scholarly journals Superior Responsibility in Estonian Criminal Law and its Compliance with International Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 64-78
Author(s):  
Andres Parmas

 If a domestic criminal-law system is to be equipped to operate in conformity with the underlying idea of complementarity that is among the International Criminal Court’s underpinnings, it is vital that, amongst other aspects of general principles of responsibility, the superior responsibility doctrine be transposed into domestic law properly. Accordingly, the paper deconstructs Art. 88 (1) of the Estonian Penal Code, which stipulates the superior responsibility concept in the Estonian legal system, for the purpose of assessing whether it exhibits compliance with customary international law on superior responsibility or Art. 28 of the Rome Statute. The analysis presented reveals considerable differences between the Estonian regulatory scheme and relevant international norms: it appears that there are several respects in which Estonian regulation does not meet the international standard and, hence, large lacunae are to be found in Estonian law on superior responsibility. For this reason, the article concludes with a recommendation that Estonian regulation of superior responsibility be complemented in such a way that it is rendered consistent with international law – specifically, with the requirements of Art. 28 of the Rome Statute – while simultaneously taking into consideration the demands stemming from Estonian criminal-law dogmatics, especially the guilt principle.

Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 27 consists two paragraphs that are often confounded but fulfil different functions. Paragraph 1 denies a defence of official capacity, i.e. official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the Statute. Paragraph 2 amounts to a renunciation, by States Parties to the Rome Statute, of the immunity of their own Head of State to which they are entitled by virtue of customary international law. In contrast with paragraph 1, it is without precedent in international criminal law instruments.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARRIE SANDER

AbstractThe recent jurisprudence of the ICTY concerning the proper interpretation of the doctrine of superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute has been stifled by division and uncertainty. In particular, the question of the responsibility of successor superiors for crimes committed by their subordinates prior to taking command has led to a number of 3–2 majority decisions. This paper seeks to reconcile the divergent judicial opinions by moving away from a narrow analysis of successor superior responsibility, instead focusing on the determination of the underlying nature of the doctrine of superior responsibility. While a polarity of opinions also exists in relation to the nature of the doctrine of superior responsibility, this paper argues that the opinions can be reconciled by adopting a more principled approach to customary international law, an approach justified by the international criminal law context. Such an approach involves two elements: first, ensuring that a clear distinction is drawn between international humanitarian and international criminal legal concepts; and, second, the invocation of the principle of individual culpability as a standard against which the weight to be attributed to authorities evidencing custom ought to be assessed. A principled approach would enable the identification of the nature of the doctrine of superior responsibility while ensuring that the doctrine reinforces international criminal law principles rather than acts as an exception to them; in addition, by determining the nature of the doctrine of superior responsibility, the principled approach would unravel the confusion concerning successor superior responsibility in the ICTY jurisprudence.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiromi Satō

The International Criminal Court recently presented its arguments concerning criminal responsibility arising pursuant to the theory of ‘control over an organization’. This theory is based on the notion of ‘perpetrator-by-means’ found in the Rome Statute, Article 25(3)a. The court appears to have utilized this theory to establish principal responsibility for ordering in contrast to accessorial responsibility prescribed in Article 25(3)b of the said Statute. However, it should be noted that customary international law has long established the notion of command responsibility lato sensu, recognizing the serious and primary nature of superiors’ responsibility for ordering. This article argues that there should be some conscious sequence between the discussions of ‘control over an organization’ and command responsibility lato sensu for the sake of the integrity of the discourse in international criminal law.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 789-828 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lachezar Yanev ◽  
Tijs Kooijmans

The concept of co-perpetration and its proper construction continues to be a topic that causes controversy and fragmentation in the field of international criminal law. The latest proof of this is the Lubanga Trial Judgment in which the three judges disagreed on whether this mode of liability should be based on the theory of joint control over the crime. The present article examines and further develops Judge Fulford’s arguments against the adoption of this theory in cases brought before the International Criminal Court. It analyses the Rome Statute and its drafting history, as well as customary international law and domestic jurisprudence, in order to review the contention that there is no legal basis for applying the joint control paradigm in ICC proceedings. In addition to this, several recent ICC cases are examined to underscore the practical weaknesses of the control over the crime approach to co-perpetration.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 346-360
Author(s):  
Leo Zaibert

International law has often been seen with scepticism, at least when contrasted against domestic law. International criminal law may suffer the same fate unless we reject a certain tendency to understand the role and functioning of any legal system in reductive and mechanistic terms. This tendency – a remnant from positivism – sees the law as modelled on games, and on their constitutive rules. I examine here a defense of this positivistic, narrow approach by prominent (domestic) criminal law theorists, and suggest reasons why international criminal law, in particular, should avoid it.


2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuela Melandri

AbstractThis article explores the relationship between state sovereignty and the enforcement of international criminal law under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This doing, it attempts to map out the ambivalent and sometimes contradictory roles that different typologies sovereignty play in advancing or hindering the enforcement of international criminal law. After a brief survey of the literature on the debate over 'international law vs. state sovereignty', the paper focuses on one specific aspect of the newly established ICC: the conditions for case admissibility. The analysis will show that the relationship between state sovereignty and international criminal justice is a dynamic and complex one, which needs to be understood and contextualized within the current system of international relations.


Author(s):  
Raphaël van Steenberghe

This chapter analyses the specific features which characterize the sources of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL). It first examines those which are claimed to characterize IHL and ICL sources in relation to the secondary norms regulating the classical sources of international law. The chapter then looks at the specific features of some IHL and ICL sources in relation to the others of the same field. Attention is given particularly to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the impact of its features on other ICL sources, as well as to the commitments made by armed groups, whose characteristics make them difficult to classify under any of the classical sources of international law. In general, this chapter shows how all those specific features derive from the specific fundamental principles and evolving concerns of these two fields of international law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-697
Author(s):  
Nada Ali

Despite the aspirations of the International Criminal Court (icc), it is unlikely to achieve an end to impunity for crimes of concern to the international community without acknowledgement of and due engagement with the politics of international criminal law. A major threat to the legitimacy of the Court is its relationship with the United Nations Security Council (unsc). unsc referrals of conflict situations under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute remain subject to geo-political considerations. The exercise is thus arbitrary at best, and may render the icc an instrument of political coercion at worst. An apolitical approach to conflicts given this context is almost antithetical to justice and has already given rise to tensions between the Court and some affected member states. Managing the asymmetry created by unsc referrals and rethinking its seemingly unjustified encroachment in the affairs of less influential states should become the priority for the Court.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 784-804
Author(s):  
Harmen van der Wilt

Inter-state practice is relatively scarce in the area of human rights and international criminal law. This article ventures to inquire how this has affected the process of identification of customary international law by international criminal tribunals and courts. The main conclusion is that the two components of customary international law – opinio juris and state practice – have become blurred. In search of customary international law, international tribunals have resorted to national legislation and case law of domestic courts. These legal artefacts can be qualified as both evidence of state practice and opinio juris. The author attempts to explain the reasons for this development and holds that, if properly applied, the methodology, while seemingly messy, comports with the nature of international criminal law.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 98 emerged in the context of the debate on grounds to refuse surrender and assistance. The Rome Statute has the potential to conflict with other obligations of States under international law, whether pursuant to customary international law or treaty. In particular, they are required to respect the immunities of diplomats and international officials. States that allow military activity by foreign troops on their territory often have agreements, known as ‘status of forces agreements’ (SOFAs). Article 98 governs these conflicts by, in effect, making obligations of arrest and surrender under the Statute subordinate to other legal norms.


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