scholarly journals Should Skepticism Be Discredited?

Conatus ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Anthony Udoka Ezebuiro ◽  
Obiora Anichebe ◽  
Anthony Chimankpam Ojimba

In our day-to-day life and experiences, when one doubts or questions unusually, he is branded a skeptic and consequently resisted. Skeptics, over the years, are seen as people whose basic mood is that of doubt; those who deny absolutely that true knowledge is possible. Although this is not completely true of skepticism, the present work demonstrates, though arguably, that skepticism is more of a philosophical method of inquiry; an epistemological attitude towards knowledge but whose goal is indeed certainty, although it selects a serious doubt concerning all knowledge as the starting point of the inquiry into the possibility of true knowledge. It can rightly be said that the work displays the paradox of skepticism. The word ‘paradox’ originates from a Latin term paradoxum, which has a Greek association paradoxon, or paradoxos, signifying “conflicting with expectation.” Thus, the word paradox signifies a tenet or proposition contrary to received opinions. It is a statement or sentiment that is seemingly contradictory or opposed to common sense and yet, perhaps true in fact. The need for this work is necessitated by the fact that in the present age, it has become no longer the case that the best way to certainty is only by accepting entirely all that one is told, especially when such comes from a sage or a tradition. Obviously, we live in a dispensation where almost every human situation challenges the human rational faculty hence the tendency to change facts and hang-on to lies generates serious fever in every thinking mind. The result of this work therefore is that imperatively, the work demands that whoever wants knowledge should proceed through doubt. The method through which this work arrives at this conclusion is the analytic process of discussion and presentation.

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-58
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Galko ◽  

The ontological question of what there is, from the perspective of common sense, is intricately bound to what can be perceived. The above observation, when combined with the fact that nouns within language can be divided between nouns that admit counting, such as ‘pen’ or ‘human’, and those that do not, such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’, provides the starting point for the following investigation into the foundations of our linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to claim that such phenomena are facilitated by, on the one hand, an intricate cognitive capacity, and on the other by the complex environment within which we live. We are, in a sense, cognitively equipped to perceive discrete instances of matter such as bodies of water. This equipment is related to, but also differs from, that devoted to the perception of objects such as this computer. Behind this difference in cognitive equipment underlies a rich ontology, the beginnings of which lies in the distinction between matter and objects. The following paper is an attempt to make explicit the relationship between matter and objects and also provide a window to our cognition of such entities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-364
Author(s):  
Mattia Pinto

Abstract In the last three decades, wartime sexual violence has become one of the main concerns for feminists engaged with international law. This essay reviews Karen Engle’s monograph on the causes and implications of today’s common-sense narrative about sexual violence in conflict. It shows how Engle’s powerful critique of ‘carceral feminism’ may represent a starting point for a new discussion of sex and war in international law.


Philosophy ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nakul Krishna

AbstractMany moral philosophers tend to construe the aims of ethics as the interpretation and critique of ‘common-sense morality’. This approach is defended by Henry Sidgwick in his influential The Methods of Ethics and presented as a development of a basically Socratic idea of philosophical method. However, Sidgwick's focus on our general beliefs about right and wrong action drew attention away from the Socratic insistence on treating beliefs as one expression of our wider dispositions.Understanding the historical contingency of Sidgwick's approach to ethics can help us reflect on whether there are other ways in which modern ethics can be Socratic.


PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (34) ◽  
Author(s):  
Britt Tatman Ferguson

Author(s):  
Paul Wood

The school of common sense philosophy originated in the mid-1730s in Aberdeen in the circle of clergymen and academics associated with Thomas Reid. During the 1750s and 1760s the details of the philosophy of common sense were developed by Reid, Alexander Gerard and George Campbell, largely in response to the irreligious implications of Hume’s writings. Their ideas subsequently served as the starting point for the different formulations of common sense philosophy published by James Beattie and James Oswald. Beattie, Oswald and Reid were widely attacked in the 1770s and 1780s for their appeals to common sense, most notably by Joseph Priestley and Immanuel Kant. These attacks prompted Dugald Stewart to reformulate the appeal to common sense principles in the 1790s. However, Stewart’s version of common sense philosophy found little support in Scotland and the school effectively disappeared with his death in 1828.


