scholarly journals Parallele Anwendbarkeit von Grundrechtecharta der EU und nationalen Grundrechten

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 9-16
Author(s):  
Ivo Pilving

Pursuant to its Article 51 (1), the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights covers the implementation of EU law. Since 2014, the Estonian Supreme Court has applied the assumption that the Charter, in principle, does not preclude parallel applicability of national-level fundamental rights in areas subject to EU law, although the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law must not be compromised thereby. The Member State's margin of appreciation should not be considered a precondition for the relevance of national fundamental rights. Even mandatory norms of EU law, which inevitably require certain national measures (e.g., permission to use a piece of music for sampling as in CJEU case C-476/17: Pelham), do not exclude the applicability of constitutional rights (here, the composer's copyright), though these can justify their restriction. Hence, the relevant piece of EU legislation itself must be valid. The CJEU should follow the principle of constitutional plurality in dialogue with national courts when examining the validity of EU norms restricting national fundamental rights. A parallel analysis of the national constitution and Charter by the competent national court would assist the CJEU in issuing a preliminary ruling. The most favourable standard of the fundamental rights in sense of the Article 53 should not be determined on merely abstract terms. Instead, the results of parallel analysis in light of the pending case should be of decisive importance. One conclusion presented is that in cases of multipolar conflict, there remains the possibility that a even fundamental right of one person that is derived from a national constitution can sometimes justify infringement on the charter-based right of another if there is no secondary legal balance of legal positions. In addition, exceptional situations might exist wherein fundamental principles of national constitutions may be granted precedence over the effectiveness of EU law.

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 9-16
Author(s):  
Ivo Pilving

Pursuant to its Article 51 (1), the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights covers the implementation of EU law. Since 2014, the Estonian Supreme Court has applied the assumption that the Charter, in principle, does not preclude parallel applicability of national-level fundamental rights in areas subject to EU law, although the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law must not be compromised thereby. The Member State's margin of appreciation should not be considered a precondition for the relevance of national fundamental rights. Even mandatory norms of EU law, which inevitably require certain national measures (e.g., permission to use a piece of music for sampling as in CJEU case C-476/17: Pelham), do not exclude the applicability of constitutional rights (here, the composer's copyright), though these can justify their restriction. Hence, the relevant piece of EU legislation itself must be valid. The CJEU should follow the principle of constitutional plurality in dialogue with national courts when examining the validity of EU norms restricting national fundamental rights. A parallel analysis of the national constitution and Charter by the competent national court would assist the CJEU in issuing a preliminary ruling. The most favourable standard of the fundamental rights in sense of the Article 53 should not be determined on merely abstract terms. Instead, the results of parallel analysis in light of the pending case should be of decisive importance. One conclusion presented is that in cases of multipolar conflict, there remains the possibility that a even fundamental right of one person that is derived from a national constitution can sometimes justify infringement on the charter-based right of another if there is no secondary legal balance of legal positions. In addition, exceptional situations might exist wherein fundamental principles of national constitutions may be granted precedence over the effectiveness of EU law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-49
Author(s):  
Mihaela Vrabie

This article aims to determine when the national authorities have the obligation to comply with EU fundamental rights, in the framework of administrative procedures carried out in the EU Member States. It also aims to determine the legal remedies available at national level in the context of judicial review in case of violation, by the national authorities, of EU fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU or as general principles of EU law. To this end, this study explains the impact of the legally binding EU Charter on public administration of the Member States and the field of application of the EU Charter at national level. The article also deals with the distinction between EU fundamental rights as primary EU law guaranteed by the EU Charter and EU fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. With reference to the judicial remedies available to national courts, the study outlines the effects of EU law (primacy of EU law, direct effect, direct application) in relation to the EU fundamental rights and the measures that can be adopted by the national courts when the action of the national administrative authorities is not compatible with EU fundamental rights. Finally, the article presents the most important findings concerning judicial protection of EU fundamental rights at the national level, especially from the perspective of the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial stipulated by Article 47 of the EU Charter.  


