What is a Child?

Author(s):  
Timothy Fowler ◽  
Timothy Fowler

This chapter outlines an account of what it means to be a child, and why childhood matters as a moral category. I argue that despite concerns, a theory should take childhood simply to mean people below the age of 18. I argue that childhood matters because children’s malleability and vulnerability mean they are poorly served by existing accounts of liberal justice.

1967 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 258-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Beck
Keyword(s):  

1967 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 258-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Beck
Keyword(s):  

1995 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Moore

One of the most important and divisive issues facing heterogeneous or culturally diverse states—and most states are culturally diverse—is the relation between these different cultures and the state.This question was raised initially in contemporary liberal political philosophy in terms of the fruitful debate between liberals and communitarians. Sandel, for example, criticized Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and, by extension, all liberal theories for falsely abstracting from conceptions of the good, abstracting from culturallyspecific conceptions, and grounding his liberal principles in terms of an abstract Kantian individualism. Liberal theorists countered by complaining that communitarians falsely conceived of a single homogeneous community. Although Rawls’s revised defense of liberal justice in his 1993 book Political Liberalism does not refer directly to the liberal-communitarian debate, nevertheless, his new grounding of liberal political principles, as principles which would be acceptable to individuals with diverse conceptions of the good, seems to justify liberal principles in terms of contemporary conditions, and, at the same time, challenges the relevance of those theories which appeal to any notion of a homogeneous ‘community’.


2006 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. R. S. (Trevor R. S.) Allan

2019 ◽  
pp. 1097184X1987409
Author(s):  
Perrine Lachenal

Treating the category “martyr” as socially constructed and contested along gendered and political lines, this paper examines how heroes and martyrs have been produced and deployed in post-revolutionary Tunisia. It begins by examining governmental attempts, launched soon after the revolution, to monopolize and institutionally define who could benefit from official recognition as a martyr. The differences in the definition of “martyrdom” between official institutions and families of the deceased are unpacked, arguing that “martyr” is a moral category, the boundaries of which are often drawn in terms of differing masculinities. The paper goes on to demonstrate how the category of “martyrs of the nation” has progressively overshadowed the category of “martyrs of the revolution” in official memorial practices, as the commemoration of the revolution has progressively focused on its uniformed victims, leaving out the civilian ones. One of the interesting features of this shift is that it demonstrates the malleability of the way the category “violence” is understood and deployed. The paper thus shows how neither state officials nor the families of deceased officers, activists, or bystanders accepted that it was sufficient simply to have died during the upheaval in order to be recognized as a martyr. All applied additional moral and political criteria in order to determine who deserved to be labelled as a martyr. At stake in these debates were contrasting representations of masculinity, in particular between triumphant, militaristic masculinities and fragile and damaged masculinities. As the figure of the uniformed “hero” has become increasingly consolidated and hegemonic in post-revolutionary Tunisia, the term “martyr” itself has been increasingly appropriated by state institutions and official memorial practices that serve to reaffirm order and governmental power.


Author(s):  
Mamuka Beriaschwili

This essay examines the becoming-one of man and God in the thought of Meister Eckhart and G. W. F. Hegel. It holds that the seemingly moral category of love is elevated to the onto-gnoseological dimension of the One itself in its fullness. In this very work which is love and at the same time is God Himself, God loves all things not as created, but rather inasmuch as they are created in God. This absolute process of becoming is brought to perfection when empirical space and time are overcome – a transcendence expressed by Eckhart as the ‹nun› of eternal presence.


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