scholarly journals When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICE BOUGETTE ◽  
MARC DESCHAMPS ◽  
FRÉDÉRIC MARTY
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
The United States ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Minor Influence

In this article, the authors interrogate legal and economic history to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They show that the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists’ caution toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. They rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that is, the “economization” process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement.

scholarly journals The Influence of Economic Theories and Schools on Competition Law in terms of Vertical Agreements

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 153-180
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Jurczyk
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Evaluation Criteria ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Competitive Effects ◽  
Economic Theories ◽  
The Past ◽  
Antitrust Analysis ◽  
Harvard School

The paper aims at showing the influence and the views espoused by economic theories and schools of economics on competition policy embedded in antitrust law and conducted by competition authorities in the field of vertical agreements. The scope of the paper demonstrates how substantially the economization of antitrust law has changed the assessment as to the harmfulness of vertical agreements. The analysis of economic aspects of vertical agreements in antitrust analysis allows one to reveal their pro-competitive effects and benefits, with the consumer being their beneficiary. The basic instrument of the said economization is that antitrust bodies draw on specific economic models and theories that can be employed in their practice. Within the scope of the paper, the author synthesizes the role and influence of those models and schools of economics on the application of competition law in the context of vertical agreements. In presenting, one after another, the theories and schools of economics which used to, or are still dealing with competition policy the author emphasises that in its nature this impact was more or less direct. Some of them remain at the level of general principals and axiology of competition policy, while others, in contrast, delineate concrete evaluation criteria and show how the application of those criteria changes the picture of anti-competitive practices; in other words, why vertical agreements, which in the past used to be considered to restrain competition, are no longer perceived as such. The paper presents the models and recommendations of neoclassical economics, the Harvard School, the Chicago and Post-Chicago School, the ordoliberal school, the Austrian and neoAustrian school as well as the transaction cost theory.

Intellectual Property and Competition Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Scott Hemphill
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Core Ability

This chapter surveys the intersection of competition law—or antitrust law, as it is known in the United States—with intellectual property (IP). It examines whether and how IP rights alter the substantive scope of antitrust law, either by operation of statute or as a matter of economic policy. It discusses a wide variety of antitrust claims, alleging collusion, exclusion, or both, that have been raised against IP rights holders. The examples are drawn mainly from the United States, although European developments are also included where relevant. The analysis supports the conclusion that, beyond a rights holder’s core ability to assert a valid, infringed right against a rival, IP restricts antitrust law less than one might expect. Moreover, the restrictions that do exist are often subtle.

A Giant Problem: The Influence of the Chicago School on Australian Competition Law, Economic Dynamism and Inequality

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 696-714 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Triggs ◽  
Andrew Leigh
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
The United States ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Competitive Process ◽  
Growing Body

Australia has a competition problem: there is not enough of it. Our industries are concentrated. Our markets show signs of weak competition. The way Australia’s courts, parliamentarians and regulators think about competition is partly to blame. Although it has been less influential in Australia than in the United States, the Chicago School’s views on competition have shaped our laws, policies and enforcement practices. The Chicago School views market concentration as a virtue more than a vice. The School contended that barriers to entry are negligible, market power is temporary, most mergers are good, vertical restraints and predatory pricing are either benign or efficient. The growing body of research and experience, however, shows that the Chicago School’s faith in the ability of markets to self-correct and deliver competitive outcomes was misplaced. There is a strong progressive case for repositioning how we think about competition. Focusing more on the competitive process, the structure of markets and the incentives those structures create for firms will play an important role in reducing inequality.

Does the European Commission Have Too Much Power Enforcing European Competition Law?

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 1446-1459
Author(s):  
Milana S. Karayanidi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Business Operations ◽  
European System ◽  
Directorate General ◽  
European Competition Law

The article critically assesses the role of the Directorate General of the European Commission in executing enforcement of the European Communities Competition Law. The Commission is granted equally unprecedented legal powers to carry out the functions of policy maker, investigator, “judge”, “jury”, and “executioner”. For some, it is accordingly difficult to resist the suggestion that the focus of so many regulatory roles and so much power in the hands of one organization represents a legitimate source of concern. By comparing the European system of antitrust enforcement with that of the United States and examining the historical evolvement of the Commission's role, the article determines whether focus of so much power in the hands of the European Commission forms a legitimate source of concern. It determines whether so much power given to the Commission may interfere with the basic rights of corporate undertakings to carry out their business operations, and how the powers granted to the Commission lead to legally based reasons for anxiety.

Healthcare Antitrust in the United States

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Greaney
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Managed Care ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pivotal Role ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Market Structures ◽  
Delicate Balance

This chapter examines the pivotal role of antitrust law in shaping institutional and professional arrangements in American healthcare. Historically, much of what can be broadly classified as “competition policy” in healthcare is found in the application of traditional antitrust principles to the conduct and structure of provider and payer organizations rather than in any sweeping statutory enactments. Although some landmark legislation removed some important barriers to the growth of managed care, the task of dealing with unacceptable practices and problematic market structures has been left to standard antitrust law. The chapter then addresses the interplay of administrative regulation with antitrust law enforcement, noting particularly those areas where the goals of antitrust are in tension with regulation and discussing the doctrinal accommodations made to deal with that problem. It also explores the critical and delicate balance antitrust law must strike in promoting competitively structured markets while taking into account market imperfections and hard-to-measure outcome variables.

scholarly journals The role of market power in economic growth: an analysis of the differences between EU and US competition policy theory, practice and outcomes

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephane Ciriani ◽  
Marc Lebourges
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Economic Growth ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Policy Theory

The European Union has experienced weak economic performance over the past 15 years, compared to the United States. In order to restore investment, innovation, and therefore growth, the European Commission seeks to raise the level of static competition in all markets. The Commission’s economic policy is largely determined by its competition policy. This policy is derived from its doctrine on competition law, which regards the exercise of market power as a source of inefficiency and advocates that its effects should be banned. By contrast, the United States competition authorities, under the influence of the Chicago School, consider that market power is a necessary incentive to invest and a fair return on investment. Recent findings in economic growth theory, which state that increased competition intensity may harm endogenous innovation, provide a theoretical basis to support the United States approach and call for a review of European doctrine.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document