. This function is related to the fact that real-time operation of complex systems often involves multiple tasks which must be performed concurrently or in rapid succession, and therefore, must be managed. It is not that this function is new. It is more that we are better able, with recent advances in cognitive psychology and associated tools and methods, to identify and quantify it. While TM appears to compose an increasingly large part of the flight crew's role on the flight deck, our understanding of it is in its infancy, and it has been largely overlooked in flight deck function, task, and information requirements analyses. Thus it is not systematically considered in the design process. This symposium explicitly addresses task management as a high level flight deck function. The basic premise is that we must thoroughly understand what TM is, how pilots currently perform it on the flight deck, and what problems occur in pilot-performed TM, before we can address TM issues with a human-centered design approach. This symposium consists of four papers which seek to describe TM processes and document TM practices and problems in real flight deck environments. The Rogers paper provides normative and operational descriptions of task management that provide useful insights into the set of processes that compose TM and the way that pilots view TM in a real-time setting. His distinction of strategic and tactical TM, based on the time-constraints associated with a particular flight situation, may prove useful in determining the types of design aids that are appropriate under different flight conditions. Pre-planning and contingency planning aids may benefit strategic TM while allocation, prioritization, and memory aids may benefit tactical TM. The Schutte and Trujillo paper and the Latorella paper provide data from full-mission simulation studies that quantify TM activities and problems in non-normal and normal flight, respectively. The Schutte and Trujillo paper suggests that subjects spend considerable time performing TM during non-normal situations, and those subjects that perform best in fault and mission management tasks seem to use a common rule of thumb (aviate, navigate, communicate, manage systems) to determine the order in which initial monitoring and situation assessment tasks occur, and a situation/event-dependent strategy to determine the order that particular discrete tasks should be performed. Application of inappropriate strategies in ordering tasks appears to contribute to operational errors. The Latorella paper investigates an aspect of TM, interruption management, by quantifying deleterious effects of interruptions on procedural tasks during descent. She found over 50% more errors (omissions, misorderings, or redundantly performed activities) occur when procedures are interrupted than when not interrupted. She also found that subjects spent a greater proportion of time engaging in unnecessary flight path management during interrupted procedure conditions than uninterrupted conditions. Finally, she reported that rather than slowing procedure performance, interruptions tended to hasten performance on remaining procedural tasks. This could be related to the observation reported in the Rogers paper that pilots seem to use a TM practice of hurrying the pace of task performance during tactical TM, when there are pressing time constraints. The Funk and McCoy paper describes an on-going effort to: (1) document agenda management errors in aviation accidents and incidents; (2) develop a formal normative model of agenda management; and (3) facilitate agenda management. Funk and McCoy take a broader perspective of task management, re-naming it “agenda management” to include activities performed by humans (i.e., tasks) and functions performed by any goal-directed “actor,” human or automated. Thus agenda management includes management of goals, functions, actor assignments and resource allocations. This is the most formal, complete analysis of task or agenda management activities to date. The level of detail provided here is necessary before human-centered TM aids can be designed. In combination, these studies begin to provide a basis for understanding the heretofore neglected flight deck function of task management. This understanding, at both a conceptual and an operational level, is required before TM can be systematically addressed within the flight deck design process.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Chow ◽  
Stephen Yortsos ◽  
Najmedin Meshkati

This article focuses on a major human factors–related issue that includes the undeniable role of cultural factors and cockpit automation and their serious impact on flight crew performance, communication, and aviation safety. The report concentrates on the flight crew performance of the Boeing 777–Asiana Airlines Flight 214 accident, by exploring issues concerning mode confusion and autothrottle systems. It also further reviews the vital role of cultural factors in aviation safety and provides a brief overview of past, related accidents. Automation progressions have been created in an attempt to design an error-free flight deck. However, to do that, the pilot must still thoroughly understand every component of the flight deck – most importantly, the automation. Otherwise, if pilots are not completely competent in terms of their automation, the slightest errors can lead to fatal accidents. As seen in the case of Asiana Flight 214, even though engineering designs and pilot training have greatly evolved over the years, there are many cultural, design, and communication factors that affect pilot performance. It is concluded that aviation systems designers, in cooperation with pilots and regulatory bodies, should lead the strategic effort of systematically addressing the serious issues of cockpit automation, human factors, and cultural issues, including their interactions, which will certainly lead to better solutions for safer flights.


Author(s):  
Tibor Bosse ◽  
Catholijn M. Jonker ◽  
Jan Treur

AbstractThis paper presents a formal analysis of design process dynamics. Such a formal analysis is a prerequisite to come to a formal theory of design and for the development of automated support for the dynamics of design processes. The analysis was geared toward the identification of dynamic design properties at different levels of aggregation. This approach is specifically suitable for component-based design processes. A complicating factor for supporting the design process is that not only the generic properties of design must be specified, but also the language chosen should be rich enough to allow specification of complex properties of the system under design. This requires a language rich enough to operate at these different levels. The Temporal Trace Language used in this paper is suitable for that. The paper shows that the analysis at the level of a design process as a whole and at subprocesses thereof is precise enough to allow for automatic simulation. Simulation allows the modeler to manipulate the specifications of the system under design to better understand the interlevel relationships in his design. The approach is illustrated by an example.


2000 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 69-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Baker ◽  
S. D. Brennan ◽  
M. Husni

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