scholarly journals Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe: “Maps,” Natural Law, and the Enemy

2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 51-74
Author(s):  
Ala Alryyes

Although it may appear that geography is distinguished by an objective, neutral subject, a genealogy of geographical knowledge reveals that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European polemics over the demarcations and legal representations of space were imbued with polemos itself, war and conflict. In this article, I examine the polemical nature of Robinson Crusoe’s spatial experience and constructions, maritime and insular. Most readers know Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe for the shipwreck and the island. This sells short the novel’s formal spatial design, which contrasts its hero’s early mobility with his subsequent settlement(s), while concurrently encoding ideas about law, enmity, and sovereignty into geographic constructions. In Defoe’s space, theory and practice of empire are intermeshed. As I shall argue, Defoe’s representations of his hero’s achievements—both Crusoe’s astute seafaring and his later claims to sovereignty and possession of “his” island—build on extraliterary systems of knowledge in which war offers blueprints for grasping colonial encounters and global space. Defoe exploits two related imperial geographical discourses, natural law (and its derivative the Law of Nations, forerunner of today’s International Law and Law of War), and cartography, drawing on them for both verisimilar and fantastical representations in his novel.

Grotiana ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-281
Author(s):  
Valentina Vadi

Abstract Gentili’s conceptualization of war as a conflict between states attempted to limit the legitimacy of war to external wars only, thus precluding the legitimacy of civil wars. It reflected both the emergence of sovereign states and the vision of international law as a law among polities rather than individuals. The conceptualization of war as a dispute settlement mechanism among polities rather than a punishment for breach of the law of nations and the idea of the bilateral justice of war humanized the conduct of warfare and the content of peace treaties. The idea of perfect war excluded brigandage, piracy, and civil wars from its purview. Some scholars have suggested that perfect war had a dark side, legitimizing imperial expansion. Others have cautioned that Gentili explicitly opposed imperial expansion rather adopting anti-imperialist stances. This article suggests that these ambivalent readings of the Gentilian oeuvre reflect the ambivalence of the early modern law of nations. Under the early modern law of nations, aggression for the sake of empire was clearly unjust; nonetheless, imperial expansion took place. Whereas ‘a law which many transgress[ed] [wa]s nonetheless a law’, there was a wide divide between theory and practice.1


2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
HALVARD LEIRA

Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) was among the most famed intellectuals in his time, but was largely forgotten during the Enlightenment. Intellectually, he stood at an important crossroads, his thought incorporating both late Renaissance traits and precursors of the early modern age. In this article I give a brief intellectual background to Lipsius's thought before concentrating on his thought regarding the lawful interaction between polities, with a focus on lawful government, dissimulation, war, and empire. I then detail the way in which Lipsian thought critically informed later theory and practice. It contained an eclectic mix of divine law, natural law, and positive human law, with some elements borrowed and popularized from earlier writers and others being more original. In the end, his work stands out both as an important inspiration for later theorists and practitioners, and as an example of the many idiosyncrasies and possible trajectories that early international law could have adopted.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan J. Criddle

AbstractThis Article explores three theories of humanitarian intervention that appear in, or are inspired by, the writings of Hugo Grotius. One theory asserts that natural law authorizes all states to punish violations of the law of nations, irrespective of where or against whom the violations occur, to preserve the integrity of international law. A second theory, which also appears in Grotius’s writings, proposes that states may intervene as temporary legal guardians for peoples who have suffered intolerable cruelties at the hands of their own state. Each of these theories has fallen out of fashion today based on skepticism about their natural law underpinnings and concerns about how they have facilitated Western colonialism. As an alternative, this Article outlines a third theory that builds upon Grotius’s account of humanitarian intervention as a fiduciary relationship, while updating Grotius’s account for the twenty-first century. According to this new fiduciary theory, when states intervene to protect human rights abroad they exercise an oppressed people’s right of self-defense on their behalf and may use force solely for the people’s benefit. As fiduciaries, intervening states bear obligations to consult with and honor the preferences of the people they seek to protect, and they must respect international human rights governing the use of force within the affected state. By clarifying the respective responsibilities of the Security Council and individual states for humanitarian intervention, the fiduciary theory also lends greater coherency to the international community’s “responsibility to protect” human rights.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (16) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Hoffmann

