Briefly Noted

2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 528-529
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
National Court ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Background Checks ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights

On Tuesday, April 20, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in Case C-896/19, Repubblika v. Il-Prim Ministru that Malta's system for appointing judges did not contradict EU law. As reported by JURIST, the ruling went before the national court when Repubblika, an association created to promote the rule of law in Malta, had challenged the procedure, which was provided by the Constitution of Malta. The process in the Maltese Constitution stated that judiciary members are appointed by the president acting under the advisement of the prime minister. However, appointees must satisfy certain conditions and are subject to background checks or other examinations by the Judicial Appointments Committee, whose purpose is to assess candidates and provide feedback to the prime minister. The national court brought this to the CJEU to decide whether this system was constitutional under EU law, specifically under Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, in light of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states that member states must provide conditions for a fair, independent, and impartial trial to ensure true justice. The court reached the conclusion that this practice was not prohibited by EU law because, in order to guarantee conditions of judicial independence and impartiality, procedures must exist to ensure that appointees are free from influence from the legislature and/or executive with regard to judiciary proceedings. The Court found that power of the prime minister to submit a candidate that was not suggested by the Judicial Appointments Committee was not contrary to EU law because of various safeguarding measures included in the Constitution. The Court held: “Inasmuch as the Prime Minister exercises that power only in quite exceptional circumstances and adheres to strict and effective compliance with that obligation to state reasons, that power is not such as to give rise to legitimate doubts concerning the independence of the candidates selected” (para. 71). Therefore, the Court concluded that the national provisions at issue do not give rise to any legitimate uncertainties, or doubts of independence, regarding the chosen judiciary candidates.

Fundamental Rights Protection between Strasbourg and Luxembourg

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin Ligeti
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Grand Chamber

Since long before the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), the two highest courts in Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have sought to develop their respective jurisprudence in such a way as to ensure a strong protection of individual rights, whilst avoiding clashes between the decisions taken in Luxembourg and Strasbourg. An important statement in this regard is provided by the Bosphorus judgment, in which the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR recognised the existence of a presumption of equivalent protection of fundamental rights under EU law. The presumption is rebuttable, but expresses the trustful attitude (and a certain degree of deference) of Strasbourg towards the ability of EU law (and of the CJEU) to protect Convention rights.

Travauxto the EU Treaties: Preparatory Work as a Source of EU Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 145-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuli MIETTINEN ◽  
Merita KETTUNEN
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Dynamic Interpretation ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Preparatory Work ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThe Court of Justice of the European Union has historically rejected references to preparatory work in the interpretation of EU Treaties. However, the preparatory work for the EURATOM, Maastricht, and Constitutional Treaties have played a role in recent judgments. The ‘explanations’ to the Charter of Fundamental Rights are expressly approved in the current Treaties. We examine the emerging case law on preparatory work. Reference to the drafters’ intent does not necessarily support dynamic interpretation, and may potentially even ossify historical interpretations. Even if the consequence of their introduction is a conservative interpretation, their use raises questions of transparency and democracy, and complicates the already difficult task of interpreting the EU constitution.

scholarly journals The Relationship between EU Law and Fundamental Principles of Estonian Substantive Criminal Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 174-182
Author(s):  
Kaie Rosin
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

Although the EU lacks explicit competence to harmonise national principles of criminal law, there are many ways in which EU law and national criminal law are interconnected on a level deeper than mere minimum standards adopted from directives. The article analyses these intersections between EU law and fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law, explaining how the principles of criminal law recognised and interpreted in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and covered by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union exhibit the capacity to affect fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law. The article focuses on five principles specific to substantive criminal law, which are derived from the fundamental principles of the Estonian Constitution and have equivalents in human-rights law: the principle of legality of criminal law, the principle of retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law, proportionality, ultima ratio, and the principle of individual guilt. The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between EU law and the various principles of substantive criminal law is not uniform because the principles of substantive criminal law are not developed evenly at European Union level.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: The First Ten Years-New Challenges and Perspectives

Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Vasileios G. Tzemos ◽  
Konstantinos Margaritis
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
New Challenges ◽  
The Eu

Since 1 December 2009, the time when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter: the EU Charter, the Charter) has been formally included in the EU legal order as primary EU law [...]

6. General principles of law

2020 ◽  
pp. 144-180
Author(s):  
Marios Costa ◽  
Steve Peers
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Procedural Rights ◽  
Relationship Of

This chapter examines the development of the general principles by the Court of Justice (CJ) to support the protection of human rights in the European Union (EU) law within the scope of EU law. It analyses the relationship of the general principles derived from the CJ’s jurisprudence to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR), which includes substantive rights and procedural rights, as well as the principles of proportionality and legal certainty. It discusses the possible accession of the EU to the ECHR and the implications of Opinion 2/13. It suggests that although the protection of human rights has been more visible since the Lisbon Treaty and there are now more avenues to such protection, it is debatable whether the scope and level of protection has increased.

scholarly journals The Spanish Constitutional Court and Fundamental Rights Adjudication After the First Preliminary Reference

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1509-1528
Author(s):  
Miryam Rodríguez-Izquierdo Serrano
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Law System ◽  
Community Law ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights

The purpose of the preliminary reference procedure is to ensure a uniform application and interpretation of Community law across all the Member States, including European fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The entry into force of the Charter has reinforced the authority of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the field of fundamental rights adjudication. But the Charter may also be a new source of conflicts between the jurisdiction of the CJEU and the jurisdiction of national constitutional courts. Indeed, compliance with the indirect rulings over national law contained in the CJEU decisions became something logical for the national ordinary courts from the beginning of the integration process, but it was not the same for national constitutional courts. Most of them have always disliked the idea of asking for the CJEU's opinion on a conflict of law involving national constitutional provisions. The CJEU succeeded in establishing a legal doctrine through principles of Community law—supremacy and direct effect being the pioneers—that meant a material constitutionalization of the European Union (EU) law system. And for the national constitutional courts, such an understanding of EU law made a rival of the CJEU.

scholarly journals Wolność prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej w świetle art. 16 Karty praw podstawowych — wybrane problemy

2018 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 499-510
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Horubski
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Economic Freedom ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Business Activity ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right ◽  
Legal Character

FREEDOM TO CONDUCT A BUSINESS IN THE LIGHT OF ARTICLE 16 OF THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION — SELECTED ISSUESThe article deals with the signifi cance and legal character of the provision of Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This article provides for the freedom to conduct a business. Therefore, the article presents a standpoint regarding the qualifi cations of the right to conduct business within the framework of the division of provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into principles and fundamental rights rights or freedoms. In the article’s considerations, the right to conduct business activity under art. 16 of the Charter is recognized as a fundamental right. The article also draws attention to the signifi cant deficiencies in the protection of economic freedom in EU law, in particular when it concerns the introduction of restrictions on this freedom in EU derivative law. Finally, comments are also made regarding the basic aspects of the subjective and objective scope of the right to conduct business.

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