3. Key Elements of Good Corporate Governance for Listed Companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 14
Author(s):  
Novia Eka Sariantono ◽  
Luh Putu Mahyuni

Do Good Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Influence Profitability of LQ45 Listed Companies. This study aims to examine the influence of good corporate governance and corporate social responsibility on profitability of LQ45 listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The data analyzed were secondary data in the form of annual reports and sustainability report. The data were analyzed using multiple linear regression. The results of this research indicate: (1) Good corporate governance (GCG) has a significant effect on profitability of LQ45 listed companies; (2) Corporate social responsibility (CSR) does not have a significant effect on profitability of LQ45 listed companies. This research provides empirical evidence that implementation of GCG could influence profitability, while the implementation of CSR does not influence profitability. Keywords: Good corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, independent commissioner board, corporate social responsibility, disclosure index, return on equity


Author(s):  
Jonty Tshipa ◽  
Leon M. Brummer ◽  
Hendrik Wolmarans ◽  
Elda Du Toit

Background: Premised on agency, resource dependence and stewardship theories, the study investigates empirically the existence of industry nuances in the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of companies listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Aims: The main objective of the study is to understand the relationship between internal corporate governance and company performance from the perspective of three distinct economic periods, as well as industry nuances, cognisant of endogeneity issues. Setting: South Africa, as an emerging African market, offers an interesting research context in which the corporate governance and financial performance nexus can be examined empirically. Method: A sample of 90 companies from the five largest South African industries, covering a 13-year period from 2002 to 2014 (1170 firm-year observations) was examined with three estimation approaches. Results: Two key trends emerged from this study. First, the relationship between corporate governance and company performance differed from industry to industry. Second, the association between corporate governance and company performance also changes during steady and non-steady periods, which is an indication that the nexus is driven by the state of the global economy and the type of the industry. Conclusion: Evidence from the study suggests that companies should be allowed to optimise rather than maximise their corporate governance options. This finding questioned the approach of the recently published King IV Code of Good Corporate Governance, which requires Johannesburg Stock Exchange-listed companies to ‘apply and explain’ as opposed to ‘apply or explain’ as pronounced by King III Code of Good Corporate Governance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Ali Rehman ◽  
Fathyah Hashim

This study seeks to understand the impact of fraud preventive measures on good corporate governance within Omani public listed companies. Fraud preventive measures are considered as fraud risk assessment and preventive role of forensic accounting. This study also proposed that preventive role of forensic accounting mediates the relationship between fraud risk assessment and good corporate governance. Unit of analysis is public listed companies in Oman. This study utilized census sampling with quantitative cross sectional study. PLS-SEM was employed for the data and result analysis. Results suggest that, fraud risk assessment does not have significant impact on good corporate governance; whereas, preventive role of forensic accounting has significant impact on good corporate governance and it is also mediating between fraud risk assessment and good corporate governance. This study can assist regulators and policy makers towards inclusion of forensic accounting as permanent and compulsory component of the codes of corporate governance. Moreover, it is highly recommended for organizations to have in-house antifraud activity which can support and enhance good corporate governance. This study identifies forensic accounting as in-house preventive measure activity which can be available within an organization and working as governance management. This preventive role of forensic accounting is not explored before especially in the Omani market.


2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 360-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roshayani Arshad ◽  
Ruhaya Atan ◽  
Faizah Darus

Corporate disclosure has been subjected to calls for corporate transparency by corporate governance movement as a matter of good corporate governance. Managers face substantial pressure to make more transparent disclosure of their activities to promote efficient governance of their companies or risk losing legitimacy from the perspectives of the investors and other stakeholders. Using the annual reports of 155 Malaysian listed companies, this study investigates the competing effects of board structure and institutional pressures on the extent and credibility of corporate voluntary disclosure during the period when public listed companies in Malaysia faced new corporate governance regulation. This study provides evidence that under the influence of dominant owners on board, management voluntary disclosure decisions are driven by mimetic pressures when their company is structured to meet expectations of good corporate governance. Managers’ voluntary disclosure strategy to gain legitimacy seems to override their incentives to disclose credible information to outside investors. This inference is consistent with the evidence that management voluntary disclosures are not viewed as credible by outside investors. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the relationships between various board structures and institutional pressures on management disclosure decisions in particular agency settings.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 134
Author(s):  
Nujmatul Laily

