Financial Stability as the Objective of the Banking Union

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-183
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bauerschmidt

The European financial and sovereign debt crisis has fundamentally transformed the banking landscape in the European Union. In order to break the dependence between banks and sovereigns, the European legislator has created a Banking Union. The objective of these legislative measures is financial stability. How can this term be understood and what is the significance of financial stability for the Banking Union? This contribution aims to answer these questions

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nicoletta Layher ◽  
Eyden Samunderu

This paper conducts an empirical study on the inclusion of uniform European Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts issued from member states of the European Union, introduced as a regulatory result of the European sovereign debt crisis. The study focuses on the reaction of sovereign bond yields from European Union member states with the inclusion of the new regulation in the European Union. A two-stage least squares regression analysis is adopted in order to determine the extent of impact effects of CACs on member states sovereign bond yields. Evidence is found that CACs in the European Union are priced on financial markets and that sovereign bond yields do respond to the inclusion of uniform CACs in the European Union.


Author(s):  
Lucinda Cadzow

The Eurozone was left reeling after the sovereign debt crisis in 2009. Huge bailouts to governments and banks to stabilise the Euro ensued and policymakers within the European Union (EU hereafter) sought to find a solution to the vulnerability of the Euro to volatility induced by currency speculation.1 In 2011, a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT hereafter) was proposed by the European Commission as both a method of recovering some of the funds that were lost due to the remedial fiscal policies that were implemented after the crisis, and also to be used as a corrective mechanism in order to reduce the volatility apparently caused by high frequency trades and currency speculators.2 The tax was to apply to trades in stocks and bonds, as well as derivatives, at a harmonised minimum of 0.1 per cent and a 0.01 per cent tax rate respectively.


2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-241
Author(s):  
Ivana V. Pešić ◽  
Gajo M. Vanka

Abstract Since the wide spreading of the European Union (EU) crisis begun, the research papers have been providing different definitions such as currency crisis, competitiveness crisis, banking crisis, balance of payment crisis, but the most frequent notion of EU crises is the sovereign debt crisis. In this paper, the researchers agree that the current European crisis can be identified as sovereign debt crises at its surface, but in order to search for solutions of EU problems, we must look deeper into the sources of this crisis. Through this paper, the multiplication of crisis is explained, whereby it is being concluded that one type of crisis led to another, while staying on the point that the Eurozone current crisis is basically a combination of two core crisis: balance of payment crisis and banking crisis. In order to support the hypothesis that sovereign debt crisis is deeply connected with balance of payment crisis, we have analysed the trade and capital flows of European countries. It was discovered that periphery countries mostly financed their current account deficit, trade deficits and public deficit through external borrowing from creditor countries. Further, the periphery countries have been cumulating not only trade deficit in trade activity with other European partners, but also in trade with the rest of the world. The key source of imbalances between the European countries seems to be a different level of competitiveness caused by different level of productivity. As the second face of EU crises, we recognised a banking crisis. We found that sovereign debt crisis and banking crisis are interconnected but banking crisis usually precedes the debt crisis. With the fast growth of international capital flows, financial integration was strongly regionally concentrated and became especially important within the EU. Through the analysis of the international investment position of creditor countries, it was concluded that these countries are more integrated within the euro area through financial flows than through real economic flows. Additionally, it was discovered that creditor countries’ banks were among the biggest investors in bonds of periphery countries such as Greece. In other periphery countries such as Ireland, banking crisis and subsequent measures for the rescuing of banking system led to the increase of public debt. In the other countries, banks were faced with solvency problems due to bad debt holdings. Having in mind that we found interconnection of the debt crisis with balance of payment crisis on the one side, and with the banking crisis on the other side, the conclusion is that sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone is a result of two-core crisis: balance of payment crisis and bank crisis. Reckoning on the European Union history where each crisis usually led to the stronger integration, maybe the current crisis is a step further towards better and deeper integration.


2012 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaos Zahariadis

This article sheds light on the Greek trigger of the eurozone's fiscal crisis. Using Ostrom's institutional theory of collective action it argues that Europe's predicament is rooted in the failings of political leadership and institutional design at both the European Union and Greek levels. The findings have implications for Ostrom's framework, Europeanization and the future of European integration.


