scholarly journals Estimation of radiation-induced health hazards from a “dirty bomb” attack with radiocesium under different assault and rescue conditions

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexis Rump ◽  
Stefan Eder ◽  
Cornelius Hermann ◽  
Andreas Lamkowski ◽  
Patrick Ostheim ◽  
...  

AbstractIn the case of a terrorist attack by a “dirty bomb”, blast injuries, external irradiation and the incorporation of radioactivity are to be expected. Departing from information about the radiological attack scenario with cesium-137 in the U.S. National Scenario Planning Guide, we estimated the radiological doses absorbed. Similar calculations were performed for a smaller plume size and a detonation in a subway. For conditions as described in the U.S. scenario, the committed effective dose amounted to a maximum of 848 mSv, even for very unfavorable conditions. Red bone marrow equivalent doses are insufficient to induce acute radiation sickness (ARS). In the case of a smaller plume size, the ARS threshold may be exceeded in some cases. In a subway bombing, doses are much higher and the occurrence of ARS should be expected. The health hazards from a dirty bomb attack will depend on the location and the explosive device. The derived Haddon matrix indicates that preparing for such an event includes education of all the medical staff about radiation effects, the time lines of radiation damages and the treatment priorities. Further determinants of the outcome include rapid evacuation even from difficult locations, the availability of a specific triage tool to rapidly identify victims at risk for ARS, the availability of an antidote stockpile and dedicated hospital beds to treat seriously irradiated victims.

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 227-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexis Rump, MD, PhD, MHBA ◽  
Daniela Stricklin, PhD ◽  
Andreas Lamkowski, MD ◽  
Stefan Eder, MD ◽  
Michael Abend, MD, PhD ◽  
...  

Objective: In radiological emergencies, there is a risk of radionuclide incorporation. The radiological doses absorbed can be reduced by decorporation treatment. Antidote requirements depend on the scenario and treatment strategy (“urgent approach”: immediate treatment of all patients with possible incorporation; “precautionary approach”: treatment only after confirmation of incorporation). We calculated the number of daily antidote doses for different scenarios and the differences in outcome for both treatment strategies.Design: The number of potentially contaminated victims was varied from 1,000 to 60,000 (a maximum that might seem plausible for “dirty bomb” scenarios in Germany), the proportion of patients actually needing decorporation treatment from 0.1 percent to 100 percent, the radioactive screening capacities from 250 to 2,500 people/day and treatment duration from 10 to 90 days. The outcomes were assessed as total statistical lifetime saved assuming an inhalation of 1 mCi cesium-137 and the achievable dose reductions by a Prussian Blue treatment.Results: Assuming 1 percent of the potentially contaminated people actually needing treatment, applying an “urgent approach” the requirements for 1,000 victims range from 1,100 to 3,400 and for 60,000 victims from 489,000 to 4,400,000 daily doses, depending on treatment duration and screening capacities. The “urgent approach” is associated with larger stockpile requirements than the “precautionary approach”, up to several hundred times in large-scale scenarios if the proportion of people actually needing treatment is low. The impact of the screening capacities is particularly important in large-scale scenarios, a low proportion of people needing treatment and extended treatment duration. The outcome is better for an “urgent approach” particularly in large-scale scenarios and low screening capacities.Conclusions: If only a small fraction of the victims actually needs treatment, their timely identification by enhancing screening capacities may be the most efficacious way to reduce antidote requirements. In large-scale scenarios, it might be necessary to abandon the medically preferable “urgent approach” for an antidote-sparing “precautionary approach”.  


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexis Rump ◽  
Patrick Ostheim ◽  
Stefan Eder ◽  
Cornelius Hermann ◽  
Michael Abend ◽  
...  

