scholarly journals Antykonkurencyjne innowacje – oksymoron czy realne wyzwanie prawa antymonopolowego?

2019 ◽  
pp. 9-41
Author(s):  
Rajmund Molski
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
The Self ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Enforcement Policy ◽  
Regulatory Ability ◽  
Modern Economic

One of the overriding principles of modern economic policy is promotion of innovation. It also turns out, however, that innovations may work against competition, thus becoming a major challenge for antitrust law. The importance and the degree of diffi culty surrounding this challenge as well as some controversies related to it can be evidenced by the antitrust enforcement policy referring to innovations. This policy has thus far been highly enigmatic and labile. It seems that no consensus can be reached on the relation between competition and innovations as much as it cannot be achieved on the validity of including the latter in the antitrust enforcement regime, particularly when it comes to applying the prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position. While it is true that innovations compound the risk of antitrust errors, especially those consisting in de-legalisation of innovations which are not anticompetitive, it would nevertheless be wrong to underestimate, and even more so to ignore, the risk of errors amounting to an unjustifi ed tolerance of anticompetitive innovations and an overstated belief in the self-regulatory ability of the market. In any case, considering the priority objective of the economic policy which should be to support and promote innovations, as well as taking into account that the goal of antitrust law is not only to settle real confl icts arising between innovations and the protection of competition, but also to provide for an innovation-friendly environment, the antitrust intervention into innovations should be sensible, farsighted and predictable. Otherwise, antitrust law may become a burden for the actual and potential innovators – like the mythical sword above the head of Damocles.

THE STATUTE OF TRADE UNIONS AS A LIMIT OF ABUSES AGAINST EMPLOYERS – SELECTED ISSUES

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (XXI) ◽  
pp. 231-240
Author(s):  
Łucja Kobroń-Gąsiorowska
Keyword(s):  
Trade Union ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
Economic Freedom ◽  
The Self ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Social Partners ◽  
Union Activists ◽  
Economic Reality ◽  
Modern Economic ◽  
Scope Of Protection

The article attempts to answer the question whether the economic freedom of the employer is not blindly limited by the model of trade unions, which do not conform to the modern economic reality, which, in the light of the principle of self-governance, often abuse their dominant position in the labor market. The author points to selected problems in the self-government of trade unions at the level of non-employment, pointing to the importance of the trade union statute, which determines the scope of protection of trade union activists in the sphere of individual labor law. The author puts forward the thesis that the basis for the balance of social partners is the observance of internal regulations by trade unions.

Defetishizing Free Time: From Akrasia to Profanation

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-188
Keyword(s):  
Leisure Time ◽  
Free Time ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Acting Out ◽  
Basic Income ◽  
Giorgio Agamben ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
The Gift ◽  
Modern Economic ◽  
Economic Thinking

Images of free time are used today to give the impression that alienation from work is being alleviated. As a result, exploitation of the workers who are constantly occupied with “self-realization” becomes even more effective. Free time becomes a fetish — a means of productively engaging people’s energy through various scenarios in which they are (supposedly) enjoying their leisure time pursuits. Is it even possible to undo the fetishization of free time? And if so, how else might we conceptualize it? In seeking an answer to these questions the author continues the discussion of akrasia launched by Michail Maiatsky in his article “Liberation from Work, Unconditional Income and Foolish Will” (Logos, 2015, 25[3]) in which Maiatsky expressed a well-founded fear that a contemporary “post-Nietzschean” person might respond to the “gift of unconditional freedom” with an irrational desire to test the boundaries of that boon and end up as Dostoyevsky said “living by his own foolish will.” A hypothesis to address that fear argues that the intentions behind such an “akratic rebellion” are inherently rooted in the fetishistic logic that dominates both current perceptions of free time and also the debate about providing a basic income. The akratic reaction is a form of phantasmatic acting out of the painful suspicion that efforts to reach liberation could turn into another form of bondage. The roots of this bind can be found in the historically embedded form of economic organization, which is based on a sense of dire emergency. We owe this understanding of the “economic dispositive” to the work of Giorgio Agamben, but it is already discernible in Xenophon. We can find an indication of its dominant position in modern economic thinking in Nikolay Sieber’s (1844–1888) criticism of the postulates of the “subjective school” of economics. Because the economy acquires a sacred aspect within this dispositive, akrasia may be compared with a sacrilegious trespass of its boundaries. However, Agamben proposes that challenging any form of the solemn ceremonies of capitalism’s priesthood in a way that is not merely imaginary must necessarily be a kind of profanation.

scholarly journals Stealth Consolidation: Evidence from an Amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas G. Wollmann
Keyword(s):  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Abrupt Increase ◽  
Merger Activity ◽  
Frequent Application ◽  
The Us

Prospective merger review is the most frequent application of antitrust law. It exempts transactions on the basis of size, though small deals can have large anticompetitive effects in segmented industries. I examine its impact on antitrust enforcement and merger activity in the context of an abrupt increase in the US exemption threshold. I find that among newly-exempt deals, antitrust investigations fall to almost zero while mergers between competitors rise sharply. Effectively all of the rise reflects an endogenous response of firms to reduced premerger scrutiny, consistent with large deterrent effects of antitrust enforcement. (JEL G34, G38, K21, L41)

6. Competition Policy Defending the Economic Constitution

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Wilks
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Economic Constitution ◽  
Directorate General ◽  
The Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

This chapter examines the European Union’s competition policy and how its effectiveness has steadily increased in terms of controlling restrictive practices, abuse of dominant position, mergers, state aid, and the liberalization of utilities. It considers how the central dominance of the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) in the European Commission has been perpetuated and how competition policy has become a supranational policy competence which can be regarded as an ‘economic constitution’ for Europe. The chapter also discusses the decentralization of antitrust enforcement to the national agencies and courts through the ‘Modernization Regulation’ of 2003, as well as a ‘turn to economics’ in which economic analysis has been substituted for legal tests to move towards an ‘effects-based’ (effect on competition) interpretation of the law.

Foucault, Weber et l'histoire du sujet économique

Dialogue ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 537-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Steiner
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Sociology Of Religion ◽  
The Self ◽  
Economic Behaviour ◽  
History Of ◽  
Modern Economic ◽  
The Way

ABSTRACTThis article deals with Michel Foucault's 1977–79 lectures on political economy. In the first part, we highlight his views on the market, which is equated to a social device instrumental in governing individuals so that they are induced to allow the ruler to reach his goal, which is providing security to the population. In the second part, we consider together Foucault's and Weber's views on the economy, since Foucault's concept of technique of the self is similar to Weber's concept of life conduct, which is central in his sociology of religion. This opens the way to a history of the modern economic behaviour considered as a form of ascetism.

EVOLUTION OF MODERN ECONOMIC POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA AND RUSSIA

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Pokrytan
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Economic Changes ◽  
Modern Economic ◽  
Political Spectrum ◽  
The Right

The rapid political and economic changes taking place in Latin America are primarily due to the collision of neoliberalism with its opponents, who have largely managed to determine a new trajectory of development for many countries. The statement in this regard about the end of neoliberalism, according to the author, is premature, although it provides a field for additional observations of the ongoing processes. Interesting are the analogies with Russia and the revealed stages of transition of countries from the left to the right political spectrum.

scholarly journals When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICE BOUGETTE ◽  
MARC DESCHAMPS ◽  
FRÉDÉRIC MARTY
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
The United States ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Minor Influence

In this article, the authors interrogate legal and economic history to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They show that the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists’ caution toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. They rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that is, the “economization” process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement.

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