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 86-91
Author(s):  
Araceli Turmo

Discussions on the appropriate fundamental rights standards in the EU and the need to take into account conflicting interests are increasingly being reframed as debates on the conflict between the primacy of EU law and the constitutional standards of the Member States. One example of this reframing is the French administrative supreme court’s decision following the ECJ judgment in La Quadrature du Net. The Conseil ruled that the EU standards set in that judgment must be reviewed, at the national level, with regard to a national understanding of security concerns and the requirements of the fight against terrorism. Thus, constitutional requirements related to public security may be relied upon to argue for a lower standard of protection of personal data than those which the ECJ requires. As this decision shows, the ability of corporations and Governments to rely on litigation before national courts to challenge the standard of protection set at the EU level creates a significant risk, not only for the uniformity of EU law, but also for the protection of the rights of individuals. 


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter examines the application of EU law by national courts and the way in which the CJEU controls national remedies for breach of EU law. Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union contains a new clause added by the Lisbon Treaty, which specifies that ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law’. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that ‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article’. However, beyond these broad new provisions, EU law does not lay down any general scheme of substantive or procedural law governing remedies for its enforcement. The European Court of Justice has responded to the lack of a harmonized system of EU remedies by requiring national courts, in certain cases, to make available a particular type of remedy (e.g., restitution or interim relief), regardless of whether this would be available under national law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 528-529

On Tuesday, April 20, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in Case C-896/19, Repubblika v. Il-Prim Ministru that Malta's system for appointing judges did not contradict EU law. As reported by JURIST, the ruling went before the national court when Repubblika, an association created to promote the rule of law in Malta, had challenged the procedure, which was provided by the Constitution of Malta. The process in the Maltese Constitution stated that judiciary members are appointed by the president acting under the advisement of the prime minister. However, appointees must satisfy certain conditions and are subject to background checks or other examinations by the Judicial Appointments Committee, whose purpose is to assess candidates and provide feedback to the prime minister. The national court brought this to the CJEU to decide whether this system was constitutional under EU law, specifically under Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, in light of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states that member states must provide conditions for a fair, independent, and impartial trial to ensure true justice. The court reached the conclusion that this practice was not prohibited by EU law because, in order to guarantee conditions of judicial independence and impartiality, procedures must exist to ensure that appointees are free from influence from the legislature and/or executive with regard to judiciary proceedings. The Court found that power of the prime minister to submit a candidate that was not suggested by the Judicial Appointments Committee was not contrary to EU law because of various safeguarding measures included in the Constitution. The Court held: “Inasmuch as the Prime Minister exercises that power only in quite exceptional circumstances and adheres to strict and effective compliance with that obligation to state reasons, that power is not such as to give rise to legitimate doubts concerning the independence of the candidates selected” (para. 71). Therefore, the Court concluded that the national provisions at issue do not give rise to any legitimate uncertainties, or doubts of independence, regarding the chosen judiciary candidates.


Author(s):  
Encarnación Roca Trías ◽  
Susana García Couso

Es de sobra conocida la tensión existente entre los Tribunales Constitucionales de los Estados miembros y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea a raíz del planteamiento de cuestiones prejudiciales ante el TJUE en supuestos en los que, aunque el asunto se plantee como una cuestión interpretativa del derecho de la Unión, comprende, además, un problema de derechos fundamentales susceptibles de ser controlados, también, constitucionalmente. Ambos procedimientos terminan con una decisión de compatibilidad con los derechos fundamentales. Este artículo pretende hacer una reflexión acerca de los problemas que suscita el hecho de que dos Tribunales —TJUE y TC— competentes en materia de protección de derechos fundamentales, y, al mismo tiempo, interpretadores de un mismo ordenamiento jurídico, puedan emitir juicios paralelos sobre una misma norma que ha sido sometida a su control y con parámetros diferentes de control: la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y la Constitución.This paper purports to reflect on the complex issues that arise from the fact that both the European Court of Justice and the national constitutional court have the power to adjudicate on fundamental rights and that, therefore, on the basis of the application of different rules — the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the national Constitution — they can occasionally arrive at different decisions. National courts are more and more aware of this dual avenue to challenge national regulations, through the preliminary reference to the ECJ and through the reference to the Constitutional Court of constitutional doubts with regard to national legislation. In consequence, national Constitutional Courts must accommodate into this new scenario.


