Chapter One: PRAGMATISM AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY

2005 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Keyword(s):  
Practical Rationality

Engineering knowledge: philosophy and ponstructive meanig

2018 ◽  
pp. 10-16
Author(s):  
V. I. Onoprienko
Keyword(s):  
Information Technologies ◽  
Knowledge Engineering ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Engineering Knowledge ◽  
World Today ◽  
The World ◽  
Technological Area

An expansion of information technologies in the world today is caused by progress of instrumental knowledge. It has been arisen a special technological area of knowledge engineering, which is related to practical rationality and experts’ knowledge for solving urgent problems of science and practice.

The Interplay of Intention and Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Pragmatic Theory ◽  
Related Idea ◽  
David Gauthier ◽  
Extended Agency ◽  
Extended Life

In a series of essays—in particular, his 1994 essay “Assure and Threaten”—David Gauthier develops a two-tier pragmatic theory of practical rationality and argues, within that theory, for a distinctive account of the rationality of following through with prior assurances or threats. His discussion suggests that certain kinds of temporally extended agency play a special role in one’s temporally extended life going well. I argue that a related idea about diachronic self-governance helps explain a sense in which an accepted deliberative standard can be self-reinforcing. And this gives us resources to adjust Gauthier’s theory in response to a threat of what Kieran Setiya has called a “fragmentation of practical reason.”

Constitutivism about Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Schafer
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Rationality

Contemporary forms of Kantian constitutivism generally begin with a conception of agency on which the constitutive aim of agency is some form of autonomy or self-unification. This chapter argues for a re-orientation of the Kantian constitutivist project towards views that begin with a conception of rationality on which both theoretical and practical rationality aim at forms of understanding. In a slogan, then, understanding-first as opposed to autonomy-first constitutivism. Such a view gives the constitutivist new resources for explaining many classes of reasons, while also offering a new way of understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason. The chapter concludes by arguing that the resulting view is best understood, not so much as an alternative to autonomy-first constitutivism, but as a complement to it.

Towards a Social Conception of Persons

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bennett W. Helm
Keyword(s):  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Peter Strawson ◽  
The One

This Chapter examines three sources of motivation for individualistic conceptions of persons (responsibility, identity, and practical rationality), all of which are in conceptual tension with the sorts of authority we can have over each other. We can relieve this tension in part by following Peter Strawson in understanding responsibility to depend on “human communities”—communities of respect by which we hold each other responsible to certain norms and so to certain practices or way of life. Yet the authority by which we hold others responsible presupposes the worth not only of the norms but also of the agent and the one holding her to those norms. We can understand such worth, it is suggested, in terms of communities of respect—in terms of its members’ joint respect for each other and for its norms and practices.

scholarly journals Aristotle on Natural Slavery

Phronesis ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm Heath
Keyword(s):  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Practical Deliberation ◽  
Natural Teleology ◽  
Hypothetical Necessity

AbstractAristotle's claim that natural slaves do not possess autonomous rationality (Pol. 1.5, 1254b20-23) cannot plausibly be interpreted in an unrestricted sense, since this would conflict with what Aristotle knew about non-Greek societies. Aristotle's argument requires only a lack of autonomous practical rationality. An impairment of the capacity for integrated practical deliberation, resulting from an environmentally induced excess or deficiency in thumos (Pol. 7.7, 1327b18-31), would be sufficient to make natural slaves incapable of eudaimonia without being obtrusively implausible relative to what Aristotle is likely to have believed about non-Greeks. Since Aristotle seems to have believed that the existence of people who can be enslaved without injustice is a hypothetical necessity, if those capable of eudaimonia are to achieve it, the existence of natural slaves has implications for our understanding of Aristotle's natural teleology.

Agency, Culture, Modernity: Towards a New Understanding of Confucian Practical Reasoning

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 230-250
Author(s):  
Kai Marchal
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Zhu Xi ◽  
Critical Perspective ◽  
The West ◽  
Global Age ◽  
To Come ◽  
Complex Forms

In this essay, I argue for a historical-critical perspective on rationality. In our global age, we in the West need to come to terms with the fact that non-Western traditions have developed complex forms of practical rationality. I will first give an overview of what I call the “Confucian standards of reasoning.” Secondly, I will explain how the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) has rearticulated the earlier understanding of practical reasoning. Thirdly, I will demonstrate why a comparative perspective may enrich our reasoned engagement with individuals in the Chinese-speaking world. In developing forms of global reasoning, we should make sure that these are neither parochial nor difference-blind.

Philippa Foot's Theory of Natural Goodness

2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Sanford S. Levy
Keyword(s):  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Natural Goodness ◽  
Large Project

Philippa Foot's book, Natural Goodness, involves a large project including a theory of natural goodness, a theory of the virtues, and a theory of practical rationality. Natural goodness is the foundation for the rest and is used to support a more or less traditional list of the virtues and a theory of reasons for action. Though Foot's doctrine of natural goodness may provide an account of some sort of goodness, I argue that it is not adequate as a foundation for practical rationality or as a defense of more or less traditional virtues.

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