The Clinical Distinction between the Affective Psychoses and Schizophrenia

1970 ◽  
Vol 117 (538) ◽  
pp. 261-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. E. Kendell ◽  
Jane Gourlay

The distinction between schizophrenic and affective illnesses has been one of the cornerstones of psychiatric classification ever since Kraepelin introduced the twin concepts of dementia praecox and manic depressive psychosis at the turn of the century. It has also long been recognized that some patients have both schizophrenic and affective symptoms, and various interpretations have been placed on these mixed states. To some continental psychiatrists they constitute a third group of psychoses distinct from both schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis—the degeneration psychoses of Kleist or the cycloid psychoses of Leonhard. By others they are regarded as genuine mixed states, with the implication that elements of both schizophrenia and manic depressive illnesses are contributing, perhaps because the genetic or constitutional endowment is mixed, perhaps because two alternative defence mechanisms are being utilized simultaneously. Often, however, mixed symptomatology is simply ignored, either by discounting the schizophrenic symptoms and focusing attention on the mood change, or, as most American psychiatrists do, by glossing over the affective symptoms and regarding the illness as a form of schizophrenia differing in no significant respect from other schizophrenias.

1972 ◽  
Vol 120 (555) ◽  
pp. 205-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. H. Reid

Hurd in 1888 described cases of mania, melancholia, folie circulaire and attempted suicide in mental defectives. Ireland in 1898 described three ‘imbecile lunatics’ who were ‘clear cases of melancholia’, and quoted an earlier physician, Wells, who in 1845 had seen ‘attacks of mania in cretins, as well as a peculiar suicidal form of this affliction, which prompts the wretched maniac to attempt self-destruction by throwing himself into the fire’. Clouston (1883) considered that ‘congenital imbeciles may have attacks of maniacal excitement or of melancholic depression—in fact are subject to them’. Kraepelin (1896, 1902) took the view that ‘imbecility may form the basis for the development of other psychoses such as manic-depressive insanity, the psychoses of involution and dementia praecox’. Gordon (1918) stated that mental defectives suffering from depression rarely express ideas of guilt or thoughts of suicide; manics lacked ‘quickness of comprehension of wit or humour or sarcasm’. He noted that depression was more common than mania and that recurrences tended to run true to type. Prideaux (1921) accepted that manic-depressive psychosis could occur in high-grade mental defectives, and drew attention to the increased incidence of conversion hysteria in patients of low intelligence. Medow (1925) observed that mental defectives could manifest all the types of mental illness seen in people of normal intelligence but in the defective mental illness had a silly, fantastic, nonsensical colouring. Neustadt (1928) put forward the view that the typical psychoses of the mental defective were acute episodic states of excitement.


1916 ◽  
Vol 62 (258) ◽  
pp. 556-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
David K. Henderson

In 1896 Kraepelin first introduced and defined his conception of the manic-depressive psychoses and dementia præcox. It has been fairly generally admitted that his was a brilliant piece of work, but since that time he has been led, in certain more or less minor respects, to modify his views. Briefly put, Kraepelin described in a very thorough and detailed way the symptomatology of these disorders, and then, according as the case was one of manic-depressive insanity or dementia præcox, the prognosis was held to be either good or bad respectively. Such a simple method of differentiation and of deciding on the prognosis seemed too good to be true, and although it must be admitted that in the main it holds good, yet in certain fundamental respects it fails. We all know that certain types of the manic-depressive psychosis do not get well, and on the other hand we all probably have seen cases which, symptomatologically, were cases of dementia præcox that recovered. In no group of cases has this been more clearly seen than in catatonia.


1995 ◽  
Vol 167 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. P. McKay ◽  
A. F. Tarbuck ◽  
J. Shapleske ◽  
P. J. McKenna

BackgroundWhile neuropsychological deficits are recognised to occur in manic-depressive psychosis during episodes of depression and to reverse with clinical recovery, it is uncertain whether they can ever be seen outside episodes of illness.MethodForty-five patients meeting DSM–III–R criteria for major depression or bipolar disorder were screened using tests of memory, executive function and overall intellectual function. All testing was carried out during remission of affective symptoms.ResultsNone of 24 young patients and 11 elderly patients scored in the impaired range on any of the tests. However, five of ten patients with chronic, severe affective disorder were impaired on one or more of the measures. On more detailed neuropsychological investigation, these five patients were found to show a variable pattern of impairment, ranging from memory and executive deficits in relative isolation, to widespread poor performance.ConclusionsEnduring neuropsychological deficits may be a feature of chronic, severe manic-depressive illness.


1983 ◽  
Vol 142 (4) ◽  
pp. 414-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sukdeb Mukherjee

At the turn of the century Kraepelin brought together the disparate syndromes of hebephrenia, dementia paranoides, and catatonia under the rubric of dementia praecox. At the same time he crystallized the concept of manic-depressive illness as an entity discrete and separate from the former syndrome. In the years since Kraepelin's classification first came to be adopted, the definitions and descriptions of these two major disorders have undergone many changes. In an attempt to comprehend the meaning and the mechanism of the psychoses, Bleuler was drawn by the emergent theories of psychoanalysis to extend Kraepelin's clinical observations into the realm of psychology. He renamed dementia praecox the schizophrenias, thus emphasizing his idea that the splitting of associative processes was a fundamental feature of the syndrome; and he added the subcategory of simple schizophrenia. American psychiatry, dominated until recently by psychoanalytic concepts, has been influenced more by Bleulerian than Kraepelinian contributions. However, it has not restricted itself to Bleulerian notions. As Kety (1980) remarked in his Maudsley Lecture, great liberties have been taken with the syndrome of schizophrenia; the essential features have been altered, primarily by an expansion of its boundaries.


2000 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciaran Mulholland ◽  
Stephen Cooper

Depression is a frequently occurring symptom in schizophrenia. While today it is often underrecognised and under-treated, historically such symptoms were the focus of much attention. Affective symptoms were used by Kraepelin as an important criterion with which to separate dementia praecox from manic–depressive illness. Kraepelin also recognised the importance of depression as a symptom in schizophrenia and identified several depressive subtypes of the illness. Mayer-Gross emphasised the despair that often occurs as a psychological reaction to acute psychotic episodes and Bleuler considered depression to be one of the core symptoms of schizophrenia.


1961 ◽  
Vol 107 (449) ◽  
pp. 633-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Leonhard

Kraepelin's diagnostic classification of the endogenous psychoses received world-wide acceptance, but today it is generally considered to have failed and is at times rejected by some workers with a few scornful words. This is not due to Kraepelin's own work but is the result of the way in which his successors have used his concepts. Kraepelin himself was not satisfied with the rough division of the endogenous psychoses into the two forms of manic-depressive insanity and schizophrenia, or as he termed it, dementia praecox. He, in fact, never ceased trying to isolate more disease entities. Thus, for example, he differentiated a large number of special forms of schizophrenia. Although he defined the two major groups of endogenous psychoses, this did not mean that he limited the number of diagnostic categories. On the contrary, he investigated all special forms of mental illness very carefully. If he saw a clinical picture which was unknown to him he would say, “So far I do not know this clinical picture, we should describe it adequately, perhaps other cases will occur as well, which will allow the isolation of a characteristic clinical picture.”


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