Balancing International Trade Policy with National Security: The Dilemma of China and Foreign Direct Investment in the United States

2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-77
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Hemphill
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Trade Policy

Tiptoeing the Line Between National Security and Protectionism: A Comparative Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Screening in the United States and European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Jason Jacobs
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
National Security ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
The United States ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
The U.S

AbstractWeaponization of state-backed, foreign investments by China is an emerging national security threat in the United States and the European Union. The U.S. and E.U. have espoused similar policy goals—to address the threat without closing their markets to foreign direct investment—while fostering increased cooperation between allied partners in screening transactions.On the surface, the recent, China-specific measures taken by the U.S. and the investment screening framework adopted by the E.U. appear reflective of an alignment of those policy goals. Indeed, many commentators have suggested that is exactly what is happening. However, closer examination reveals a stark divergence. The U.S. has a robust screening mechanism that has evolved into a weapon of economic warfare. The E.U. meanwhile, remains a patchwork of conflicting—or nonexistent—national regulations overlaid by a comparatively toothless investment screening framework.There is a tendency to attribute this divergence to structural differences between the United States and European Union. This in-depth comparison of U.S. and E.U. investment screening mechanisms exposes a split that goes beyond application and into actual policy. This revelation should temper expectations that the E.U. is equipping itself to block transactions that are of concern to the U.S.

Competitively-Linked and Non-Competitively-Linked Negotiations: Bilateral Trade Policy Negotiations in Australia, Singapore and the United States

2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Crump
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Case Analysis ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Trade Policy

AbstractIt is unusual to find a negotiation not linked to at least one other negotiation. In some domains, such as international trade policy, we can identify negotiation networks with parties simultaneously involved in negotiations in global, multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade policy settings. A single party (i.e., a national government) will manage similar issues in all four settings and also manage these same issues with multiple parties in a single setting. International trade policy is one of many "linkage-rich" environments.This study examines the relationship between two discrete but linked treaty negotiations: the Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (SAFTA) and the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (USSFTA). Case analysis identifies five structural factors that enhance the potential and fundamentally shape the nature of negotiation linkage dynamics. If linkage occurs then role theory can be employed to define two functional role types, a link-pin party (Singapore in this study) and linked parties (Australia and the United States). Such theory and case analysis support the development of propositions and help establish guidance for managing negotiation behavior. Key structural characteristics that appear to create linkage dynamics in this study are used to build a four-part structural framework that maps the universe of negotiation-linkage phenomena and determines the fundamental nature of four discrete linkage conditions. This framework also provides descriptive and prescriptive guidance for managing strategy and power in linked negotiations.

The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence

2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonardo Baccini ◽  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Stephen Weymouth
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Multinational Corporations ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
The United States ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Distributional Consequences

AbstractWhile increasing trade and foreign direct investment, international trade agreements create winners and losers. Our paper examines the distributional consequences of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) at the firm level. We contend that PTAs expand trade among the largest and most productive multinationals by lowering preferential tariffs. We examine data covering the near universe of US foreign direct investment and disaggregated tariff data from PTAs signed by the United States. Our results indicate that US preferential tariffs increase sales to the United States from the most competitive subsidiaries of multinational corporations operating in partner countries. We also find increases in market concentration in partner countries following preferential liberalization with the United States. By demonstrating that the gains from preferential liberalization are unevenly distributed across firms, we shed new light on the firm-level, economic sources of political mobilization over international trade and investment policies.

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