<p>A number of previous empirical studies have attempted to reveal the existence of earnings management. However, a research that focuses on how to alleviate the earnings management practices committed by managers is still insufficiently available. This study is aimed to examine the effects of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) and audit quality on earnings management. The presence of Board of Commisioner and Audit Commitee in Indonesian Manufacturing Public Listed Companies serves as the proxy of GCG. On the other hand, KAP (public accounting firm) size, dichotomous variables and an assumption that big four auditors perform higher audit quality compared to non-big four auditor serve as the proxy of the audit quality. To echo the prior research, earnings management is measured by employing discretionary accruals modified by Jone (1995). 151 manufacturing listed companies were determined as the population and 86 public listed companies were eventually opted for the sample. Purposive sampling method was employed and regression was performed to analyze the data. The results showed that (1) accounting firms size does not yield significant effects on earnings management. It indicates that neither big four nor non-big four can significantly detect the existence of earnings management undertaken by manager through the audit they administer; (2) Board of Commisioner and Audit Commitee also do not generate significant effects on earnings management. It indicates that good corporate governance proxied by the existence of Board Commisioner and Audit Commitee do not necessarily alleviate the earnings management practices.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Keywords: </strong>Earnings management, audit quality, good corporate governance</p>


2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond da Silva Rosa ◽  
Dane Etheridge ◽  
Izan H. Y. Izan

The ASX Corporate Governance Council’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (Released March 2003) has been criticised as unduly prescriptive and potentially costly, particularly for small firms. Using a sample of 518 West Australia and Queensland based ASX listed companies, we show that small companies are less likely to comply with several of the ASX recommendations than large companies. We also show that some agency controls largely ignored in the recommendations, such as substantial shareholders, may substitute for some of the corporate governance mechanisms recommended by the ASX. We also consider the effect that the extent of director interlocking may have on compliance, and find that it is minimal. Overall, the results of this research provide a timely reminder that when it comes to corporate governance, one size does not fit all.


Author(s):  
Chih-Yi Hsiao ◽  
Qing-Yuan Zhang ◽  
Hao-Nan Huang ◽  
Wei-Xun Xi

Since the meeting of China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2020 once again emphasized the issue of earnings quality of corporate governance, this paper intends to study this issue from different perspectives. This study takes the IT industry of China's A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2019 as the sample, and makes an empirical analysis with the fuzzy set/ Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA). The results show that the companies with large scale and good corporate governance concept, poor financial structure but with the assistance of external experts, high salary and high proportion of independent directors have relatively high earnings quality. According to the above research results. According to the findings, we put forward the following suggestions. For enterprises, good corporate governance concept and the concept of integrity are very important, but there must be efficient operation of the board of directors in order to play the role of corporate governance. Therefore, the size of the board of directors should not be too large, but it can be adjusted flexibly depends on whether the required professionals are enough. In addition, enterprises with poor financial structure should rely on the assistance of professional managers, rather than using earnings manipulation to obtain short-term benefits. For the regulators of listed companies, the procedures of independent directors’ selection should be more strictly supervised, so as not to make the setting of independent directors become mere formality. For investors, we should always pay attention to the corporate governance, and announce the disclosure of real-time information about directors, supervisors and senior executives, to prevent losses caused by investment misjudgment.


2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-191
Author(s):  
Hashanah Ismail

This paper examines the relationship between the contents of a report, the Statement of Corporate Governance, required to be included in the Annual Report of listed corporations, and the receipt of public reprimands. Since the formalization of good corporate governance in the Code, all listed companies are required by rule PN9 to include how they have applied the principles and the extent of compliance with best practice found in the Code. The paper is based on companies that received public reprimands in the first three quarters of 2005 and we compared the contents of the statement of corporate governance of a matched pair of companies which did not receive public reprimands to see if such statements differ between the two groups. We do not see any difference between the two groups.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Berglund

This paper discusses the relationship between stock market liquidity and corporate governance. Both concepts are widely investigated from different angles in the literature. It is generally agreed that they are related so that better corporate governance implies higher liquidity for shares of listed companies. However, the importance of good corporate governance for the market liquidity of the share will differ depending on the characteristics of the firm’s business. Good corporate governance will be particularly important in reducing agency problems in firms where the business is subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Proper corporate governance, in other words, matters most for firms where external assessment of the firm’s business prospects is difficult, while it is less important for value creation in firms where the business is easier to understand.


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