scholarly journals Can internal tobacco industry documents be useful for studying the UK alcohol industry?

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Hawkins ◽  
Jim McCambridge
Thorax ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony A Laverty ◽  
Christopher Millett ◽  
Nicholas S Hopkinson ◽  
Filippos T Filippidis

Standardised packaging of tobacco products is intended to reduce the appeal of smoking, but the tobacco industry claims this increases illicit trade. We examined the percentage of people reporting being offered illicit cigarettes before and after full implementation of standardised packaging in the UK, Ireland and France and compared this to other European Union countries. Reported ever illicit cigarette exposure fell from 19.8% to 18.1% between 2015 and 2018 in the three countries fully implementing the policy, and from 19.6% to 17.0% in control countries (p for difference=0.320). Standardised packaging does not appear to increase the availability of illicit cigarettes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (Supplement_5) ◽  
Author(s):  
M Moore AM

Abstract Background The alcohol industry has taken a page from the tobacco industry play book in an attempt to resist regulation through delay, self-regulation and effective lobbying. The global alcohol industry is constantly seeking to increase sales of harmful products through widespread marketing, the targeting of young people, and resisting regulatory action. Methods An assessment of the number of lobbyists engaged in one form of another to influence members of Parliament in Australia is being conducted to provide an insight into the attempts to influence alcohol policy. This follows a scan of the lobbyists' register by Daube et al in 2018 that found the while the tobacco industry had 20 direct lobbyists and 14 indirect, the junk food industry 33 direct and 13 indirect, the most dominant was the alcohol industry with 43 direct and 23 indirect. A careful re-examination of the register in 2020 is expected to reveal an increase in these numbers. There will also be an examination of the State and Territory registers in an attempt to understand the overall numbers of people specifically attempting to influence governments. Discussion This particular examination is focussed on the Australian Parliament/s. However, the message will be similar world-wide. Companies such as Diageo have a significant share of the world market with net sales, for example, being 25% of scotch, 16% of beer and 11% of vodka. Their “Drinkiq” website claims “Diageo is committed to preventing and reducing alcohol abuse around the world”. However, other business websites illustrate that their prime objective is to sell more alcohol. Presentation The presentation will focus on the importance of countering the efforts of industry in increasing availability of alcohol. It will also provide a series of steps that public health advocates can take in order to persuade governments of the importance of protecting community health through appropriate regulation of the marketing and sales of alcohol. Key messages The alcohol industry seeks to increase sales while arguing it is protecting health. Public health advocates do have the tools to counter approaches by alcohol companies.


Author(s):  
June YY Leung ◽  
Sally Casswell

Background The World Health Organization (WHO) has engaged in consultations with the alcohol industry in global alcohol policy development, including currently a draft action plan to strengthen implementation of the Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol. WHO’s Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA) is an organization-wide policy that aims to manage potential conflicts of interest in WHO’s interactions with private sector entities, non-governmental institutions, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions. Methods We analysed the alignment of WHO’s consultative processes with non-state actors on "the way forward" for alcohol policy and a global alcohol action plan with FENSA. We referred to publicly accessible WHO documents, including the Alcohol, Drugs and Addictive Behaviours Unit website, records of relevant meetings, and other documents relevant to FENSA. We documented submissions to two web-based consultations held in 2019 and 2020 by type of organization and links to the alcohol industry. Results WHO’s processes to conduct due diligence, risk assessment and risk management as required by FENSA appeared to be inadequate. Limited information was published on nonstate actors, primarily the alcohol industry, that participated in the consultations, including their potential conflicts of interest. No minutes were published for WHO’s virtual meeting with the alcohol industry, suggesting a lack of transparency. Organizations with known links to the tobacco industry participated in both web-based consultations, despite FENSA’s principle of non-engagement with tobacco industry actors. Conclusion WHO’s consultative processes have not been adequate to address conflicts of interest in relation to the alcohol industry, violating the principles of FENSA. Member states must ensure that WHO has the resources to implement and is held accountable for appropriate and consistent safeguards against industry interference in the development of global alcohol policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-140
Author(s):  
Timea R Partos ◽  
Rosemary Hiscock ◽  
Anna B Gilmore ◽  
J Robert Branston ◽  
Sara Hitchman ◽  
...  

