The logical problem of language acquisition: representational and procedural issues

Author(s):  
Martin Atkinson
2004 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 936-940 ◽  
Author(s):  
LETITIA R. NAIGLES

MacWhinney (2004) has provided a clear and welcome synthesis of many strands of the recent research addressing the logical problem of first language acquisition from a non-nativist or non-generative grammar framework. The strand that I will comment on is the one MacWhinney calls the ‘pivot’ of his proposal, namely, that acquiring a grammar is primarily a function of learning ITEM-BASEDPATTERNS (e.g. pp. 23–29, 41, passim). These item-based patterns serve a number of dominant roles within MacWhinney's proposal, including enforcing children's conservatism (thereby reducing greatly their overgeneralizations and need to recover from the same), supporting the probabilistic nature of grammar, and enabling the competition that promotes recovery from the overgeneralizations that do occur. My concern here is primarily with the first role, that of enforcing children's conservatism, and especially with the exclusive use of language PRODUCTION as the demonstrated support of this conservatism.


1985 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lydia White

Arguments for universal grammar (DO) in generative theory are based on the so called "logical problem of language acquisition." The nature of the problem becomes apparent when we consider the end product of the acquisition process and compare this to the input data, which do not seem sufficiently rich or precise to allow the learner to work out all the complexities of the adult grammar, unless one assumes the availability of certain innate principles (DO). In this paper, I will suggest that this orientation is also useful when one comes to consider second language acquisition. If we focus on the successful second language (L2) learner, it would appear that he or she will also achieve complex knowledge of the L2 which goes well beyond the input. This suggests that DO might have a role to play in L2 acquisition as well, and raises the question of whether the way that DO has operated in the Ll has any effects in L2 acquisition. I will briefly look at current L2 research that presupposes a DO framework, as well as suggesting some directions for further research.


2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 680-680 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Chater

Carruthers’ argument depends on viewing logical form as a linguistic level. But logical form is typically viewed as underpinning general purpose inference, and hence as having no particular connection to language processing. If logical form is tied directly to language, two problems arise: a logical problem concerning language acquisition and the empirical problem that aphasics appear capable of cross-modular reasoning.


2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 521-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Tecumseh Fitch

AbstractHistorical language change (“glossogeny”), like evolution itself, is a fact; and its implications for the biological evolution of the human capacity for language acquisition (“phylogeny”) have been ably explored by many contemporary theorists. However, Christiansen & Chater's (C&C's) revolutionary call for a replacement of phylogenetic models with glossogenetic cultural models is based on an inadequate understanding of either. The solution to their “logical problem of language evolution” lies before their eyes, but they mistakenly reject it due to a supposed “circularity trap.” Gene/;culture co-evolution poses a series of difficult theoretical and empirical problems that will be resolved by subtle thinking, adequate models, and careful cross-disciplinary research, not by oversimplified manifestos.


2004 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 963-968

These twelve thoughtful commentaries demonstrate interesting shifts in our collective understanding of the ‘logical problem of language acquisition.’ The bulk of the commentary supports the multiple process approach to the logical problem. At the same time, there is strong and productive disagreement regarding the ways in which conservatism, competition, probabilistic identification, indirect negative evidence, item-based learning, cue construction, monitoring, and constraints make their separate and related contributions to the learning of specific target structures.


Nordlyd ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Gualmini

This paper examines the logical problem of language acquisition drawing upon an experimental study on children’s knowledge of anaphoric <em>one</em> by Lidz, Waxman and Freedman (2003). The finding was that, upon being presented with the instruction “<em>Look! A yellow bottle. Do you see another one?</em>”, 18-month-old children prefer to look at a yellow bottle rather than to a bottle of a different color. According to Lidz et al. (2003), the results that children cannot interpret <em>one</em> as anaphoric to head nouns. We point out that the experimental findings are not explained under the hypothesis offered by the authors of that study. Secondly, we consider whether, under current assumptions, children’s knowledge of anaphoric <em>one</em> can be inferred from the properties of the final state. Thirdly, we reaffirm the validity of the Poverty of the Stimulus argument, despite the challenge posed by the learning model proposed by Regier and Gahl (2004). Finally, we draw upon recent psycholinguistic work to propose an explanation for the findings documented by Lidz et al. (2003) that is independent from – though consistent with – their knowledge of the constraint on anaphoric <em>one</em>.


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