scholarly journals The Origins of Common Identity: Evidence from Alsace-Lorraine

2022 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-292
Author(s):  
Sirus H. Dehdari ◽  
Kai Gehring

We study how more negative historical exposure to the actions of nation-states—like war, occupation, and repression—affects the formation of regional identity. The quasi-exogenous division of the French regions Alsace and Lorraine allows us to implement a geographical regression discontinuity design at the municipal level. Using measures of stated and revealed preferences, we find that more negative experiences with nation-states are associated with a stronger regional identity in the short, medium, and long run. This is linked to preferences for more regional decision-making. Establishing regional organizations seems to be a key mechanism to maintaining and strengthening regional identity. (JEL H77, N43, N44, N93, N94, Z13)

2020 ◽  
pp. 001041402093808
Author(s):  
J. Andrew Harris

Decisions about how to organize and run an election can shape political participation. Policy choices may distribute election resources unequally, skewing voting outcomes. In low- and middle-income countries where electoral capacity and resources are scarce and decision-making highly centralized, election administration has the potential to shape results on a large scale. In the context of Kenya’s August 2017 elections, I study the consequences of a legislated threshold that determines the capacity of polling centers to quickly serve voters by reducing election-day lines. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that turnout is 2.4% lower in congested polling places just below the threshold relative to polling places above the threshold. Relative to other hypothetical thresholds, the chosen threshold benefits the incumbent president, as incumbent strongholds receive more polling resources than opposition areas. The results demonstrate how electoral resource allocation shapes political behavior and election outcomes.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Andrew Harris

Decisions about how to organize and run an election can shape political participation. Policy choices may distribute election resources unequally, skewing voting outcomes. In low- and middle-income countries where electoral capacity and resources are scarce and decision-making highly centralized, election administration has the potential to shape results on a large scale. In the context of Kenya's August 2017 elections, I study the consequences of a legislated threshold that determines the capacity of polling centers to quickly serve voters by reducing election-day lines. Using a regression discontinuity design I find that turnout is 2.4% lower in congested polling places just below the threshold relative to polling places above the threshold. Relative to other hypothetical thresholds, the chosen threshold benefits the incumbent president, as incumbent strongholds receive more polling resources than opposition areas. The results demonstrate how electoral resource allocation shapes political behavior and election outcomes.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koichiro Ito

Many countries use substantial public funds to subsidize reductions in negative externalities. Such policy designs create asymmetric incentives because increases in externalities remain unpriced. I investigate the implications of such policies by using a regression discontinuity design in California's electricity rebate program. Using household-level panel data, I find that the incentive produced precisely estimated zero treatment effects on energy conservation in coastal areas. In contrast, the rebate induced short-run and long-run consumption reductions in inland areas. Income, climate, and air conditioner saturation significantly drive the heterogeneity. Finally, I provide a cost-effectiveness analysis and investigate how to improve the policy design. (JEL D12, D62, H76, L94, L98, Q48)


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 533-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Hausman ◽  
David S. Rapson

Recent empirical work in several economic fields, particularly environmental and energy economics, has adapted the regression discontinuity (RD) framework to applications where time is the running variable and treatment begins at a particular threshold in time. In this guide for practitioners, we discuss several features of this regression discontinuity in time framework that differ from the more standard cross-sectional RD framework. First, many applications (particularly in environmental economics) lack cross-sectional variation and are estimated using observations far from the temporal threshold. This common empirical practice is hard to square with the assumptions of a cross-sectional RD, which is conceptualized for an estimation bandwidth shrinking even as the sample size increases. Second, estimates may be biased if the time-series properties of the data are ignored (for instance, in the presence of an autoregressive process), or more generally if short-run and long-run effects differ. Finally, tests for sorting or bunching near the threshold are often irrelevant, making the framework closer to an event study than a regression discontinuity design. Based on these features and motivated by hypothetical examples using air quality data, we offer suggestions for the empirical researcher wishing to use the RD in time framework.


2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (7) ◽  
pp. 2049-2074 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon B. Dahl ◽  
Katrine V. Løken ◽  
Magne Mogstad

We estimate peer effects in paid paternity leave in Norway using a regression discontinuity design. Coworkers and brothers are 11 and 15 percentage points, respectively, more likely to take paternity leave if their peer was exogenously induced to take up leave. The most likely mechanism is information transmission, including increased knowledge of how an employer will react. The estimated peer effect snowballs over time, as the first peer interacts with a second peer, the second peer with a third, and so on. This leads to long-run participation rates which are substantially higher than would otherwise be expected. (JEL J13, J16, J18, K31, M52, Z13)


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