EXPRESS: A meta-analysis of the effects of episodic future thinking on delay discounting

2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110662
Author(s):  
Jun-yan Ye ◽  
Qing-yu Ding ◽  
Ji-fang Cui ◽  
Zhe Liu ◽  
Lu-xia Jia ◽  
...  

Delay discounting (DD) refers to the phenomenon in which the subjective value of future rewards is reduced over time. There are individual differences in the DD rate, and increased discounting has been observed in those with various psychiatric disorders. Episodic future thinking (EFT) is the act of vividly imagining events that may happen in the future. Studies have shown that EFT could reduce DD, although inconsistent results have been reported. The aim of this meta-analysis was to clarify the efficacy with which EFT reduces DD and to identify potential moderators. Forty-seven studies (including 63 contrasts) were included in the final analysis. EFT was found to significantly reduce DD (Hedges’ g =0.52). Moderator analysis showed that positive EFT (g=0.64) was more effective in reducing DD than EFT with the valence not specifically mentioned (g=0.28), and EFT with neutral or negative valence (g=-0.03). In addition, several factors related to the control task and DD task were related to the efficacy of EFT to reduce DD. These findings have implications for using EFT to reduce DD in the future.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rebecca Olsen

<p>Delay discounting refers to the fact that rewards lose their value if they are delayed. Excessive delay discounting is associated with various health-related problems such as over-eating and substance abuse. One phenomenon shown to reduce delay discounting is Episodic Future Thinking (EFT; imagining personal future events). Across multiple experiments and a meta-analysis, the current thesis examined the reliability of the effect of EFT on delay discounting and also sought to clarify the components of EFT that are necessary to reduce delay discounting.  Experiment 1 replicated the EFT effect using a common titrating-amount procedure, and the meta-analysis based on 40 independent studies confirmed that EFT has a reliable, medium-sized effect on delay discounting. The meta-analysis also assessed the robustness of the EFT effect across various methodological features and participant characteristics. A multiple meta-regression revealed that the between-study variability in the size of the EFT effect was accounted for by study design and type of discounting measure. Within-subjects design studies had significantly smaller effect sizes than between-subjects design studies. Studies that used k as a discounting rate measure had significantly smaller effect sizes than studies that used area under the discounting curve or other atheoretical discounting measures. The size of the EFT effect was robust across different participant characteristics and ages, suggesting that EFT may be utilized as an effective intervention for a variety of age groups and impulsive behaviors.  Experiments 2A, 2B and 2C assessed the suitability of an alternative and briefer delay discounting procedure (in which participants simply report their indifference points) for subsequent EFT experiments. The report indifference points procedure produced a high percentage of invalid data, a finding that was replicated across all three experiments. We therefore continued to use the well-established titrating-amount procedure in subsequent studies.  Experiment 3A found that episodic past thinking (imagining personal past events) and semantic future thinking (estimating what a person could buy with the larger, delayed amount) had no effect on discounting, indicating that both episodic thinking and future thinking are necessary components of the EFT effect. Experiment 3A results also indicated that financial relevance alone is not sufficient to reducing discounting. Experiment 3B found that the future events also need to be personally relevant to reduce discounting, and that participants perceived EFT to reduce their discounting by primarily making the larger, delayed reward more valuable. We also showed that demand characteristics, where participants change their behavior to conform to the researcher’s expectations, are an unlikely explanation for the EFT effects found in Experiments 3A and 3B. Further research is warranted to form a better understanding of the mechanism(s) through which EFT reduces delay discounting.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rebecca Olsen

<p>Delay discounting refers to the fact that rewards lose their value if they are delayed. Excessive delay discounting is associated with various health-related problems such as over-eating and substance abuse. One phenomenon shown to reduce delay discounting is Episodic Future Thinking (EFT; imagining personal future events). Across multiple experiments and a meta-analysis, the current thesis examined the reliability of the effect of EFT on delay discounting and also sought to clarify the components of EFT that are necessary to reduce delay discounting.  Experiment 1 replicated the EFT effect using a common titrating-amount procedure, and the meta-analysis based on 40 independent studies confirmed that EFT has a reliable, medium-sized effect on delay discounting. The meta-analysis also assessed the robustness of the EFT effect across various methodological features and participant characteristics. A multiple meta-regression revealed that the between-study variability in the size of the EFT effect was accounted for by study design and type of discounting measure. Within-subjects design studies had significantly smaller effect sizes than between-subjects design studies. Studies that used k as a discounting rate measure had significantly smaller effect sizes than studies that used area under the discounting curve or other atheoretical discounting measures. The size of the EFT effect was robust across different participant characteristics and ages, suggesting that EFT may be utilized as an effective intervention for a variety of age groups and impulsive behaviors.  Experiments 2A, 2B and 2C assessed the suitability of an alternative and briefer delay discounting procedure (in which participants simply report their indifference points) for subsequent EFT experiments. The report indifference points procedure produced a high percentage of invalid data, a finding that was replicated across all three experiments. We therefore continued to use the well-established titrating-amount procedure in subsequent studies.  Experiment 3A found that episodic past thinking (imagining personal past events) and semantic future thinking (estimating what a person could buy with the larger, delayed amount) had no effect on discounting, indicating that both episodic thinking and future thinking are necessary components of the EFT effect. Experiment 3A results also indicated that financial relevance alone is not sufficient to reducing discounting. Experiment 3B found that the future events also need to be personally relevant to reduce discounting, and that participants perceived EFT to reduce their discounting by primarily making the larger, delayed reward more valuable. We also showed that demand characteristics, where participants change their behavior to conform to the researcher’s expectations, are an unlikely explanation for the EFT effects found in Experiments 3A and 3B. Further research is warranted to form a better understanding of the mechanism(s) through which EFT reduces delay discounting.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Palombo ◽  
Christopher R Madan

