Der Homo Oeconomicus: Ausnahmeerscheinung in jeder Situation oder Jedermann in Ausnahmesituationen?

1989 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reinhard Zintl

AbstractEven if formally precise, the economic concept of rationality has different empirical implications depending on how it is used in theory building. If it is used as a tool of microfoundation in multi-level analysis it can be applied universally, but does not imply a specific model of human behavior. As a means of constructing microtheories proper it is, on the other hand, translated into a definite model of man but can be applied only to specific situations. This model, known as homo oeconomicus or economic man, should not be taken as an assertion about human nature but rather as a shorthand description of the behavior enforced and stabilized by social situations of a certain type.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 594-616
Author(s):  
Cornelia Ilie

Abstract After a record number of women were elected to the House of Commons in 1997, many incidents of sexism and abusive behaviour were reported. The aim of this article is twofold: on the one hand, to scrutinize the mechanisms and effects of sexist discrimination and stereotyping of women MPs in the House of Commons; on the other, to identify the strategies used by female (and male) MPs to subvert discriminatory representations, and to counteract gender-biased and sexist treatment. The focus of the multi-level analysis is on three recurrent strategies: objectifying women MPs through fixation on personal appearance rather than professional performance (e.g. making trivialising comments about women’s hair and dressing style); patronizing women MPs through the use of derogatory forms of address (e.g. directly addressing them by the terms of endearment “honey”, “dear”, “woman”); and stigmatizing women MPs through abusive and discriminatory labelling (e.g. ascribing to them stereotypically insulting names.



1988 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Levine

In what follows, “persons” are ideal-typical concepts of human beings, deployed expressly or supposed implicitly in particular theoretical contexts. Thus, the person of Kantian moral philosophy is a pure bearer of moral predicates, bereft of all properties that empirically distinguish human beings from one another: properties that, in Kant's view, are irrelevant to moral deliberation. No man or woman, actual or possible, could be so starkly featureless. But Kant's aim was not to describe human beings in actual or possible deliberations, but moral agency as such. Similarly, homo oeconomicus, economic man, is not a composite man or woman, but also a person, a theoretical construct introduced for explanatory purposes in models of economic behavior. My aim is to investigate capitalist persons: ideal-typical concepts of human beings deployed in justifying theories of capitalist property relations.I shall identify two capitalist persons, and impugn one of them. To situate my position historically, I call the impugned person Lockean, and the other Kantian. It is tempting to designate the Lockean person “the capitalist person.” However, this characterization would be misleading. Justifying theories of capitalism can employ either concept, and both can serve in accounts of socialist economies. Nevertheless, the Lockean person is tendentially procapitalist while the Kantian person is not.What follows is therefore relevant to the broader capitalism/socialism debate. To fault the Lockean person is not quite to fault capitalism itself. But a case against the Lockean person, if successful, would undermine an important strain of procapitalist argument. More importantly, the considerations I will adduce suggest a way of thinking about distributive justice and, ultimately, an ideal of equality that socialism, but not capitalism, can in principle accommodate.



Human Affairs ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-124
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani

Abstract I argue that when conceiving or assessing normative ideas about how we should organize society into the kind of ecosystem we desire, it is unwise to completely ignore empirical conditions. I also demonstrate that when evaluating empirical difficulties attending a social system, it is also unwise to do so in total oblivion to the normative idea or objective informing the establishment of such a system. Each of these assessments I call an under informed single-level analysis. By contrast I advocate a multi-level analysis (by which we evaluate both the normative and empirical dimensions of an idea or a social system) or, at the least, an informed single-level analysis (by which we evaluate either a normative idea or an empirical system with an implicit awareness of the content of the other level). I demonstrate that these models of analysis would never yield the same conclusions as an under informed single-level analysis. For my case studies I focus on the various models of analyses used in the debate about liberal majoritarian and consensus/communal democracies.



2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-28
Author(s):  
Juan J. Pulido ◽  
Tomás García-Calvo ◽  
Francisco M. Leo ◽  
António J. Figueiredo ◽  
Hugo Sarmento ◽  
...  






2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Addisu Alehegn Alemu ◽  
Liknaw Bewket Zeleke ◽  
Bewket Aynalem ◽  
Melaku Desta ◽  
Eskeziaw Abebe Kasahun ◽  
...  


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