David Hume's Invisible Hand in The Wealth of Nations: The Public Choice of Moral Information

Hume Studies ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 1985 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Levy
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Invisible Hand ◽  
The Public ◽  
Wealth Of Nations

Invisible Hand Arguments: Milton Friedman and Adam Smith

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alistair M. Macleod
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Invisible Hand ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
The Public ◽  
Economic Motivation ◽  
Milton Friedman ◽  
Common Structure ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
The Invisible

The version of the invisible hand argument in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments differs in important respects from the version in The Wealth of Nations. Both are different, in turn, from the version invoked by Milton Friedman in Free to Choose. However, all three have a common structure. Attention to this structure can help sharpen our sense of their essential thrust by highlighting the questions (about the nature of economic motivation, the structure of markets, and conceptions of the public interest) to which answers of certain kinds would have to be available for any of the versions to succeed.

Voting at the U.S. Constitutional Convention

2019 ◽  
pp. 780-796
Author(s):  
Keith L. Dougherty
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Constitutional Convention ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Choice Perspective ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The U.S

This chapter describes how the public-choice perspective has provided new insights into the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787. It reviews articles on the impact of the rules of the Convention, attempts to infer delegate votes, and reviews how public choice has helped us understand the adoption of various clauses in the Constitution and studies of the Beard thesis.

Subject of Economic Science

2015 ◽  
pp. 115-120
Author(s):  
D. Egorov
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Classical Theory ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Economic Science ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Consciousness ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Relationship

Adam Smith defined economics as “the science of the nature and causes of the wealth of nations” (implicitly appealing – in reference to the “wealth” – to the “value”). Neo-classical theory views it as a science “which studies human behavior in terms of the relationship between the objectives and the limited funds that may have a different use of”. The main reason that turns the neo-classical theory (that serves as the now prevailing economic mainstream) into a tool for manipulation of the public consciousness is the lack of measure (elimination of the “value”). Even though the neo-classical definition of the subject of economics does not contain an explicit rejection of objective measures the reference to “human behavior” inevitably implies methodological subjectivism. This makes it necessary to adopt a principle of equilibrium: if you can not objectively (using a solid measurement) compare different states of the system, we can only postulate the existence of an equilibrium point to which the system tends. Neo-classical postulate of equilibrium can not explain the situation non-equilibrium. As a result, the neo-classical theory fails in matching microeconomics to macroeconomics. Moreover, a denial of the category “value” serves as a theoretical basis and an ideological prerequisite of now flourishing manipulative financial technologies. The author believes in the following two principal definitions: (1) economics is a science that studies the economic system, i.e. a system that creates and recombines value; (2) value is a measure of cost of the object. In our opinion, the value is the information cost measure. It should be added that a disclosure of the nature of this category is not an obligatory prerequisite of its introduction: methodologically, it is quite correct to postulate it a priori. The author concludes that the proposed definitions open the way not only to solve the problem of the measurement in economics, but also to address the issue of harmonizing macro- and microeconomics.

scholarly journals The Public Choice View at the “Deregulation” Movement: Analyzing the Experience of European Telecommunications

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Dimitrii Trubnikov
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Current Trend ◽  
Telecommunications Industry ◽  
Global Scale ◽  
Open Market ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Public ◽  
Private Corporations

Purpose – The liberalization of European telecommunications has been expressed in highly concentrated markets with several major players at the pan-European level. Instead of fostering competitive marketplaces, the reform has created an oligopolistic landscape with powerful private corporations. This induces reasonable questions about the real objectives and the chosen ways of the reform. Methodology/approach/design – The deregulatory movement in the telecommunications sector is analyzed through contrasting perspectives of the public interest approach and public choice theory. Findings – The chance to change the landscape of the industry has been missed, and the current trend towards the global oligopolistic marketplace yields an unprecedented amount of economic power to narrow groups at the global scale. The liberalization movement introduced market mechanisms in the industry, but the real free and open market has never been formed, and it is possible to assert that it has never been among the real objectives and intentions of the policymakers. Originality/value – The recent surge of “liberalization” in the telecommunications industry speaks rather in favor of the hypothesis of vested private interests in the policy and that they have always been greatly covered by the sauce of public interest justifications. The case of telecommunications shows that ideas and understanding of economic phenomena played an important role in adoption of regulatory regimes, and it is apparent that people on the top of the social pyramid have opportunities to pick up and foster those ideas that better fit their private needs.

scholarly journals Corporate Responsibility: In the Dilemma between Fake and Trust?

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 143-147
Author(s):  
Simon Fietze ◽  
Wenzel Matiaske ◽  
Roland Menges
Keyword(s):  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Corporate Responsibility ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Invisible Hand ◽  
Social Orientation ◽  
The Public ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Market Organization ◽  
Corporate Social

The accusation of whitewashing accompanied the discussion about corporate social responsibility (CSR) since its inception the 1950s. That's not surprising. Ever since its beginnings in Scottish moral philosophy, economics did not expect the general good to be enhanced by the individual's social orientation, but rather by its self-interest, a concept less liable to disappointment, and the work of the invisible hand (Hirschman, 1977). The latter aims to promote a common goal that individuals have not intended. Following his famous text, Adam Smith (2007 [1786], p. 350) continues: ‘I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.’ The ‘mistrust’ of the ‘goodwill’ of the capitalist lives on in various streams such as Marxism, (neo-)liberalism or sociological system theory, to name but a few schools of thought. Marxists do not expect societal progress any more than (neo-)liberals from benevolent capitalists who, demand more taxable profits, instead of social responsibility, in the framework of the market organization of companies. System theorists find that ethical demands are hardly transferable directly into the economy code of payment/non-payment. Although Adam Smith (2007 [1786], p. 350) shared the view that the claim of public good orientation is ‘indeed, not very common among merchants’, but that ‘very few words need to be employed in dissuading them from it.’

Financial Indicators as Determinants of Mayoral Elections

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-53
Author(s):  
Serena Santis ◽  
Francesca Citro ◽  
Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros ◽  
Marco Bisogno
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Capital Expenditure ◽  
Financial Indicators ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
The Public ◽  
Mayoral Elections ◽  
Local Politicians ◽  
Italian Context

The chapter seeks to contribute to the literature on determinants of local government election by adopting a different perspective focused on the effects of financial indicators on the elections of mayors. Using the agency and the public choice theory, this study implements a model where specific financial indicators—whose selection takes into account the increased autonomy and responsibility of local politicians—have been included to document their effect on mayoral re-election. Focusing on the Italian context, the chapter examines a sample of 129 municipalities during the period 2008-2014, where several elections were held. By using different estimators, findings indicate that the re-election of mayors is affected by the level of indebtedness and the current equilibrium. In addition, current spending is better valued by citizens/voters than capital expenditure, which increases the probability of being re-elected.

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