A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Relative Payouts to Operational Creditors and Financial Creditors from Bankruptcy Resolution in India

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rohit Prasad ◽  
Gaurav Gupta ◽  
Yogesh B. Mathur

AbstractThis paper analyses the outcomes of the cases resolved under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of India to examine the treatment of admitted claims for the two main classes of creditors i.e. operational and financial creditors. It shows that, at an aggregate level, operational creditors and financial creditors realize an equal percentage of their claims. However, at an individual level, there is wide heterogeneity in the treatment of the two classes of creditors. Three benchmark division rules – Proportional division, Constrained Equal Losses and Constrained Equal Awards, are used to characterize the actual divisions in each case. This analysis allows us to hypothesize that when aggregate claims of operational creditors are tiny, the Constrained Equal Awards (that is extremely generous to small creditors), does well. When aggregate claims of operational creditors are large, the Proportional rule does well. But when the claims of operational creditors fall in an intermediate range, the Constrained Equal Losses rule which is most unfavourable to the operational creditor comes to the fore. Hence, some broad guidelines that can be applied on a case by case basis appear to be desirable.

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Diamant ◽  
Shoham Baruch ◽  
Eias Kassem ◽  
Khitam Muhsen ◽  
Dov Samet ◽  
...  

AbstractThe overuse of antibiotics is exacerbating the antibiotic resistance crisis. Since this problem is a classic common-goods dilemma, it naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic analysis. Hence, we designed a model wherein physicians weigh whether antibiotics should be prescribed, given that antibiotic usage depletes its future effectiveness. The physicians’ decisions rely on the probability of a bacterial infection before definitive laboratory results are available. We show that the physicians’ equilibrium decision rule of antibiotic prescription is not socially optimal. However, we prove that discretizing the information provided to physicians can mitigate the gap between their equilibrium decisions and the social optimum of antibiotic prescription. Despite this problem’s complexity, the effectiveness of the discretization solely depends on the type of information available to the physician to determine the nature of infection. This is demonstrated on theoretic distributions and a clinical dataset. Our results provide a game-theory based guide for optimal output of current and future decision support systems of antibiotic prescription.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pieter Balcaen ◽  
Cind Du Bois ◽  
Caroline Buts

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