Evaluation and Strategy: Strengthening Indonesia Council of Representatives of the Regions

The Council of Representatives of the Regions emerged through the 1945 Constitution third amendment. The Council of Representatives of the Regions intended to represent regional interests and regional society in the central legislation making processes and products, to perform checks and balances principle on The People’s Representative Council which is a political representation that brings and struggles the aspirations and interests of political parties at the central level. The Council of Representatives of the Regions also acts as a guardian of decentralization and regional autonomy. The most fundamental problem for The Council of Representatives of the Regions is its institutional weaknesses. In legislation weaknesses terms, budgeting, and supervision have affected The Council of Representatives of the Regions in maximizing its performances. The Law regarding Indonesia Legislative Branch does not mandate legislation as The Council of Representatives of the Regions tasks. This provision can not be used as a guideline to describe the scope of duties, which are the limits of their authority in The Council of Representatives of the Regions order. On the other hand, after the Constitutional Court Decision Number 92/PUU-X/2012 and Number 79/PUU-XII/2014 issued, the relations that were later present were the three-party discussion model of The People’s Representative Council-The Council of Representatives of the Regions-President (Tripartite). Based on those facts, this article focuses on the evaluation of 15 years of The Council of Representatives of the Regions establishment and strategy to strengthen it.

A Typology of Advisory Bodies in Legislatures and Research Perspectives

IntroductionRigorous scientific advice processes are becoming increasingly important and often used to develop evidence-informed policymaking. Most of the work has focused on investigating advisory processes for the Executive rather than for the Legislative branch. In this contribution, we developed a typology and evaluated current and emerging trends in legislative scientific advice processes. AimsThe aims of this work are to i) Develop a typology to inform academics about key characteristics and insights that can lead to new valuable research questions about legislative science advice, ii) Provide policymakers with information about scientific advice processes in legislatures worldwide so that they can use it for developing new or expand legislative advisory processes, iii) Evaluate emerging trends in scientific advice processes in legislatures for future research or practitioners' work.MethodsWe systematically analyzed literature for publications between 2014 and 2020 using Google Scholar, EBSCO, ScienceDirect, ProQuest, and JSTOR. We used pre-defined terminology related to scientific advice in legislatures to search for peer-reviewed articles and complemented the information of the advisory scientific advisory bodies found using cross-references and grey literature. The unit of analysis for creating the typology and subsequent analysis was the legislative scientific advice body itself.ConclusionWe developed a typology that includes 12 categories defined to provide insights about the contextual background, mandate, structure, and process of advice of legislative advisory bodies. The analysis indicates that advisory bodies in different countries have a wide degree of politicization, with many advisory bodies being considerably politicized. Moreover, most of the work focused on advisory units is in western and high-income countries. There are open opportunities for research, such as doing further comparative analyzes and investigating staff roles in advisory bodies. Lastly, we found that foresight and horizon scanning methodologies were increasingly implemented in legislatures for participatory future-forward thinking advice and to set long-term priorities in agendas.

Introduction

This section introduces the topic by explaining the role that structure plays in protecting liberty and property rights. As illustrations, it explains how federalism offers a role for states and the national government to play in addressing pandemics, race discrimination, and criminal law. It explains how the states and federal government have adopted increasingly different forms of government over time. It then introduces the parts. Part I deals with the judicial branch. The second part of the book looks at current issues facing the executive branch in the state and federal systems. The third part of the book deals with the legislative branch. The fourth part of the book, all in Chapter 9, takes vertical separation of powers one step further: federalism within federalism. The fifth part of the book, all in Chapter 10, addresses the ultimate recourse of liberty: the freedom to change our fifty-one constitutions.

Are There “Sources of Resilience” When the Separation of Powers Breaks Down?

Jacob Levy describes three variants of the separation of powers in the 31st Annual McDonald Lecture in Constitutional Studies, only one of which is germane to this reflection. The first variant he describes is based solely on the independence of the judiciary from both the executive and legislative branches of governments; consequently, this variant encompasses both presidential and parliamentary systems under its conceptual ambit. Another variant, which Levy attributes to Montesquieu, envisages the separation of powers between executive, judicial, and legislative branches as a way of allowing for the “pooled”1 rule of “the one” (i.e. monarch), “the few” (i.e. aristocrats), and “the many” (i.e. the people). Levy also describes a distinctly American variant of the separation of powers undergirded by a system of checks and balances. This variant was designed to ensure “mutual monitoring between executive and legislative”2 and it vests the legislative branch with the power to impeach the executive in order to “maintain effective limits on the political power and the political ambition of the president.”3

De-Russification of Government as a Factor in the Disintegration of the USSR

In the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1990, the political inequality of the nationalities’ representation in institutions of governance was overcome, non-Russians’ participation in the power structures increased, and Russians’ role in administration correspondingly decreased. The increased non-Russian percentage in governance was mainly due to the introduction of the democratic principle in government formation, according to which ethnicities should participate in proportion to their number. By 1990 in the USSR overall, Russians had a slight majority in all power structures, corresponding roughly to their higher share in the country’s population. In the union republics, however, the situation was different. Only in the RSFSR did all peoples, Russian and non-Russian, participate in government administration in proportion to their numbers, following the democratic norm. Elsewhere, Russians were underrepresented and therefore discriminated against in all organs of power, including the legislative branch. Representatives of non-Russian titular nationalities, who on average filled two-thirds of all administrative positions, predominated in disproportion to their numbers. Given these representatives’ skill majority in legislative bodies, republican constitutions permitted them to adopt any laws and resolutions they desired, including laws on secession from the USSR; and the executive and judicial authorities, together with law enforcement, would undoubtedly support them. Thus, the structural prerequisites for disintegration were established. Thereafter, the fate of the Soviet Union depended on republican elites and the geopolitical environment, because of the Center’s purposeful national policy, aimed toward increasing non-Russian representation among administrative cadres and the accelerated modernization and developmental equalization of the republics.

