scholarly journals INTERNAL COUNTERREVOLUTION ARMED FORCES MILITARY EFFICIENCY IN THE SOUTH AND EAST OF RUSSIA DURING THE CIVIL WAR

2014 ◽  
Vol 0 (7) ◽  
pp. 70
Author(s):  
Alexander Anatolevich Shuvalov
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The South

Problems of Interactions of the White Army Commanders with Separatist Governments of South Russia in A. I. Denikin’s ‘Defamation of the White Movement’

2018 ◽  
pp. 1149-1162
Author(s):  
Konstantin N. Kurkov ◽  
◽  
Alexander V. Melnichuk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Russian Empire ◽  
The South ◽  
National Interests ◽  
German Occupation ◽  
Imperial Germany ◽  
Occupied Territories ◽  
Sensitive Issues ◽  
Regional Interests

The article studies some of the more complicated and sensitive issues of the Civil War in the South of Russia – relations of the Armed Forces of South Russia with the Krai governments of the Don and the Kuban and separatist movements as an important factor in the Whites’ defeat in the South of Russia. Both issues are covered in ‘Defamation of the White Movement,’ one of the last works of General A. I. Denikin. Its manuscript has been introduced into scientific use by the authors. Commanders and military authorities of the Volunteer Army with A. I. Denikin at its head were not tied down by regional interests and could pursue national interests in their policy in order to restore an all-Russian unity destroyed by the revolution. Regional concerns of the Don, Kuban, Little Russian, Caucasian independentists were in direct conflict with the national tasks that the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of South Russia strove to solve. Unlike the Don Ataman P. N. Krasnov, who was forced to cooperate with the occupation authorities of Imperial Germany, whose troops had occupied the territory of the Great Don Army for the most of 1918, and unlike other regional administrators in the German-occupied territories, the Whites did not cooperate with the occupiers and at times counteracted their anti-Russian policy. Denikin's propaganda successfully used this fact to fall back on traditional patriotic sentiments and to eat away at the Kremlin regime’s support. Centrifugal tendencies in the South of Russia did not allow the Volunteers to consolidate anti-Bolshevik forces and made an armed resistance to the Bolsheviks impossible. Hence A. I. Denikin’s uncompromising stand on separatist aspirations of independentists. In his view, it was the separatists’ activities in different regions of the former Russian Empire that hindered the successful offensive of the armed forces of South Russia, for instance, on the Moscow direction. Internal dissent was exacerbated by intervention of foreign forces – German occupation forces, the Allied Intervention, and active Bolshevik influence on the outskirts of the former Empire. The article compares Denikin’s text with testimonies of contemporaries and writings of historians. Thus, the authors have been able to show that his slender work reliably and accurately recreates the complex and dramatic situation, which led to the defeat of the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Civil War.

“In Fact, We Do Not Have a Regular Army Yet…” A Letter of the Commander of Kiev Region Armed Forces General A.M. Dragomirov to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia General A.I. Denikin. 12 (25) December 1919

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 245-264
Author(s):  
Andrey Ganin
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Stanford University ◽  
The South ◽  
Moral Improvement ◽  
Policy And Strategy ◽  
Red Army ◽  
Regular Army ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Commander In Chief

The document published is a letter from the commander of the Kiev Region General Abram M. Dragomirov to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia General Anton I. Denikin of December, 1919. The source covers the events of the Civil War in Ukraine and the views of the leadership of the White Movement in the South of Russia on a number of issues of policy and strategy in Ukraine. The letter was found in the Hoover Archives of Stanford University in the USA in the collection of Lieutenant General Pavel A. Kusonsky. The document refers to the period when the white armies of the South of Russia after the bright success of the summer-autumn “March on Moscow” in 1919 were stopped by the Red Army and were forced to retreat. On the pages of the letter, Dragomirov describes in detail the depressing picture of the collapse of the white camp in the South of Russia and talks about how to improve the situation. Dragomirov saw the reasons for the failure of the White Movement such as, first of all, the lack of regular troops, the weakness of the officers, the lack of discipline and, as a consequence, the looting and pogroms. In this regard, Dragomirov was particularly concerned about the issue of moral improvement of the army. Part of the letter is devoted to the issues of the civil administration in the territories occupied by the White Army. Dragomirov offers both rational and frankly utopian measures. However, the thoughts of one of the closest Denikin’s companions about the reasons what had happened are interesting for understanding the essence of the Civil War and the worldview of the leadership of the anti-Bolshevik Camp.