1956 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-152
Author(s):  
Walter P. Krolikowski ◽  
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Hanna M. Salminen

Orientation: Given the global shortage of registered nurses, it is important to investigate the intentions for job withdrawal of nurses, and resolve these, in order to retain nurses in the field.Research purpose: The objective was to examine the intentions for job withdrawal of ageing and younger nurses, and the antecedents of these intentions, with special reference to job control and perceived development opportunities. The age of 45 was adopted as a starting point when referring to ageing employees.Motivation for the study: Different forms of job withdrawal have rarely been studied together and associated.Research design, approach and method: A quantitative study was applied with logistic regression analyses. Respondents were registered nurses working in a university hospital in Finland. The response rate was 46.1% (N = 343).Main findings: A quarter (25%) of the nurses had frequently thought about leaving the profession and 19% of the nurses had thought about taking early retirement. Factors that increased the likelihood of intentions for occupational turnover were young age, low job satisfaction, low organisational commitment, low work ability and skills in balance with or above present work demands. The intention to take early retirement was increased with older age, being male, working shifts, low work ability, low job satisfaction and poor job control.Practical/managerial implications: A nurse’s job satisfaction and work ability should be regularly monitored and opportunities should be offered them, to apply their skills and to control their work, in order to retain them.Contribution/value–added: The article added information about the factors that contribute to a nurse’s intentions for job withdrawal.


Author(s):  
William G. Lycan

This book offers an epistemology of philosophy itself, a partial method for philosophical inquiry. The epistemology features three ultimate sources of justified philosophical belief. First, common sense, in a carefully restricted sense of the term—the sorts of contingent propositions Moore defended against idealists and skeptics. Second, the deliverances of well confirmed science. Third, and more fundamentally, intuitions about cases, in a carefully specified sense of that term. Chapters 1–4 expound a version of Moore’s method and apply it to each of several issues. The version is shown to resist all the standard objections to Moore; most of them do not even apply. Chapters 5 and 6 argue that philosophical method is far less powerful than most have taken it to be. In particular, deductive argument can accomplish very little, and hardly ever is an opposing position refuted except by common sense or by science. Chapters 7 and 8 defend the evidential status of intuitions and the Goodmanian method of reflective equilibrium; it is argued that philosophy always and everywhere depends on them. The method is then set within a more general explanatory-coherentist epistemology, which is shown to resist standard forms of skepticism. In sum, this book advocates a picture of philosophy as a very wide explanatory reflective equilibrium incorporating common sense, science, and our firmest intuitions on any topic—and nothing more, not ever.


2021 ◽  
pp. 146470012110147
Author(s):  
Rachel O’Neill

The essential premise of #MeToo is that, while large numbers of women are subject to sexual harassment and assault, this reality is not known to or understood by unnamed others. This article interrogates the subject of non-knowing that #MeToo points to but does not name, asking: who exactly does not know, and why? These questions provide the starting point to elaborate the concept of male ignorance. While this lexicon has been fleetingly deployed in canonical feminist works – where it denotes something so obvious that it does not require explanation, functioning instead as a kind of feminist common sense – I develop it here so it might be put to greater use as a dedicated analytic. The work of Charles Mills, particularly his writings on white ignorance, provides a critical precedent in this regard. Following Mills in foregrounding the ideological operations of not knowing, I conceive male ignorance as a structure of concerted if unconscious epistemic occlusion which both stems from and serves to protect male privilege. As such, it plays a crucial role in securing the overall relation of domination and oppression within which gendered lives are lived. While male ignorance is itself multiple and has a variety of stakeholders, I argue that the non-knowing that surrounds sexual harassment and assault – which #MeToo draws attention to and seeks to undo – constitutes a paradigmatic manifestation, one in which cisgender heterosexual men have a particular stake.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document