CONTROL FUNCTION OF PARLIAMENT AND PRINCIPLE OF DIVISION OF POWERS

The article analyzes using the normative and systematic methods, as well as analysis and synthesis, the content of the statements of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic «On Regulations of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic», decisions of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic and the works of legal scholars. The article is devoted to the study of the postulate that the principle of division of powers has a deep theoretical basis, which has been developed since existence of institution of state and is aimed at identifying clear boundaries of authority between individual branches of government in order to build their structure so that they serve society. The author came to the conclusion that parliamentary control is in direct connection with the principle of division of powers, in this system it serves and acts as element of mutual control of branches of government. The judiciary today also unequivocally determines inadmissibility of overarching function, the priority role of legislative branch over other parts of government. Parliamentary control is in direct connection with the principle of division of powers, in this system it serves and acts as an element of mutual control of branches of government. According to the author, presence of such control in practice constantly leads to idea of the priority role of legislative branch, which leads to weakening of principle of division of powers. However, it should be noted the implementation of control powers is not aimed at determining the priority of legislative branch in system of division of powers; parliamentary control only organizationally implements of existing powers of parliament.

8. External Powers

This chapter explores the external competences and procedures of the European Union. Sadly, the Union here suffers from a ‘split personality’ because it has a split constitutional regime for foreign affairs. It has a general competence for its ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) within the TEU; and it enjoys various specific external powers within the TFEU. The chapter analyses each of these competences and their respective nature. It then looks at the procedural dimension of the external relations of the Union. How will the Union act, and which institutions need to cooperate for it to act? This depends on which of the two constitutional regimes applies. While the CFSP is still characterized by an ‘executive’ dominance, the procedures within the Union’s special external powers are closer to the ‘legislative’ branch. Finally, the chapter considers two constitutional safeguards regulating the exercise of shared external competences: mixed agreements and the duty of loyal cooperation.

8. External Powers

This chapter explores the external competences and procedures of the European Union. Sadly, the Union here suffers from a ‘split personality’ because it has a split constitutional regime for foreign affairs. It has a general competence for its ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) within the TEU; and it enjoys various specific external powers within the TFEU. The chapter analyses each of these competences and their respective nature. It then looks at the procedural dimension of the external relations of the Union. How will the Union act, and which institutions need to cooperate for it to act? This depends on which of the two constitutional regimes applies. While the CFSP is still characterized by an ‘executive’ dominance, the procedures within the Union's special external powers are closer to the ‘legislative’ branch. Finally, the chapter considers two constitutional safeguards regulating the exercise of shared external competences: mixed agreements and the duty of loyal cooperation.

The principle of independence of the judiciary as the basis of a democratic society

The article is devoted to the state of relations between the judiciary and the legislative and executive branches of government, maintaining a balance between branches of government, seeking to improve and optimize the organization of the judiciary in order to ensure access to justice by an independent and impartial court. The initiated judicial reform in 2016, as well as the attempt to restart it in 2019 and the current state of the judicial system are analyzed. The range of problematic issues in the field of justice and the reasons for their occurrence, the main of which are the imperfect balance between the branches of government, inefficient activities, and in some cases the inaction of the legislative branch. Sociological research was analyzed and the level of public confidence in the judiciary was established. It is concluded that in order to ensure the independence of the judiciary, as well as maintaining an effective balance between all branches of government, it is necessary to create conditions under which all three branches of government will be responsible for their actions before each other and control of one branch of government people in accordance with the principle of the rule of law. The necessity to develop a national strategy for the development of the judiciary, which should be adopted at the legislative level for at least 10 years and ensure the impossibility of changing the "rules of the game" in the field of justice during this period. The concrete and urgent steps that the judicial system needs today are identified, namely, the adoption at the legislative level of the procedure for forming the High Qualifications Commission of Judges of Ukraine, holding a fast and effective competition and, accordingly, launching this body. Until the formation of the High Qualifications Commission of Judges of Ukraine, its powers must be transferred to the High Council of Justice, which must take urgent measures to address staffing issues, including completing the selection for the position of judge, announced in 2017. To solve these problems, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine must adopt registered bills № 3711 and 4055.

Rotational dynamics between bureaucracy and electocracy

It is generally believed that, based on the principle of separation of powers, the branches of government are endowed with independence from each other and equality among themselves, which means that they can control and balance each other’s activities. This principle can also be considered true for politicians, representatives of each of the branches of government. Bureaucrats holding positions in the executive branch are politically equal to electocrats in the legislative branch. At the same time, bureaucrats and electocrats are politicians of different kinds, they have a large number of differences in their powers, functions, rights, and competencies. But does this principle remain immutable for the Russian political system de facto? Are bureaucrats and electocrats so different from each other in Russia? The present study, analyses the biographies of 800 politicians of the Russian Federation who hold public positions in the executive and legislative authorities of all three levels: federal, regional, and municipal. The analysis allowed us to reveal the specifics of recruitment and circulation of personnel in the Russian political system, which makes it possible to speak with a high degree of probability about the trends in the development of the Russian establishment as a whole.