The Crafts–Harley view of German industrialization: an independent estimate of the income side of net national product, 1851–1913

Novel information on land rent is used to estimate the income side of German net national product (NNP) in 1851–1913 without recourse to output side aggregates. The new series shows higher values during the initial part of the period of observation, which narrows the wedge that opens up between existing estimates of NNP before the 1880s. The results support a modified Crafts–Harley view of the first phase of German industrialization: despite rapid catch-up growth of industrial leading sectors from the 1840s to the 1870s, the pace of aggregate growth accelerated only gradually. The initially small size of the modern sector and the simultaneity of the first phase of industrialization and the first wave of globalization account for this paradox. The labor share remained largely constant; the decline of the land share in NNP was compensated by a rise of the capital share.

The origins of informality: the ILO at the limit of the concept of unemployment

Official histories suggest that the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted the term ‘informal sector’ as a replacement for ‘traditional sector’, which, in its pairing with the ‘modern sector’, had fallen out of favour. This article argues that the adoption of the informal sector concept is better understood as arising out of a different context: the ILO’s post-war efforts to generate a globally operational concept of unemployment for use in the ‘developing world’. ILO officials abandoned this project in the late 1960s when they realized that, where work for wages did not constitute a widespread social norm, an accurate measure of what they called ‘disguised unemployment’ was impossible to construct. That led the ILO to develop alternative constructs, including ‘employment in the informal sector’. However, it proved difficult for the agency to operationalize those, too, and it soon found itself losing control of the policy implications of the measures that it was producing.

A Welfare Economic Analysis of Labor Market Policies in the Harris-Todaro Model

This chapter presents a welfare economic analysis of the benefits of various labor market policies in the Harris-Todaro labor market model. The policies considered are a policy of modern sector job creation, called modern sector enlargement (MSENL); a policy of rural development, called traditional sector enrichment (TSENR); and a policy of wage limitation in the urban economy, called modern sector wage restraint (MSWR). First, the inequality effects of these policies are analyzed. Then two welfare economic analyses are performed, the first based on summary measures of labor market conditions (total labor earnings, unemployment, inequality of labor incomes, and poverty rates) and the second based on dominance analysis in the labor market, in both cases assuming that the costs are borne elsewhere. The results of the welfare analyses are compared, and it is shown that TSENR unambiguously increases welfare in the labor market using both approaches, the other policies yield ambiguous results, and no policy is unambiguously welfare-decreasing.

On-the-Job Search in a Labor Market Model: Ex Ante Choices and Ex Post Outcomes

This chapter builds a multi-sector labor market model including wage dualism, open unemployment, underemployment, on-the-job search, and expected wage equalization. The innovative feature of this model is the distinction between the ex ante allocation of the labor force among search strategies and the ex post allocation of the labor force among labor market outcomes. Among the findings are: more efficient on-the-job search lowers the equilibrium unemployment rate; in a rational expectations equilibrium, the average rural and urban wages will not be equal; modern sector enlargement may leave labor market conditions in one of the sectors unchanged, even when wages and employment in that sector are fully flexible.

A Study on the Working Conditions of Sales Persons in a Garment Shop at Mangalore

The unorganized labour could be described as those who have not been able to be organized in pursuits of common objective because of constraints, such as casual nature of employment, ignorance, and illiteracy. The small size of establishments with low capitalinvestment per person employed, scattered nature of establishment and superior strength ofthe employer operating singularly or in combination. Labour engaged in informal sectors,being unorganized, have weak bargaining power and have been deprived of reasonablewages and working conditions. It is a common complaint that the benefits of labourlegislation have not reached rural and unorganized labour. Unlike the modern sector, wherewages are usually protected by labour legislations and trade union activity in the informalsector, there is an easier entry, but less job security and lower earnings. The people workingin the unorganized sector are mostly middle-class people. Unorganized laborers work underthe close supervision, control of employers and they do not have a common employer. They face many problems like Low productivity, due to lack of skills and proper tools, Noprotection from the minimum wage legislative and Exploitation by middlemen/ contractors.This Study is conducted with 50 respondents, 25 female, and 25 male sales personnel. TheObjectives are; to understand the working conditions of the respondents and to explore the possible progressive changes in the working conditions of the respondents. Both primary andsecondary data is collected in this study

Welfare Analysis in an Extended Harris-Todaro Model: An Application of the Atkinson Theorem

I analyze the welfare effects of a policy of modern sector enlargement (MSENL), and a policy of increasing the efficiency of on-the-job search from the urban informal sector (IEOS) in a generalized Harris-Todaro model. I show that MSENL causes a Lorenz worsening of the income distribution and IEOS causes a Lorenz improvement. In a rare direct application of the Atkinson theorem, I conclude that MSENL decreases social welfare and IEOS increases social welfare for all anonymous, increasing and Schur-concave social welfare functions.