A Lexicographic Decision Rule With Tolerances

AbstractThe implementation of the Wujciak algorithm as a new rule for organ allocation by Eurotransplant is of considerable interest for the theorist of choice making. In the process reformers accepted the status quo in principle but expected that their potential opponents would be willing to make minimal or 'tolerable' concessions. Thereby the consensual introduction of new dimensions of value and reforms of allocation practices based thereupon became viable. The paper characterizes a decision procedure based on ‘almost lexicographically pre-ordering established values and practices’ in a stylized manner, presents a formal reconstruction of it and points out some of its potential implications for rule choices in general.

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Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis

American Economic Journal Microeconomics ◽

10.1257/mic.20160337 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 10 (3) ◽

pp. 253-271 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Moritz Drexl ◽

Andreas Kleiner

Keyword(s):

Decision Rule ◽

Welfare Analysis ◽

Status Quo ◽

Majority Voting ◽

Qualified Majority ◽

Monetary Transfers ◽

The Status ◽

Common Objection ◽

The Common ◽

Strategy Proof

A committee decides collectively whether to accept a given proposal or to maintain the status quo. Committee members are privately informed about their valuations and monetary transfers are possible. According to which rule should the committee make its decision? We consider strategy-proof and anonymous mechanisms and solve for the decision rule that maximizes utilitarian welfare, which takes monetary transfers to an external agency explicitly into account. For regular distributions of preferences, we find that it is optimal to exclude monetary transfers and to decide by qualified majority voting. This sheds new light on the common objection that criticizes voting for its inefficiency. (JEL D71, D72, D82)

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Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123407000142 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 37 (2) ◽

pp. 281-312 ◽

Cited By ~ 58

Author(s):

THOMAS KÖNIG ◽

BJORN LINDBERG ◽

SANDRA LECHNER ◽

WINFRIED POHLMEIER

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Conflict Resolution ◽

Power Distribution ◽

Decision Procedure ◽

European Parliament ◽

Status Quo ◽

The European Union ◽

The Status ◽

Institutional Actors ◽

The Impact

This article is a study of bicameral conflict resolution between the Council and the European Parliament in the European Union, which has established a bicameral conciliation process under the co-decision procedure. Scholars commonly agree that the European Parliament has gained power under the co-decision procedure, but the impact of the conciliation process on the power distribution between the Council and the European Parliament remains unclear. The scholarly debate suggests that the power of the institutional actors depends on their proximity to the status quo, the (im-)patience and the specific preference distribution of the institutional actors, although most analyses assume that the Commission plays an insignificant role. Using an ordered probit model, this study examines the power distribution between the two institutional actors, the factors for their bargaining success and the role of the Commission in the period between 1999 and 2002. The findings show that the European Parliament wins most conflicts, but that the Council is more successful in multi-dimensional disputes. The results confirm some theoretical claims made in the literature, such as the importance of the status quo location and of preference cohesiveness. However, they also reject a major assumption in the literature on the irrelevance of the Commission in the conciliation process, which we show to have an influential informational position for parliamentary success.

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