In the first place, I should like to stress that the emphasis of my rather ambitious-sounding subtitle is on ‘speculation’, and not on ‘the future of international law’; for one, it is, at least at the time of writing, entirely speculative to think about the mid- and long-term consequences of the September 11 attacks, since, so far, the announced response to the attacks by the United States, the ‘West’ and the ‘civilised world’, has not yet happened. We are in a strange state of limbo, where everything seems possible, from secret James Bond-type operations to outright military attack of Afghanistan by the US and NATO troops, from civil war in Pakistan to biological —or even nuclear-counterattacks by the terrorist fold, from ‘business as (almost) usual’ to ‘the world is out of joint’. At such times, to speculate is not only all one can do, but it is, I believe, positively encouraged for those who professionally and/or passionately deal with the structure and meaning of social reality, as, inter alia, international legal academics do. Secondly, the emphasis is also on speculation because, evidently, it would be quite preposterous to pretend to set out, in a very brief comment written ‘out of the moment’, what all this will come to mean for so richly textured an academic discourse as international law. Yet international law and international lawyers are in everyone's mouth at this moment, and so it seems precisely apt to ‘speculate’ —and no more—, in rough sketch, about the consequences the events of September 11 and their political-military aftermath could have on the theory and practice of the ‘law of nations’.


Author(s):  
Stephen C Neff

This chapter presents a brief history of international law. It proceeds chronologically, beginning with an overview of the ancient world, followed by a more detailed discussion of the great era of natural law in the European Middle Ages. The classical period (1600–1815) witnessed the emergence of a dualistic view of international law, with the law of nature and the law of nations co-existing (more or less amicably). In the nineteenth century—the least-known part of international law—doctrinaire positivism was the prevailing viewpoint, though not the exclusive one. For the inter-war years, developments both inside and outside the League of Nations are considered. The chapter concludes with some historically oriented comments on international law during the post-1945 period.


2000 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-80
Author(s):  
Mashood A. Baderin

As traditionally understood, the Islamic State and the Shari’ah havebeen seen inimical to contemporary international law, membership inthe United Nations Organization, and the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights. Hardline advocates of the Shari’ah argue that the institutionof nation-state and modem internationalism are hostile to theIslamic polity. The position taken here, however, argues quite the opposite.Through looking at the theory and practice of Islamic Law, it isclaimed that the Islamic Law of Nations is evolutionary in character.The participation of Muslim nations in the modem international orderis not antagonistic to the principles of Shari’ah. Islamic law can accommodatethe modern international order on the basis of cooperation andpeaceful coexistence.


Author(s):  
Peter Haggenmacher

This chapter enquires into the sources of international law in the scholastics. In fact the concept of sources of law obtained general currency in legal discourse, and how international law took shape as a legal discipline only after the heyday of scholasticism. But the two main pillars of what was to become classical international law in the eighteenth century—natural law and the law of nations—were both part of the theologians’ teachings of moral philosophy, especially with the Dominicans and later the Jesuits. Examining the two concepts handed down from Antiquity, Thomas Aquinas had assigned them distinct places in his system of legal norms, while fathoming their respective grounds of validity. His endeavours were continued by his sixteenth-century Spanish followers, who set out to explore the ‘internationalist’ dimensions of the Protean concept of ius gentium as well as the ‘fundamentalist’ properties of ius naturae.


2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-59
Author(s):  
Talya Uçaryılmaz

Honesty, loyalty and reasonableness together refer to the principle of good faith in contemporary private law. The principle of good faith historically emerged as a natural law principle deriving from Roman law of nations, the universal set of rules applicable for all mankind. However, it also has immense historical effects on the early modern theories of international law. Being based on natural law and morality, good faith is well-equipped to be a fundamental standard of behavior in contemporary international law concerns. Good faith manifests itself as pacta sunt servanda as the basis of international treaty law. As a principle referring to honesty, loyalty and reasonableness, it guarantees the prohibition of the abuse of power and provides equitable solutions in legal relationships between sovereigns and private actors. Accordingly this article examines the application of the classical Roman principle of good faith in international law from a transhistorical perspective to clarify its contemporary applications, taking refugee law as an example. It concerns itself with the fundamental elements of good faith, the historical emergence of the principle, its relationship with early modern international legal theories and its contemporary significance in refugee law.Received: 23.10.2019Accepted: 29.12.2019Published online: 03.07.2020


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 521-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly De Luca

This article posits an interpretation of Thomas More’sUtopiathat focuses on the ways in which the nature of justice within a putatively ideal state is illuminated by references to international relations and the law of nations. Like Plato’sRepublic,Utopiauses differences of scale to provide a lens through which to examine the operation in one context of a unitary concept that is more visible elsewhere. Justice is constructed as a single concept; thus, in the same way that Plato uses the justice of thekallipolisto provide insight into the justice of an individual, More uses the justice of the international community to provide a macroscopic perspective on justice as it exists within a sovereign state. Through discussions of trade, diplomacy, war and empire, Utopian understandings of international law and justice are revealed. The ideal organisation of the state is then characterised as one in which the resulting notions of justice, defined as the correct operation of laws that accord with natural law, are institutionalised.


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