Abstract Background In radiological emergencies with radionuclide incorporation, decorporation treatment is particularly effective if started early. Treating all people potentially contaminated (“urgent treatment”) may require large antidote stockpiles. An efficacious way to reduce antidote requirements is by using radioactivity screening equipment. We analyzed the suitability of such equipment for triage purposes and determined the most efficient mix of screening units and antidote daily doses. Methods The committed effective doses corresponding to activities within the detection limits of monitoring portals and mobile whole-body counters were used to assess their usefulness as triage tools. To determine the optimal resource mix, we departed from a large-scale scenario (60,000 victims) and based on purchase prices of antidotes and screening equipment in Germany, we calculated efficiencies of different combinations of medical countermeasure resources by data envelopment analysis. Cost-effectiveness was expressed as the costs per life year saved and compared to risk reduction opportunities in other sectors of society as well as the values of a statistical life. Results Monitoring portals are adequate instruments for a sensitive triage after cesium-137 exposure with a high screening throughput. For the detection of americium-241 whole-body counters with a lower daily screening capacity per unit are needed. Assuming that 1% of the potentially contaminated patients actually need decorporation treatment, an efficient resource mix includes 6 monitoring portals and 25 mobile whole-body counters. The optimum mix depends on price discounts and in particular the fraction of victims actually needing treatment. The cost-effectiveness of preparedness for a “dirty bomb” attack is less than for common health care, but costs for a life year saved are less than for many risk-reduction interventions in the environmental sector. Conclusion To achieve economic efficiency a high daily screening capacity is of major importance to substantially decrease the required amount of antidote doses. Among the determinants of the number of equipment units needed, the fraction of the potentially contaminated victims that actually needs treatment is the most difficult to assess. Judging cost-effectiveness of the preparedness for “dirty bomb” attacks is an issue of principle that must be dealt with by political leaders.


Birth ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 287-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Glover Blackwell ◽  
Lois Salisbury

2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas L. McGehee ◽  
Victor F. Medina ◽  
Rochelle M. Martino ◽  
Anthony J. Bednar ◽  
Charles A. Weiss ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Simon Reich ◽  
Peter Dombrowski

This chapter begins with a personal vignette from one of the authors (Reich) regarding scenario planning and its relationship to strategizing. In this chapter, we outline the major strands of contemporary US grand strategy, and identify the conditions under which each one is employed by policymakers and, ultimately, the U.S. Navy. It then examines theories that may explain why a series of strategies run simultaneously before comprehensively examining the contemporary contending variants of grand strategy. It outlines three major variants and then distinguish two sub-categories within each variant for a total of six. It compares and contrasts the key elements of each to illustrate how – despite the fact that they may share features –is ultimately configures in a unique way.


