scholarly journals Welfare Reversals in a Monetary Union

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 246-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphane Auray ◽  
Aurélien Eyquem

We show that welfare can be lower under complete financial markets than under autarky in a monetary union with home bias, sticky prices, and asymmetric shocks. Such a monetary union is a second-best environment in which the structure of financial markets affects risk-sharing but also shapes the dynamics of inflation rates and the welfare costs from nominal rigidities. Welfare reversals arise for a variety of empirically plausible degrees of price stickiness when the Marshall-Lerner condition is met. These results carry over a model with active fiscal policies, and hold within a medium-scale model, although to a weaker extent. (JEL E31, E52, E62, F33, F41)

2010 ◽  
Vol 62 (5) ◽  
pp. 347-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faruk Balli ◽  
Syed Abul Basher ◽  
Hatice Ozer-Balli

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (28) ◽  
Author(s):  
Branka Topić-Pavković

The condition of the optimal currency area as a theoretical basis of the monetary integration considers the harmonization of the fiscal and monetary policy crucial in achieving the efficient functioning of the monetary union. The issue of sustainability of the monetary union without fiscal union reaches real intensity in times of crisis and market instability. In that context, this paper focuses on the relation of uncoordinated fiscal policies and non-fulfillment of the fiscal criteria of convergence with the functioning and sustainability of the monetary union. The aim of this research is to establish whether, based on the analysed theoretical assumptions and empirical case, the fiscal criteria are respected in practice in the member countries, and how specificity of the fiscal policy influences the monetary integration especially in the years of crisis. We started research with the cost-benefit analysis of the monetary union pointing out to the specific costs and benefits occurring when a country joins the monetary union. We examined the fiscal parameters of the convergence criteria of the member states pointing to the problem of heterogeneity of members and deviations from the reference values of the Union. The results show that the metodology used to establish the set norms of the fiscal convergence cannot cor-respond symetrically to all member countries. The results also point to thefact that, unlike symmetrical, in the emergence of asymmetric shocks, i.e.disorders that affect various countries differently, membership in the monetaryunion becomes more expensive because of the inability to conductmonetary policy.


1995 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam L. Campanella

THE NEW REGIONALISM, MANIFESTED IN EUROPE BY THE SINGLE European Act and the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and in North America by the signature of the North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA 1993), is centred on strategic policies and new institutions, the aims of which are to achieve a more effective role in global competition. In Europe, the shift is marked by the impending process of monetary union and the creation of its related institutions. The new approach agreed in the Maastricht Treaty sets out four requirements for eligibility to membership of monetary union. Convergence criteria embodying the judgment of financial markets about future inflation, exchange rate and fiscal policy appeared to be the second best choice for governments seeking to institutionalize their commitment to inflation-avoiding policies. The whole mechanism is meant first to provide the region with a credible monetary institution able to win over the financial markets and secondly to set up bulwarks to the inflation-prone pressures of domestic sheltered interests. Thirdly, the aim is to commit member countries, through a so-called targeting exercise (in Keohane's words) to accomplishing the agreed objectives with monetary discipline and macroeconomic adjustment.


2015 ◽  
Vol 130 (3) ◽  
pp. 1369-1420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Gabaix ◽  
Matteo Maggiori

Abstract We provide a theory of the determination of exchange rates based on capital flows in imperfect financial markets. Capital flows drive exchange rates by altering the balance sheets of financiers that bear the risks resulting from international imbalances in the demand for financial assets. Such alterations to their balance sheets cause financiers to change their required compensation for holding currency risk, thus affecting both the level and volatility of exchange rates. Our theory of exchange rate determination in imperfect financial markets not only helps rationalize the empirical disconnect between exchange rates and traditional macroeconomic fundamentals, it also has real consequences for output and risk sharing. Exchange rates are sensitive to imbalances in financial markets and seldom perform the shock absorption role that is central to traditional theoretical macroeconomic analysis. Our framework is flexible; it accommodates a number of important modeling features within an imperfect financial market model, such as nontradables, production, money, sticky prices or wages, various forms of international pricing-to-market, and unemployment.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Leibrecht ◽  
Johann Scharler

Abstract In this article, we explore how characteristics of the domestic financial system influence the international allocation of consumption risk in a sample of OECD countries. Our results show that the extent of risk sharing achieved does not depend on the overall development of the domestic financial system per se. Rather, it depends on how the financial system is organized. Countries characterized by developed financial markets are less exposed to idiosyncratic risk, whereas the development of the banking sector contributes little to the international diversification of consumption risk.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gunther Schnabl

Abstract The paper scrutinizes the role of diverging fiscal policy stances for diverging current account positions in Europe with a focus on the European Monetary Union (EMU). In a heterogeneous monetary union fiscal policy has the task to absorb asymmetric shocks to ensure the efficacy of the one-size monetary policy. It is argued that since the early years of the European Monetary Union divergent fiscal policies combined with monetary expansion constituted a major determinant of current account divergence within the euro area, which finally led into the European debt and financial crisis. Panel regressions reveal a significant impact of fiscal policies on current account positions, which to a large extent are independent from the exchange rate regime and turn out to be contingent on monetary and fiscal policy mix. Based on the findings economic policy recommendations are presented.


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