Strategy of the White Army on the Southern Front in A. I. Denikin’s ‘Defamation of the White Movement’

2018 ◽  
pp. 260-272
Author(s):  
Konstantin N. Kurkov ◽  
◽  
Alexander V. Melnichuk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Black Sea ◽  
The South ◽  
Strategic Issues ◽  
Initial Stage ◽  
Black Sea Coast ◽  
History Of ◽  
Southern Russia

The article studies A. I. Denikin's interpretation of military strategic issues of the Civil War in the South of Russia as presented in his manuscript ‘Defamation of the White Movement,’ which is being introduced into scientific use by the authors. It analyses military aspects of A. I. Denikin’s activities, which had been widely debated by the White emigration. One of the main issues in studying the history of the Civil War is formation and battles of the Volunteer Army at the initial stage of the Civil War, strategy of its commanders, and causes of its subsequent defeat and retreat. In his work A. I. Denikin addressed such important issues as strategy of the White leaders when the Movement emerged and the Volunteer Army was formed and later transformed into the Armed Forces of South Russia. He pointed out reasons behind selection of the direction of attack during the First Kuban Campaign, among them expectations of the Don Cossacks uprising. He assessed the validity of assumption that German occupation forces might have supported Bolsheviks. This last point was particularly significant, as German command did not want a revival of independent Russian national armed forces, and wished to prevent the creation of a United White Front against Bolsheviks, their proteges and allies. Offensive in the direction of Kuban aimed to access the Black Sea coast, where the White army could secure much-needed assistance of the Entente. In the South of Russia, on the Don and the Kuban, there was much opposition to the Russian communism and manpower needed by and ultimately supporting Denikin’s army. Finally, A. I. Denikin devoted some (although insufficient) pages to the famous Moscow Campaign, which holds its special place in the history of the Civil War in the South of Russia. The authors compare content of A. I. Denikin’s work with data on main strategic operations of the armed forces of Southern Russia available to contemporary historical science. They argue that A. I. Denikin convincingly refuted erroneous conclusions and speculation of his opponents, widespread in the Russian emigre community. Accurate and succinct characterization of the events, given from the perspective of an eyewitness and an active participant, makes up the bulk of the ‘Defamation of the White Movement,’ which may be of interest not only to scholars, but to all interested in the national history.

scholarly journals “The Terek Host Cleaned out the Native Villages from the Infection with Their Own Hands”: Gorsko-Mozdok Regiments in the Ranks of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia in the Early 1919

2019 ◽  
pp. 84-92
Author(s):  
Ruslan Gagkuev ◽  
Svetlana Shilova
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Local Population ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Black Sea ◽  
Soviet Power ◽  
The South ◽  
Historical Sources ◽  
The Crimea ◽  
History Of

Introduction. The article focuses on the creation of Gorsko-Mozdock regiments of the Terek Cossack Host in the Early 1919 and their subsequent participation in combat operations. The article provides an overview of related historical literature and underlines the importance of further research into the history of the Terek Cossack Host during the Civil War and publication of historical sources. The introduction provides a detailed account of how Terek Cossacks were drafted to the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, and touches upon the difficulties associated with mobilization (not enough officers, undermanning, shortage of weapons and typhus outbreak). Materials. The article introduces a previously unavailable historical source – the order of Terek Cossack Host Mozdock division Ataman Yesaul S.N. Portyanko dated January 17, 1919 on the commencement of mobilization and formation of Cossack regiments. Analysis. The order demonstrates overly optimistic expectations of the Cossack leadership regarding the support of the local population and mobilization results. In real life, fast implementation of the command’s plans proved to be impossible due to the situation in Cossack stanitsas. The document shows the Cossack command’s commitment to mobilize all available resources in order to defeat the Soviet power. Results. The article sums up the considerations by pointing out that during the Civil War the majority of the Terek Cossack Host opposed the Soviet power and supplied considerable human resources to the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. Despite the aforementioned difficulties caused by the situation in the region, the formation of Cossack regiments went rather well, and soon these regiments were dispatched to the front. The efforts undertaken by the Terek Cossack Host in the war against the Soviet power in 1919–1920 show the Cossacks’ unwavering commitment to give their all to victory. Upon the evacuation of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia from the Black Sea coast to the Crimea, Terek Cossacks could no longer hope for reinforcement and were incorporated into other White military units.

“The last chord of the Silver Age”: science and culture in Crimea in 1920

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (10-4) ◽  
pp. 4-14
Author(s):  
Vladimir Kalinovsky ◽  
Alexander Puchenkov
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
The South ◽  
Silver Age ◽  
Russian Culture ◽  
Short Period ◽  
The Crimea ◽  
Science And Culture ◽  
History Of ◽  
Russian Intelligentsia

This article is devoted to the development of science and culture in the short period of the Wrangel Crimea - 1920. At this time, the brightest figures of Russian culture of that time worked on the territory of the small Peninsula: O. E. Mandelstam, M. A. Voloshin, B.D. Grekov, G.V. Vernadsky, V.I. Vernadsky and others. The article provides an overview of the life and activities of the Russian intelligentsia in 1920 in the Crimea, based on materials of periodicals as the most important source for studying the history of the Civil war in the South of Russia whose value is to be fully evaluated.

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