How does imagining future events – whether positive or negative – influence our choices in the present? Prior work has shown the simulation of hypothetical future events, dubbed episodic future thinking, can alter the propensity to engage in delay discounting (the tendency to devalue future rewards) and does so in a valence specific manner. Some research shows that positive episodic future thinking reduces delay discounting, whereas negative future thinking augments it. However, more recent research indicates that both positive and negative episodic future thinking reduce delay discounting, suggesting an effect of episodic future thinking that is independent of valence (Bulley et al., 2019). In the present study, we sought to replicate and extend these latter findings. Here, participants (N = 604) completed an online study. In the baseline task, participants completed a delay discounting task. In the experimental task, they engaged in episodic future thinking before completing a second delay discounting task. Participants were randomly assigned to engage in either positive, neutral, or negative episodic future thinking. In accordance with Bulley et al., we found that episodic future thinking, regardless of valence, reduced delay discounting. Although episodic future thinking shifted decision-making in all conditions, the effect was stronger when participants engaged in positive episodic future thinking, even after accounting for personal relevance and vividness of imagined events. These findings suggest that episodic future thinking may promote future-oriented choices by contextualizing the future, and this effect is further strengthened when the future is tied to positive emotion.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Palombo ◽  
Christopher R Madan

How does imagining future events – whether positive or negative – influence our choices in the present? Prior work has shown the simulation of hypothetical future events, dubbed episodic future thinking, can alter the propensity to engage in delay discounting (the tendency to devalue future rewards) and does so in a valence specific manner. Some research shows that positive episodic future thinking reduces delay discounting, whereas negative future thinking augments it. However, more recent research indicates that both positive and negative episodic future thinking reduce delay discounting, suggesting an effect of episodic future thinking that is independent of valence (Bulley et al., 2019). In the present study, we sought to replicate and extend these latter findings. Here, participants (N = 604) completed an online study. In the baseline task, participants completed a delay discounting task. In the experimental task, they engaged in episodic future thinking before completing a second delay discounting task. Participants were randomly assigned to engage in either positive, neutral, or negative episodic future thinking. In accordance with Bulley et al., we found that episodic future thinking, regardless of valence, reduced delay discounting. Although episodic future thinking shifted decision-making in all conditions, the effect was stronger when participants engaged in positive episodic future thinking, even after accounting for personal relevance and vividness of imagined events. These findings suggest that episodic future thinking may promote future-oriented choices by contextualizing the future, and this effect is further strengthened when the future is tied to positive emotion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Yan Sze ◽  
Jeffrey S. Stein ◽  
Warren K. Bickel ◽  
Rocco A. Paluch ◽  
Leonard H. Epstein

Obesity is associated with steep discounting of the future and increased food reinforcement. Episodic future thinking (EFT), a type of prospective thinking, has been observed to reduce delay discounting (DD) and improve dietary decision making. In contrast, negative income shock (i.e., abrupt transitions to poverty) has been shown to increase discounting and may worsen dietary decision making. Scalability of EFT training and protective effects of EFT against simulated negative income shock on DD and demand for food were assessed. In two experiments, we showed online-administered EFT reliably reduced DD. Furthermore, EFT reduced DD and demand for fast foods even when challenged by negative income shock. Our findings suggest EFT is a scalable intervention that has implications for improving public health by reducing discounting of the future and demand for high energy dense food.


Author(s):  
Leonard H. Epstein ◽  
Rocco A. Paluch ◽  
Mathew J. Biondolillo ◽  
Jeff S. Stein ◽  
Teresa Quattrin ◽  
...  

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 256-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin A Conway ◽  
Catherine Loveday ◽  
Scott N Cole

Remembering and imagining are intricately related, particularly in imagining the future: episodic future thinking. It is proposed that remembering the recent past and imagining the near future take place in what we term the remembering–imagining system. The remembering–imagining system renders recently formed episodic memories and episodic imagined near-future events highly accessible. We suggest that this serves the purpose of integrating past, current, and future goal-related activities. When the remembering–imagining system is compromised, following brain damage and in psychological illnesses, the future cannot be effectively imagined and episodic future thinking may become dominated by dysfunctional images of the future.


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