scholarly journals On the Economics of the “Meeting Competition Defense” Under the Robinson–Patman Act

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 1213-1238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iñaki Aguirre
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Competitive Pressure ◽  
Economic Aspects ◽  
Equilibrium Models ◽  
Final Good ◽  
Good Market ◽  
Goods Market ◽  
Secondary Line

Abstract This paper studies the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination when competitive pressure varies across markets. In particular, we study the economic aspects of the Robinson–Patman Act associated with the “meeting competition defense.” Using equilibrium models, the main result we find is that this defense might be used successfully in cases of primary line injury precisely when it should not be used, namely when price discrimination reduces social welfare. This result obtains both when discrimination appears in the final good market and when it is used in the intermediate goods market. We also find that these results may maintain under secondary line injury.

scholarly journals Cards on the Table: Efficiency and Welfare Effects of the No-Surcharge Rule

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Henriques
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Network Externalities ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Electronic Payment ◽  
Price Efficiency ◽  
Payment Card ◽  
The Social ◽  
Card Payment

Abstract In Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs), the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this paper, I use a three-party model (consumers, local monopolistic merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes, heterogeneous card use benefits for merchants and network externalities of card-accepting merchants on cardholders to assess the efficiency and welfare effects of the NSR. I show that the NSR: (i) promotes retail price efficiency for cardholders, and (ii) inefficiently reduces card acceptance among merchants. The NSR can enhance social welfare and improve payment efficiency by shifting output from cash payers to cardholders. However, if network externalities are sufficiently strong, the reduction of card payment acceptance affects cardholders negatively and, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse off under the NSR. This paper also suggests that the NSR may be an instrument to decrease cash usage, but the social optimal policy on the NSR may depend on the competitive conditions in each market.

Naked Open-Market Manipulation and Its Effects

2018 ◽  
pp. 199-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merritt B. Fox ◽  
Lawrence R. Glosten ◽  
Gabriel V. Rauterberg
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Market Manipulation ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Trading Activity ◽  
The Social

More than 80 years after US federal law first addressed stock market manipulation, there is still dispute about manipulation law’s foundational principles; this chapter aims to provide clarity by offering an analytical framework for understanding a specific manipulation. There has been a sharp split among the federal circuits concerning manipulation law’s central question: Can trading activity alone ever be considered illegal manipulation? Economists and legal scholars do not agree on whether manipulation is possible in principle, let alone on how to address it properly in practice. The framework offered by this chapter aims to help clarify federal law and may guide regulators in successfully prosecuting financial law’s most intractable wrong. We draw on the tools of microstructure economics and the theory of the firm to provide an analysis of a particular form of manipulation, identify who is harmed by it, and evaluate the social welfare effects.

scholarly journals Welfare Analysis in an Extended Harris-Todaro Model: An Application of the Atkinson Theorem

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hautahi Kingi
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Informal Sector ◽  
Job Search ◽  
Welfare Analysis ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Direct Application ◽  
Modern Sector ◽  
Schur Concave ◽  
Urban Informal Sector

AbstractI analyze the welfare effects of a policy of modern sector enlargement (MSENL), and a policy of increasing the efficiency of on-the-job search from the urban informal sector (IEOS) in a generalized Harris-Todaro model. I show that MSENL causes a Lorenz worsening of the income distribution and IEOS causes a Lorenz improvement. In a rare direct application of the Atkinson theorem, I conclude that MSENL decreases social welfare and IEOS increases social welfare for all anonymous, increasing and Schur-concave social welfare functions.

Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist

1991 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Armstrong ◽  
John Vickers
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Welfare Effects

Consumer surplus bias and the welfare effects of price discrimination

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-45
Author(s):  
Francisco Galera ◽  
Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio ◽  
Pedro Mendi
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Welfare Effects

WELFARE EFFECTS OF PATENT PROTECTION IN A GROWTH MODEL WITH R&D AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Yibai Yang
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Growth Model ◽  
Capital Accumulation ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Welfare Analysis ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Us Economy ◽  
The Us ◽  
Welfare Implications ◽  
Relative Productivity

This study explores the welfare effects of patent protection in a Romer-type expanding variety model in which R&D and capital accumulation are both engines of growth. It shows that the comparison between the productivity of R&D and that of capital plays an important role in the welfare analysis. When the relative productivity of R&D compared to capital is high (low), social welfare takes an inverted-U shape for (is decreasing in) the strength of patent protection, and the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection is no greater than (identical to) the growth-maximizing degree. Moreover, the model is calibrated to the US economy and the numerical results support these welfare implications.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document