scholarly journals Is the WTO Passé?

2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1125-1231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Bagwell ◽  
Chad P. Bown ◽  
Robert W. Staiger

The WTO has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand-off, where the WTO has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage, and is now passing the baton to PTAs to finish the job? We survey a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argue on this basis that the WTO is not passé. Rather, and subject to some caveats, our survey of research to date suggests that the WTO warrants strong support while a more cautious view of PTAs seems appropriate. (JEL F13, F14, K33, N70)

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 923-937
Author(s):  
Claire Peacock ◽  
Karolina Milewicz ◽  
Duncan Snidal

Abstract New international agreements often recycle language from previous agreements, using boilerplate solutions alongside customized provisions. The presence of boilerplate in international agreements has important implications for understanding how international rules are made. The determinants behind boilerplate in international agreements have not previously been systematically evaluated. Using original data from a sample of 348 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) adopted between 1989 and 2009, we combine novel text analysis measures with Latent Order Logistic (LOLOG) graph network techniques to assess the determinants behind boilerplate in labor and environmental provisions commonly found in PTAs. Our results indicate that whereas boilerplate can be used for both efficiency and distributive purposes, international boilerplate is used primarily for efficiency gains and power-distribution considerations are not systematically important.


2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 896-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuno Limão

Most countries are members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The effect of these agreements has attracted much interest and raised the question of whether PTAs promote or slow multilateral trade liberalization, i.e., whether they are a “building block” or “stumbling block” to multilateral liberalization. Despite this long-standing concern with PTAs and the lack of theoretical consensus, there is no systematic evidence on whether they are actually a stumbling block to multilateral liberalization. We use detailed data on U.S. multilateral tariffs to provide the first systematic evidence that the direct effect of PTAs was to generate a stumbling block to its MTL. We also provide evidence of reciprocity in multilateral tariff reductions.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONG BUM KIM

AbstractThe most favoured nation (MFN) clauses in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) under GATT Article XXIV or under GATS Article V entrench the preferential trade relations between the PTA parties because the trade liberalization in future PTAs with third parties will be constrained by the existing PTA MFN clauses. Trade liberalization based on PTA MFN clauses cannot be considered part of the internal trade liberalization required by GATT Article XXIV:8 or GATS Article V:1. The exclusionary effects caused by trade liberalization through PTA MFN clauses increase the burden on trade with third parties. As a result, PTA MFN clauses do not meet the necessity test under the Appellate Body's decision in Turkey–Textiles, as reasonable alternatives to the PTA MFN clauses are available. For these reasons, PTA MFN clauses fail the requirements for legal defences under GATT Article XXIV or GATS Article V for their violations of the general MFN clauses under GATT Article I and GATS Article II. For those products or services subject to existing PTA MFN clauses, any preferential liberalization based on PTA MFN clauses should be accorded non-discriminatorily to all WTO members in accordance with GATT Article I or GATS Article II.


Author(s):  
Michael Trebilcock

While economists overwhelmingly favor free trade, even unilateral free trade, because of the gains realizable from specialization and the exploitation of comparative advantage, in fact international trading relations are structured by a complex body of multilateral and preferential trade agreements. The article outlines the case for multilateral trade agreements and the non-discrimination principle that they embody, in the form of both the Most Favored Nation principle and the National Treatment principle, where non-discrimination has been widely advocated as supporting both geopolitical goals (reducing economic factionalism) and economic goals (ensuring the full play of theories of comparative advantage undistorted by discriminatory trade treatment). Despite the virtues of multilateral trade agreements, preferential trade agreements (PTAs), authorized from the outset under GATT, have proliferated in recent years, even though they are inherently discriminatory between members and non-members, provoking vigorous debates as to whether (a) PTAs are trade-creating or trade-diverting; (b) whether they increase transaction costs in international trade; and (c) whether they undermine the future course of multilateral trade liberalization. A further and similarly contentious derogation from the principle of non-discrimination under the multilateral system is Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries, where since the mid-1950s developing countries have been given much greater latitude than developed countries to engage in trade protectionism on the import side in order to promote infant industries, and since the mid-1960s on the export side have benefited from non-reciprocal trade concessions by developed countries on products of actual or potential export interest to developing countries. Beyond debates over the strengths and weaknesses of multilateral trade agreements and the two major derogations therefrom, further debates surround the appropriate scope of trade agreements, and in particular the expansion of their scope in recent decades to address divergences or incompatibilities across a wide range of domestic regulatory and related policies that arguably create frictions in cross-border trade and investment and hence constitute an impediment to it. The article goes on to consider contemporary fair trade versus free trade debates, including concerns over trade deficits, currency manipulation, export subsidies, misappropriation of intellectual property rights, and lax labor or environmental standards. The article concludes with a consideration of the case for a larger scope for plurilateral trade agreements internationally, and for a larger scope for active labor market policies domestically to mitigate transition costs from trade.


2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICIA TOVAR

AbstractThere is no consensus in the literature on whether preferential trade agreements help or hinder trade liberalization toward non-members. We examine the link between preferential trade liberalization and tariffs imposed against non-member countries for the case of CAFTA-DR. Using product data at the 6-digit HS level, we find that products with larger reductions in preferential tariffs experienced larger increases (or smaller decreases) in most-favored nation tariffs applied against non-members. However, we also uncover some interesting dynamics regarding the relationship between preferential liberalization and tariffs imposed against non-members. When we split the sample period into two sub-periods, we find an initial negative relationship between changes in preferential and most-favored nation tariffs during the first half of the sample period, followed by a positive relationship during the second half, although the evidence on the latter is not as strong. The results thus provide the first evidence of an initial stumbling block effect of preferential trade liberalization on unilateral liberalization, as well as (weaker) evidence of a subsequent building block effect.


2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 552-553

Pravin Krishna of Johns Hopkins University reviews, “Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements” by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the role of domestic politics in governments' decisions to enter trade pacts. Discusses a political economy theory of international trade agreements; systemic influences on preferential trade agreement formation; regime type, veto players, and preferential trade agreement formation; and auxiliary hypotheses about domestic politics and trade agreements. Mansfield is Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Milner is B. C. Forbes Professor of Public Affairs at Princeton University.”


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