scholarly journals Regulating Markups in US Health Insurance

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 71-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Cicala ◽  
Ethan M. J. Lieber ◽  
Victoria Marone

A health insurer's Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) is the share of premiums spent on medical claims, or the inverse markup over average claims cost. The Affordable Care Act introduced minimum MLR provisions for all health insurance sold in fully insured commercial markets, thereby capping insurer profit margins, but not levels. While intended to reduce premiums, we show this rule creates incentives to increase costs. Using variation created by the rule's introduction as a natural experiment, we find medical claims rose nearly one-for-one with distance below the regulatory threshold: 7 percent in the individual market and 2 percent in the group market. Premiums were unaffected. (JEL G22, H51, I13, I18)

2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 280-297
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Hoffmann

This Note focuses on the medical loss ratio provision (“MLR Provision”) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The MLR Provision states that health insurance companies must spend at least a certain percentage of their premium revenue on “activities that improve healthcare quality” (in other words, meet a minimum threshold medical loss ratio) and comply with reporting requirements determined by the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Because states have historically had authority over the regulation of health insurance, there is an outstanding question as to whether or not the MLR Provision has legal authority to preempt conflicting state MLR regulations.Part II of this Note outlines the major requirements in the MLR Provision and discusses the history of MLR regulation in the United States. Part III discusses the likelihood that the courts will soon resolve the question of preemption regarding the MLR Provision.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 130-135
Author(s):  
Michael McCue ◽  
Mark A Hall ◽  
Jennifer Palazzolo

While most publicly-traded insurers have experienced losses and exited the Affordable Care Act individual insurance market exchange, insurers specializing in Medicaid managed care have been profitable in this market. Accessing individual market data, this study compares the financial performance of 20 state insurers owned by two publicly-traded companies that historically focused on insuring Medicaid members compared to 40 insurers owned by other publicly-traded companies. Medicaid-focused insurers incurred a significantly lower medical loss ratio of 83.3% compared to the medical loss ratio of 93.7% of other publicly-traded insurers, and they earned a significantly higher profit margin of 4.6% compared to the operating loss of 6.5% incurred by other publicly-traded insurers. This superior financial performance of Medicaid-focused insurers could be due to one or a combination of: their care management experience with the Medicaid population, other cost reducing strategies such as provider contracting, or the enrollment of a healthier than average population.


2013 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 418-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean M. Abraham ◽  
Pinar Karaca-Mandic ◽  
Michel Boudreaux

2017 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 384-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Hall ◽  
Michael J. McCue ◽  
Jennifer R. Palazzolo

Many insurers incurred financial losses in individual markets for health insurance during 2014, the first year of Affordable Care Act mandated changes. This analysis looks at key financial ratios of insurers to compare profitability in 2014 and 2013, identify factors driving financial performance, and contrast the financial performance of health insurers operating in state-run exchanges versus the federal exchange. Overall, the median loss of sampled insurers was −3.9%, no greater than their loss in 2013. Reduced administrative costs offset increases in medical losses. Insurers performed better in states with state-run exchanges than insurers in states using the federal exchange in 2014. Medical loss ratios are the underlying driver more than administrative costs in the difference in performance between states with federal versus state-run exchanges. Policy makers looking to improve the financial performance of the individual market should focus on features that differentiate the markets associated with state-run versus federal exchanges.


2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 679-706
Author(s):  
Petra W. Rasmussen ◽  
Gerald F. Kominski

Abstract When passed in 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) became the greatest piece of health care reform in the United States since the creation of Medicare and Medicaid. In the 9 years since its passage, the law has ushered in a drastic decrease in the number of uninsured Americans and has encouraged delivery system innovation. However, the ACA has not been uniformly embraced, and states differ in their implementation of the law and in their individual health insurance marketplace's successfulness. Furthermore, under the Trump administration the law's future and the stability of the individual market have been uncertain. Throughout, however, California has been a leader. Today, the state's marketplace, known as Covered California, offers comprehensive, standardized health plans to over 1.3 million consumers. California's success with the ACA is largely attributable to its historical receptiveness to health reform; its early adoption of the law; its decision to have Covered California operate as an active purchaser, help shape the plans sold through the marketplace, and design a consumer-friendly enrollment experience; its engagement with stakeholders and community partners to encourage enrollment; and Covered California's commitment to continually innovate, improve, and anticipate the needs of the individual market as the law moves forward.


Author(s):  
Gregory Colman ◽  
Dhaval Dave ◽  
Otto Lenhart

Health insurance depends on labor market activity more in the U.S. than in any other high-income country. A majority of the population are insured through an employer (known as employer-sponsored insurance or ESI), benefiting from the risk pooling and economies of scale available to group insurance plans. Some workers may therefore be reluctant to leave a job for fear of losing such low-cost insurance, a tendency known as “job lock,” or may switch jobs or work more hours merely to obtain it, known as “job push.” Others obtain insurance through government programs for which eligibility depends on income. They too may adapt their work effort to remain eligible for insurance. Those without access to ESI or who are too young or earn too much to qualify for public coverage (Medicare and Medicaid) can buy insurance only in the individual or nongroup market, where prices are high and variable. Most studies using data from before the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 support the prediction that ESI reduced job mobility, labor-force participation, retirement, and self-employment prior to the ACA, but find little effect on the labor supply of public insurance. The ACA profoundly changed the health insurance market in the U.S., removing restrictions on obtaining insurance from new employers or on the individual market and expanding Medicaid eligibility to previously ineligible adults. Research on the ACA, however, has not found substantial labor supply effects. These results may reflect that the reforms to the individual market mainly affected those who were previously uninsured rather than workers with ESI, that the theoretical labor market effects of expansions in public coverage are ambiguous, and that the effect would be found only among the relatively small number on the fringes of eligibility.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
JoAnn Volk Volk ◽  
Sabrina Corlette Corlette ◽  
Kevin W. Lucia Lucia ◽  
Justin Giovannelli Giovannelli ◽  
Dania Palanker Palanker ◽  
...  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document