Background Increasing tobacco prices through taxation is very effective for reducing smoking prevalence and inequalities. For optimum effect, understanding how the tobacco industry and smokers respond is essential. Tobacco taxation changes occurred in the UK over the study period, including annual increases, a shift in structure from ad valorem to specific taxation and relatively higher increases on roll-your-own tobacco than on factory-made cigarettes. Objectives Understanding tobacco industry pricing strategies in response to tax changes and the impact of tax on smokers’ behaviour, including tax evasion and avoidance, as well as the effect on smoking inequalities. Synthesising findings to inform how taxation can be improved as a public health intervention. Design Qualitative analysis and evidence synthesis (commercial and Nielsen data) and longitudinal and aggregate cross-sectional analyses (International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation Project data). Setting The UK, from 2002 to 2016. Data sources and participants Data were from the tobacco industry commercial literature and retail tobacco sales data (Nielsen, New York, NY, USA). Participants were a longitudinal cohort (with replenishment) of smokers and ex-smokers from 10 surveys of the International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation Project (around 1500 participants per survey). Main outcome measures (1) Tobacco industry pricing strategies, (2) sales volumes and prices by segments over time and (3) smokers’ behaviours, including products purchased, sources, brands, consumption, quit attempts, success and sociodemographic differences. Review methods Tobacco industry commercial literature was searched for mentions of tobacco products and price segments, with 517 articles extracted. Results The tobacco industry increased prices on top of tax increases (overshifting), particularly on premium products, and, recently, the tobacco industry overshifted more on cheap roll-your-own tobacco than on factory-made cigarettes. Increasingly, price rises were from industry revenue generation rather than tax. The tobacco industry raised prices gradually to soften impact; this was less possible with larger tax increases. Budget measures to reduce cheap product availability failed due to new cheap factory-made products, price marking and small packs. In 2014, smokers could buy factory-made (roll-your-own tobacco) cigarettes at real prices similar to 2002. Exclusive roll-your-own tobacco and mixed factory-made cigarettes and roll-your-own tobacco use increased, whereas exclusive factory-made cigarette use decreased, alongside increased cheap product use, rather than quitting. Quitting behaviours were associated with higher taxes. Smokers consumed fewer factory-made cigarettes and reduced roll-your-own tobacco weight over time. Apparent illicit purchasing did not increase. Disadvantaged and dependent smokers struggled with tobacco affordability and were more likely to smoke cheaper products, but disadvantage did not affect quit success. Limitations Different for each data set; triangulation increased confidence. Conclusions The tobacco industry overshifted taxes and increased revenues, even when tax increases were high. Therefore, tobacco taxes can be further increased to reduce price differentials and recoup public health costs. Government strategies on illicit tobacco appear effective. Large, sudden tax increases would reduce the industry’s ability to manipulate prices, decrease affordability and increase quitting behaviours. More disadvantaged, and dependent, smokers need more help with quitting. Future work Assessing the impact of tax changes made since 2014; changing how tax changes are introduced (e.g. sudden intermittent or smaller continuous); and tax changes on tobacco initiation. Funding This project was funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Public Health Research programme and will be published in full in Public Health Research; Vol. 8, No. 6. See the NIHR Journals Library website for further project information.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Holden ◽  
Benjamin Hawkins ◽  
Jim McCambridge

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (Supplement) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Silver ◽  
Rosemary Hiscock
Keyword(s):  

1986 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 598-600
Author(s):  
Joseph C Johnson

Abstract The smoking and analytical methods used by government and tobacco industry laboratories are the result of many years of collaborative work within the industry and through international bodies such as the International Standards Organization. Recently, some publications have criticized the validity and scientific soundness of these procedures. It is shown that such criticisms are totally unfounded by reviewing the work that led to the adoption of the current technique. Tar tables, published by the UK Health Departments are valid in ranking brands in order of their yields, while not necessarily reflecting the absolute tar delivery to the smoker. These tables are intended to and do provide a relevant guide for smokers about the proportional tar yields of UK cigarettes.


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