scholarly journals Political risk, incentives and international credit market equilibrium

2002 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 299
Author(s):  
Carlos Hamilton Vasconcelos Araújo
Keyword(s):  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Political Risk ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
International Credit

Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard

1993 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Besanko ◽  
George Kanatas
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Bank Monitoring

International credit market integration in northwestern Europe in the 1670s

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-145
Author(s):  
Ling-Fan Li
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
Market Integration ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Disruptive Effect ◽  
Speed Of Adjustment ◽  
Financial Market Integration ◽  
International Credit

This article studies the financial market integration in the 1670s by examining the effectiveness of triangular exchange arbitrage. The results suggest that international credit markets based on bills of exchange in northwestern Europe were well integrated and responded to exchange-rate differences quickly. The speed of adjustment, ranging between one and three weeks, accorded with the speed of communication, but the transaction cost associated with exchange arbitrage was much lower than that of shipping bullion. Although warfare had a disruptive effect on exchange arbitrage by increasing transaction cost, markets were resilient in remaining efficient.

Imperfect Credit Markets and Crime

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Baumann ◽  
Tim Friehe
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Information Asymmetries ◽  
Lending Rate ◽  
Criminal Opportunity ◽  
Enforcement Policies

AbstractThis paper analyzes the link between individual crime choices and imperfect credit markets. The study shows that, by affecting the equilibrium lending rate, credit market characteristics such as the mark-up required by lenders or the severity of information asymmetries between lenders and loan applicants influence the extent of crime. For example, higher mark-ups incite more crime when less borrowing makes the criminal opportunity more tempting. Similarly, law enforcement policies may impact on the credit market equilibrium.

The Systemic Effects of Prudential Regulation Toughening:The Results of a Stress-test for Russian Banks

2012 ◽  
pp. 4-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Mamonov ◽  
A. Pestova ◽  
O. Solntsev
Keyword(s):  
Financial Services ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Stress Test ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Government Ownership ◽  
Prudential Regulation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

The stability of Russian banking sector is threatened by three negative tendencies - overheating of the credit market, significant decrease of banks capital adequacy ratios, and growing problems associated with banks lending to affiliated non-financial corporations. The co-existence of these processes reflects the crisis of the model of private investments in Russian banking sector, which was observed during the last 20 years. This paper analyzes the measures of the Bank of Russia undertaken to maintain the stability of the banking sector using the methodology of credit risk stress-testing. Based on this methodology we conclude that the Bank of Russias actions can prevent the overheating of the credit market, but they can also lead to undesirable effects: further expansion of the government ownership in Russian banking sector and substitution of domestic credit supply by cross-border corporate borrowings. The later weakens the competitive positions of Russian banks. We propose a set of measures to harmonize the prudential regulation of banks. Our suggestions rely on design and further implementation of the programs aimed at developing new markets for financial services provided by Russian banks to their corporate and retail customers. The estimated effects of proposed policy measures are both the increase in profitability and capitalization of Russian banks and the decrease of banks demand for government support.

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