Bankarstvo ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-101
Author(s):  
Kristijan Ristić ◽  
Aleksandar Živković

The debt crisis in the European Union is known to be caused by the interdependence of banking and state financial stability, and, together with the non-existence of the fiscal union, it has taken on the existential dimensions of the EU project itself. Under the guise of financial fragmentation within the financial markets of the Eurozone, and from the aspect of the outbreak of the crisis, EU member states resorted to national interventions, thus closing national banking and financial markets, which ultimately resulted in deepened and stronger structural foundation of the crisis and its economic and financial consequences. In that context, the Banking Union is the regulatory and institutional response of the EU after the global financial crisis, about which the first proposals have found a place in institutional controversies since 2012. In addition to the key moment and motive for establishing such an institutional regulatory arrangement, the reason for its creation is more to create a union that is connected with the creation of a single market for financial services and free money circulation, and certainly with the tendency of fuller monetary integration. However, certain questions which arose remained relevant to date: whether these established and instrumentalized frameworks, mechanisms and procedures are in fact sufficient; whether the EU banking union, conceptually designed, really represents banking integration; and whether the "centralized-common" and "sovereign-national" relationships continued in the EU financial architecture, the use of the principle "one measure for all" in the implementation of the Basel III, non-inclusion of all types of banks, and the conflict of emission and supervisory roles of the Central Bank, be a structural conflict in achieving the desired financial stability, which is the ultimate goal. In the broader context of the functioning of the EU, financial stability can also be interpreted as a factor in the survival of the common currency and the European Union itself, regardless of the intertwined contradictions and construction conflict. In this paper, we analyze the functional scope of the regulatory framework for banking supervision in the EU during the five-year existence to date, and finally the effects and impact that this framework has had on the regulatory adjustment of the Serbian banking sector.


Author(s):  
Peter Loedel

Slovakia’s most recent crisis of identity involving the murder of journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kusnirova, and the subsequent anti-government protests (the largest since 1989), indicate that the push of European-wide democratic values and the pull of the old ways of Slovakian politics continue to define the nation’s political and economic landscape. Despite a decade and a half of European Union (EU) membership, Slovakia remains caught between the two competing pressures: one of corruption and the other of the rule of law. On the one hand, the rule of law heavily shaped by the intense Europeanization of Slovakia’s accession to the EU and its strong desire to be seen as a committed, highly integrated European partner, indeed part of the core of EU nations. On the other hand, the state remains relatively weak and captured by a dominant one-party political regime, resistant to fundamental change and punctuated by corruption. Indeed, for many analysts, Slovakia has fallen in line with other Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, high on absorbing EU funds and economic benefits, but less than committed to European political values and espousing nationalist and populist agendas. With pressure increasing from the European Union for accountability, the rule of law, and human rights, in which direction will Slovakia turn? This is not just a question for Slovakia; it is a fundamental question for Europe and the European Union. The direction in which nation-states such as Slovakia develop could determine the fate of the Union. In order to determine which direction Slovakia is headed, analysis of particular case studies of Europeanization suggest intentional, deep, and lasting impacts on Slovakia. Specifically, by examining justice and home affairs policy issues and inclusion into the European monetary system and eventual participation in the eurozone, Slovakia’s EU approach can be explained by its relative power and influence within the European Union. The first phase of Slovakian Europeanization can be characterized by its relative weakness, defined by rapid acceptance of EU directives, near total commitment to implementing those directives, and little Slovakian leverage over the process. By the time Slovakia joined the eurozone in January 2009, the EU’s ability to shape and impact Slovakia’s political and economic direction was demonstrable. However, following the severe economic downturn beginning in 2008 and the onset of the sovereign debt crisis of 2010, a second phase began to emerge. By the time of the migrant crisis in Europe in 2015, Slovakia surfaced as a key player in the EU’s ongoing struggles with the sovereign debt crisis and defending the external borders of Europe. Shifting relative Slovakian influence within the EU, broken down into two historical time frames, thus provides an overlapping explanation of the dual nature of Slovakia’s relationship with and to the European Union. These dual tracks help us further understand how truly Europeanized Slovakia is, despite its more recent resistance to further integrationist efforts. Slovakia, like the EU, is walking a very delicate tightrope, striking its own distinct and influential path among its CEE and Visegrad partners.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document