Book Reviews

2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1399-1401

John O. S. Wilson of the University of St. Andrews reviews “Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises,” edited by Martin Guzman, José Antonio Ocampo, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Fifteen papers, most originally presented at the conference 'Frameworks for Sovereign Debt Restructuring' held at Columbia University in November 2014, examine general issues and goals of debt restructuring as well as the deficiencies of the current nonsystem, focusing on an analysis of the resolution of Argentina's and Greece's debt crises, possible improvements in the contractual approach, and specific implementation proposals for a multinational formal framework.”

2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 747-749

David E. Weinstein of Columbia University reviews “Product Variety and the Gains from International Trade” by Robert C. Feenstra. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins “Explores the methods that have been developed to measure the product variety of imports and exports in international trade and the gains from trade due to product variety. Discusses consumer benefits from import variety; producer benefits from export variety; the extensive margin of trade and country productivity; and product variety and the measurement of real gross domestic product. Feenstra is Professor of Economics and C. Bryan Cameron Distinguished Chair in International Economics at the University of California, Davis. Index.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (8) ◽  
pp. 1889-1922 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew DiGiuseppe ◽  
Patrick E. Shea

When do private creditors versus debtor states accept a greater burden in resolving sovereign debt crises? In this study, we argue that distributive politics helps explain the “haircut”—or losses—private creditors take in debt restructuring cases. Despite the expected convergence of partisan policies in a globalized economy, we argue that right and left leaders extract different settlements in debt negotiations. Left governments, representing constituents most likely to be hurt from higher debt repayment, credibly demonstrate more bargaining power and extract greater concessions from creditors. Distributive politics, however, is an indeterminate factor in explaining states entrance into debt negotiations. We use recently released data on the outcome of sovereign debt restructuring cases between states and private creditors from 1975 to 2013 to test our expectations. Results from a double-hurdle model indicate that creditors receive a larger haircut when negotiating with left governments.


Policy Papers ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (043) ◽  
Author(s):  

There have been significant developments in sovereign debt restructuring involving private-sector creditors since the IMF’s last stocktaking in 2014. While the current contractual approach has been largely effective in resolving sovereign debt cases since 2014, it has gaps that could pose challenges in future restructurings.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-77
Author(s):  
Maximiliano Dvorkin ◽  
Juan M. Sánchez ◽  
Horacio Sapriza ◽  
Emircan Yurdagul

Sovereign debt crises involve debt restructurings characterized by a mix of face value haircuts and maturity extensions. The prevalence of maturity extensions has been hard to reconcile with economic theory. We develop a model of endogenous debt restructuring that captures key facts of sovereign debt and restructuring episodes. While debt dilution pushes for negative maturity extensions, three factors are important in overcoming the effects of dilution and generating maturity extensions upon restructurings: income recovery after default, credit exclusion after restructuring, and regulatory costs of book value haircuts. We employ dynamic discrete choice methods that allow for smoother decision rules, rendering the problem tractable. (JEL E44, F34, F41, H63)


2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 367-370

Assaf Razin of Tel Aviv University reviews “Managing the Euro Area Debt Crisis”, by William R. Cline. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Addresses the recent debt crisis in Europe and the European Central Bank's commitment to preserve the euro area with purchases of government bonds, and explores the history of the Euro Area debt crisis and makes projections of future debt sustainability. Discusses policy implications, leading policy issues, and model projections; fiscal adjustment, growth, and default risk; the bank-sovereign debt nexus; external adjustment and breakup costs; eurobonds, firewalls, outright monetary transactions, and debt restructuring; European debt simulation model projections─Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; and debt restructuring and economic prospects in Greece.” Cline is Senior Fellow with the Peterson Institute for International Economics.


Author(s):  
Skylar Brooks ◽  
Domenico Lombardi

AbstractIn recent years, a number of costly and destabilizing sovereign debt crises – from Argentina and Greece to Ukraine – have served as a forceful reminder that the international community lacks an agreed-upon framework for resolving debt crises and, when necessary, restructuring sovereign debt in a timely, orderly, and equitable manner. To help address this apparent governance gap, the paper argues that there is an important but underutilized role for the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in governing sovereign debt restructuring. More specifically, in a governance domain that is relatively fragmented between uncoordinated, even sometimes competing, rules and rule-makers, the FSB could serve as the focal institution responsible for overseeing the coordination and further development of soft law regulatory standards for sovereign debt restructuring. The reasons for FSB governance in this domain are simple and compelling, relating to both the nature of the debt restructuring regime and its evolution to date, as well as the specific institutional features of the FSB and the core tasks it performs. Although there remains room for treaty-based organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations (UN) to develop a hard law approach to sovereign debt restructuring, the FSB, we argue, is best positioned to strengthen and oversee the existing soft law approach, which currently prevails as the modus operandi of the present debt restructuring framework.


Venezuela’s debt restructuring could be the fourth-largest sovereign restructuring in history. The country’s default was triggered by missed interest payments on both government and Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) bonds in November 2017. Shortly thereafter, the government announced its intention to restructure its debt. This article compares Venezuela’s crisis with prior sovereign bond defaults and argues that several key features will make restructuring Venezuela’s debt more complex and likely more protracted than in past sovereign debt crises, with likely larger-than-average losses experienced by bondholders. These include Venezuela’s heavy annual debt maturities through the next decade, the interdependence of government and PDVSA finances, the extent of the economic crisis in the country, elevated sociopolitical tensions, lack of transparency on economic data, and U.S. sanctions imposed on Venezuela.


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