Author(s):  
B. King ◽  
Y. Desmedt

Today a significant amount of research has focused on trying to apply the advances in information technology to governmental services. One endeavor has been the attempt to apply it to “electronic voting.” Unfortunately, while questionable secure e-voting technology has been widely deployed, the same cannot be said for cryptographic based ones. There is one type of “voting” which has received only limited attention concerning applying these technology advances, the type of voting that takes place within a legislative body. At first glance, it may not appear difficult to institute electronic voting in a legislature, for it may seem that one only needs to apply the traditional security mechanisms that are used to safeguard networked systems, but as we soon outline there will be significant security risks associated with an electronic legislature. One of our concerns is that entities may attempt to implement an electronic version of a legislature without realizing all the risks and implementing all the needed security mechanisms. In fact, there have been occasional instances of some entities attempting to create some electronic/digital form of legislature, for example (Weidenbener, 2004). In any legislative vote, the legislature’s ability to pass or to not pass legislation should be interpreted as the legislature deciding whether to “sign the proposal” into “law.” Thus, “law” is a signature; anyone can verify that a “proposal” is a “law” by applying the signature verification procedure. As we move towards electronic applications of governmental services, it is only natural when this is applied towards legislatures we will replace the “written law” by a “digital signature” (here the use of the term law can be replaced by any internal regulation and a legislature by any regulatory body). The underlying aspect of the article is the security considerations that need to be applied when this is implemented. The question why consider an electronic legislature is important. The fundamental reasons for applying today’s information technology to government and its services have always focused on that it would bring improved services and allow greater accessibility of government to its constituents. An electronic legislature would most certainly improve the legislative service. It will allow for the legislators to be mobile, they will no longer need to be tied to the legislative house to provide representation. Many industrial employers allow their workers to telecommute to work, it is a realization by the employers that these workers are valuable, as well as a recognition that the workforce and the time constraints on the workforce has changed. In many cases, without this option, these workers may leave the workplace. This same reasoning of a valued worker should be applied to our legislators. Further, it does not make sense that today we would allow a subset of the legislature to make and pass laws due to absenteeism, especially in light that many of the required mechanisms to bring about a mobile “electronic legislature” are available. One can argue that by allowing legislators to occasionally telecommute will provide an improved workforce (this argument is motivated by the same reason that private industry utilizes “telecommuting”). We also observe that an electronic legislature should provide the constituents greater access to their legislators. A final argument for an electronic legislature is that it will provide continuation of government in the case of some drastic action like a terrorist attack. In the fall of 2001, the legislative branch of the U.S. federal government came under two attacks. The first attack was performed by Al Qaeda operatives (who it is speculated intended to fly one of the planes into the U.S. capital), and a second attack by an unknown entity who contaminated parts of the U.S. senate (and it offices) with anthrax spores. This second attack was successful in that it denied the Senate the ability to convene for several days. Although such terrorist’s attacks on the legislative branch may appear novel, at least in the U.S., such attacks have been precipitated in other countries for some years (PBS, 2001). The U.S. government has recognized the need to develop a means for the continuity of government in the wake of such disasters (Continuity of Government Commission, 2002), one such solution is to utilize an e-legislature.


Author(s):  
E. J. Butcher ◽  
J. W. Roe

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and subsequent events has effected perceptions of the terrorist threat to the U.S. in general, and nuclear power plants in particular. These concerns have given rise to calls by government and private orga nizations for reevaluations of both the nature of the threat and protection against it. This paper suggests a general framework for a balanced approach to these reevaluations and highlights some practical and cost effective approaches for improving nuclear power plant safeguards protection.


Risk Analysis ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Gordon ◽  
James E. Moore ◽  
Ji Young Park ◽  
Harry W. Richardson

2002 ◽  
Vol 713 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Fortner ◽  
Scott Aase ◽  
Don Reed

ABSTRACTWe demonstrate the use of transmission electron microscopy (TEM) to study the effects of beta-decay of radioactive 137Cs to 137Ba in crystalline pollucite (CsAlSi2O6). Most prior work on radiation effects in materials has focused on structural damage from alpha radiation. Beta radiation, on the other hand, causes little atomic displacement, but the decay transmutation, that is, the radioactive decay of a radioisotope to an isotope of another element, results in progeny with different the valence and ionic radius. Cesium-137, a fission product of uranium, is a major contaminant at U.S. Department of Energy production facilities. Pollucite is an aluminosilicate ceramic with potential use for long-term storage of 137Cs. We focused on one of several available 137Cs sources originally fabricated in the 1970s and 1980s. These sources were small, sealed, stainless steel capsules containing pollucite in which varying amounts of the natural Cs had been replaced by radioactive 137Cs (t1/2 = 30.13 years). The sample chosen for TEM examination, aged for nearly 20 years, contained the most radiogenic barium and was expected to show the largest radiation effects. Bright field transmission images revealed a homogeneous crystalline matrix, with no evidence of distinct Ba phases or ex-solution phenomena resulting from the 137Cs transmutation. Electron diffraction patterns obtained from several portions of the sample were consistent with literature values for pollucite. These data suggest that little substantial damage was done to the crystal structure of this sample, despite the transmutation of nearly 1.5% of the total cesium to barium over the elapsed 20 years. Although our observations are limited, to our knowledge these are the only available data in which transmutation effects have been isolated from other radiation damage phenomena.


Chemosphere ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 1153-1157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie C. Ford ◽  
William A. Jester ◽  
Samual M. Griffith ◽  
Roger A. Morse ◽  
Robert R. Zall ◽  
...  

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