scholarly journals On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Equilibrium

2008 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip A Haile ◽  
Ali Hortaçsu ◽  
Grigory Kosenok
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Empirical Content ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
Experimental Subjects ◽  
Observed Behavior

The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) notion of Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995) has recently attracted considerable attention, due in part to its widely documented ability to rationalize observed behavior in games played by experimental subjects. However, even with strong a priori restrictions on unobservables, QRE imposes no falsifiable restrictions: it can rationalize any distribution of behavior in any normal form game. After demonstrating this, we discuss several approaches to testing QRE under additional maintained assumptions. (JEL C72, D84)

scholarly journals Ising model versus normal form game

2010 ◽  
Vol 389 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serge Galam ◽  
Bernard Walliser
Keyword(s):  
Ising Model ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
Model Versus

scholarly journals Institutional Inertia and Institutional Change in an Expanding Normal-Form Game

Games ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 398-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torsten Heinrich ◽  
Henning Schwardt
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game

Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (02) ◽  
pp. 1940011
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Weber
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Canonical Extension ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
The Given

To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.

COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 253-261
Author(s):  
RYUSUKE SHINOHARA
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
Aggregative Games ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Coalition Proof

The relationship between coalition-proof (Nash) equilibria in a normal-form game and those in its subgame is examined. A subgame of a normal-form game is a game in which the strategy sets of all players in the subgame are subsets of those in the normal-form game. In this paper, focusing on a class of aggregative games, we provide a sufficient condition for the aggregative game under which every coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is also coalition-proof in the original normal-form game. The stringency of the sufficient condition means that a coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is rarely a coalition-proof equilibrium in the whole game.

scholarly journals Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-Form Game

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietmar Fehr ◽  
Dorothea F. Kübler ◽  
David Nils Danz
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game

Quantal Response Equilibrium in Normal-Form Games

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Cost Model ◽  
Reduced Form ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Response Functions ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Control Cost ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Best Response

This chapter lays out the general theory of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) for normal-form games. It starts with the reduced-form approach to QR, based on the direct specification of “regular” quantal or smoothed best-response functions required to satisfy four intuitive axioms of stochastic choice. A simple asymmetric matching pennies game is used to illustrate these ideas and show that QRE imposes strong restrictions on the data, even without parametric assumptions on the quantal response functions. Particular attention is given to the logit QRE, since it is the most commonly used approach taken when QRE is applied to experimental or other data. The discussion includes the topological and limiting properties of logit QRE and connections with refinement concepts. QRE is also related to several other equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior in games, including a game-theoretic equilibrium version of Luce's (1959) model of individual choice, Rosenthal's (1989) linear response model, and Van Damme's (1987) control cost model; these connections are explained in the chapter.

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