Author(s):  
Helena Majić

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has been applied directly by the Croatian Constitutional Court since the decision No. U-I-1397/2015 (Act on Elections of the Representatives to the Croatian Parliament) rendered in 2015. Ever since it can be observed that the Charter has been consistently applied both in the proceedings of constitutional review in abstracto and in the proceedings initiated by a constitutional complaint (constitutional review in concreto), however, in a limited number of cases mostly concerning migrations or asylum.Therefore, this paper analyses the application of the Charter in the case law of the Croatian Constitutional Court and the method of interpretation pursued, with special reference to both its shortcomings and benefits. The paper also investigates the reasons for limited application of the Charter, even in those cases which would normally fall under the scope of application of EU law. The analysis indicates two distinct methodological approaches adopted by the Constitutional Court. The first one, where the Charter has been regarded as an interpretative tool only; and the second one, where the Charter has been found to be directly applicable vis-à-vis individual rights inferred from the EU law. The latter approach, first followed in an asylum case No. U-III-424/2019 (X. Y.), had raised new questions on interpretation of the Charter (with respect to the Croatian constitutional framework) in the cases where the Charter's applicability ratione materiae overlaps with the Croatian Constitution and the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which to the day, in contrast to the Charter, has been consistently followed and therefore legally internalised by the Croatian Constitutional Court. Therefore, the paper also elaborates a new methodological approach adopted by the Croatian Constitutional Court in finding a way out of „limbo“ between the Charter, the ECHR, and the Croatian Constitution.


Author(s):  
Violeta Moreno-Lax

This chapter presents the subject matter under scrutiny and provides a historical account of the development of extraterritorial strategies of migration management in Europe, coinciding with parallel changes in refugee movements and the composition of migratory flows on the global scale. The objective and research questions the study seeks to address are also introduced, together with a description of the methodology underpinning the research. In particular, the ‘cumulative standards’ or ‘integrated interpretation’ model employed to construe EU Charter of Fundamental Rights standards is canvassed. The concept of ‘jurisdiction’ and the alternative ‘Fransson paradigm’ applicable to interpret the scope of application of EU law is also briefly defined. The structure of the book is outlined at the end, providing an overview of the different chapters and their interrelation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 53-85
Author(s):  
Petr Mádr

This article contributes to the growing scholarship on the national application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ('the Charter') by assessing what challenges national courts face when dealing with Article 51 of the Charter, which sets out the Charter's material scope of application. In keeping with this aim, the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) – with its general formulas, abstract guidance and implementation categories – is discussed strictly from the perspective of the national judge. The article then presents the findings of a thorough study of the case law of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) and evaluates this Court's track record when assessing the Charter's applicability. National empirical data of that kind can provide valuable input into the CJEU-centred academic debate on the Charter's scope of application.


This Commentary provides an article-by-article summary of the TEU, the TFEU, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, offering a quick reference to the provisions of the Treaties and how they are interpreted and applied in practice. Written by a team of contributors drawn from the Legal Service of the European Commission and academia, the Commentary offers expert guidance to practitioners and academics seeking fast access to the Treaties and current practice. The Commentary follows a set structure, offering a short overview of the Article, the Article text itself, a key references list including essential case law and legislation, and a structured commentary on the Article itself. The editors and contributors combine experience in practice with a strong academic background and have published widely on a variety of EU law subjects.


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