scholarly journals The Hidden Advantage of Delegation: Pareto Improvements in a Gift Exchange Game

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (5) ◽  
pp. 2358-2379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Charness ◽  
Ramón Cobo-Reyes ◽  
Natalia Jiménez ◽  
Juan A Lacomba ◽  
Francisco Lagos
Keyword(s):  
Positive Reaction ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Gift Exchange ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Pareto Improvements

This paper analyzes the effect on performance and earnings of delegating the wage choice to employees. Our results show that such delegation significantly increases effort levels. Moreover, we observe a Pareto improvement, as the earnings of both employers and employees increase when employers delegate than when they do not. Interestingly, we also find that the employees' performance under delegation is higher than under nondelegation, even for similar wages. While there is strong evidence that behavior reflects strategic considerations, this result also holds for one-shot interactions. A possible nonstrategic motivation explaining the positive reaction to delegation is a sense of enhanced responsibility. (JEL J31, J33, J41)

scholarly journals Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 387-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew F Mitchell ◽  
Andrea Moro
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Efficient Method ◽  
Pareto Frontier ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Lump Sum ◽  
Standard Textbook ◽  
Pareto Improvements

Why are distortionary policies used when seemingly Pareto improvements exist? According to a standard textbook argument, a Pareto improvement can be obtained by eliminating the distortions, compensating the losers with a lump sum transfer, and redistributing the gains that are left over. We relax the assumption that winners know the losses suffered by the losers and show that the informationally efficient method of compensating losers may involve the use of seemingly inefficient (but informationally efficient) distortionary policies. The risk of overcompensating losers may make distortions informationally efficient, as there are points on the Pareto frontier where distortions are used.

scholarly journals Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions

1998 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Stiglitz
Keyword(s):  
Government Policy ◽  
Major Theme ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Public Interests ◽  
The Public ◽  
Simple Question ◽  
Pareto Improvements ◽  
Made In

[Joseph Stiglitz was a member of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1993–95, and chairman of the CEA from 1995 through February 1997.] Today, I want to share with you some of my thoughts about the possibilities and limitations of government. These thoughts are focused around a simple question: Why is it so difficult to implement even Pareto improvements? Working in Washington, I quickly saw that although a few potential changes were strictly Pareto improvements, there were many other changes that would hurt only a small, narrowly defined group (for example, increasing the efficiency of the legal system might hurt lawyers). But if everyone except a narrowly defined special interest group could be shown to benefit, surely the change should be made. In practice, however, “almost everyone” was rarely sufficient in government policy-making and often such near-Pareto improvements did not occur. My major theme will be to provide a set of explanations for why this might be so. I shall put forward four hypotheses in this lecture, each of which provides part of the explanation for the failure in at least one instance of a proposed Pareto improvement. These hypotheses, like much of the literature on government failures, focus on the role of incentives: how misaligned incentives can induce government officials to take actions that are not, in any sense, in the public interest.

scholarly journals Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1249-1279
Author(s):  
Battal Dogan ◽  
Lars Ehlers
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Blocking Pair ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Pareto Improvements ◽  
The Stability

We investigate efficient and minimally unstable Pareto improvements over the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism—a popular school choice mechanism that is stable but not efficient. We show that there is no Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism that is minimally unstable among efficient assignments when the stability comparison is based on counting the number of blocking pairs. Our main result characterizes the priority profiles for which there exists a Pareto improvement over the DA assignment that is minimally unstable among efficient assignments. We further consider an alternative natural stability comparison based on the set of blocking students who are involved in at least one blocking pair, show that the impossibilities remain, and characterize the possibility domain of priority profiles.

Concurrent Electrodermal and Eyeblink Conditioning With Masked and Unmasked Stimuli

2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
José Luis Marcos ◽  
Azahara Marcos
Keyword(s):  
Unconditioned Stimulus ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Eyeblink Conditioning ◽  
Noise Burst ◽  
Conditioning Phase ◽  
Contingency Awareness ◽  
Blank Screen ◽  
Neutral Face ◽  
Fearful Face

Abstract. The aim of this study was to determine if contingency awareness between the conditioned (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US) is necessary for concurrent electrodermal and eyeblink conditioning to masked stimuli. An angry woman’s face (CS+) and a fearful face (CS−) were presented for 23 milliseconds (ms) and followed by a neutral face as a mask. A 98 dB noise burst (US) was administered 477 ms after CS+ offset to elicit both electrodermal and eyeblink responses. For the unmasking conditioning a 176 ms blank screen was inserted between the CS and the mask. Contingency awareness was assessed using trial-by-trial ratings of US-expectancy in a post-conditioning phase. The results showed acquisition of differential electrodermal and eyeblink conditioning in aware, but not in unaware participants. Acquisition of differential eyeblink conditioning required more trials than electrodermal conditioning. These results provided strong evidence of the causal role of contingency awareness on differential eyeblink and electrodermal conditioning.

Gift exchange and outcome based incentives in principal-agent contracts

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
William P. Bottom ◽  
James Holloway ◽  
Gary J. Miller ◽  
Alexandra Mislin ◽  
Andrew Whitford
Keyword(s):  
Gift Exchange ◽  
Principal Agent
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