Health

Author(s):  
Shlomi Segall

The chapter discusses the evolution of theories of justice in health and healthcare. It traces Norman Daniels’s Rawlsian account, as well as the criticism it received. It then goes on to discuss two rival theories that sprang in opposition to Daniels’s, namely a sufficientarian family of theories and luck egalitarian justice in health. Special attention is devoted to three focal questions: the pattern of justice in health, its currency, and its scope, that is, the what, how, and who. Under the latter, the chapter discusses the requirements of global justice in health, and investigates what temporal unit is appropriate in thinking of just healthcare.

Author(s):  
Carl-Henric Grenholm

The purpose of this article is to examine the contributions that might be given by Lutheran political theology to the discourse on global justice. The article offers a critical examination of three different theories of global justice within political philosophy. Contractarian theories are criticized, and a thesis is that it is plausible to argue that justice can be understood as liberation from oppression. From this perspective the article gives an analysis of an influential theory of justice within Lutheran ethics. According to this theory justice is not an equal distribution but an arrangement where the subordinate respect the authority of those in power. This theory is related to a sharp distinction between law and gospel. The main thesis of the article is that Lutheran political theology should take a different approach if it aims to give a constructive contribution to theories of justice. This means that Lutheran ethics should not be based on Creation and reason alone – it should also be based on Christology and Eschatology.


Author(s):  
Miriam Ronzoni ◽  
Laura Valentini

The chapter critically analyzes the role played by the state in the global justice debate. It surveys the different ways in which statists and cosmopolitans invoke the state either to justify the scope and content of their preferred principles of justice or to explain how such principles might be realized. The chapter also distinguishes between two conceptualizations of the state: as a system of institutions and as an agent in its own right. On the basis of this analysis, the authors conclude that both at the level of justification and at that of realization, the most plausible positions with respect to global justice lie somewhere in between full-blown cosmopolitanism and full-blown statism. While principles of egalitarian justice are not confined to the state, they do not extend in identical form to the global realm. Similarly, while the state—as we know it—is insufficient to realize plausible principles of justice (be they statist or cosmopolitan), what realizing justice requires falls short of the creation of a comprehensive global sovereign.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael G. Festl

AbstractThe article explicates how the pragmatic account of justice which is called ‘justice as historic experimentalism’ can be applied to the debate on global justice. It investigates thereby the role that normative justifications of the nation-state ought to play in global theories of justice. It argues that one distinctive element of pragmatic approaches, as opposed to the dominant approaches in the field of global justice, is that arguments on the role of the nation-state do not occupy a central position. Rather, it is concrete problems of justice and their experimental and historic examination that guide the pragmatist inquiry. The role of the nation-state has to fall in line. The problem of global economic in equalities is invoked to illustrate the merits of the pragmatist approach to justice here presented.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerah Gordon-Solmon

AbstractIn the classic article, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” G.A. Cohen states that “a large part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the effects of brute luck on distribution.” This canonical formulation pinpoints what is distinctive of the luck-egalitarian mandate. But it also indicates that that mandate, so stated, is incomplete. The primary task of the paper is to extend what is explicit within that mandate, and in doing so, to bring it closer to completion. To that end, I defend – in the spirit of Cohen, and by arguments he pioneered – a new, expanded conception of luck-egalitarian compensation. I propose, accordingly, an amendment, seemingly friendly, to Cohen’s statement. But, in fact, my proposed amendment, and its rationale, reveal a major lacuna in the normative underpinnings of Cohen-style egalitarianism. I thereby show that, contrary to what is widely assumed, important foundational work remains to be done for the luck-egalitarian project.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 329-336
Author(s):  
Alexander Livingston

The question of what political consequences, if any, follow from American pragmatism is nearly as old as pragmatism itself. David Rondel’s Pragmatist Egalitarianism breathes new life into this old debate. Rondel outlines a distinctively pluralistic and problem-oriented approach to political philosophy that claims to “reconcile and mediate” the false dichotomies and interminable debates marking philosophical discourses of egalitarian justice. This article identifies two competing visions of the political consequences of Rondel’s egalitarian brand of pragmatism: one Rortyan and deflationary, the other Deweyan and reconstructive. Rondel’s reconstructive argument shows how pragmatism’s democratic radicalism pushes beyond the liberal consensus of contemporary theories of justice and towards a more robust conception of democratic socialism, yet the full implications of this position are cut short by the book’s competing deflationary mode.


Author(s):  
David Wasserman

Is it wrong for prospective parents not to select against having children with disabilities because these children impose substantial costs on society? Recent writers such as Stephen John have argued that the state should fund prenatal diagnosis based on expected cost savings and that parents who have had a reasonable opportunity to avoid having a child with a disability should bear some of the additional costs of raising the child. This chapter offers three responses to these social cost arguments: claims about increased costs and reduced productivity are greatly exaggerated, modern states subsidize many similar costs of childrearing and do not attempt to limit the number of children per family to reduce these costs, and luck-egalitarian theories of justice do not adequately respect the institution of the family.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 277-288
Author(s):  
Steven Ratner ◽  
James Stewart ◽  
Jiewuh Song ◽  
Carmen Pavel ◽  
David Luban

International law (IL) and political philosophy represent two rich disciplines for exploring issues of global justice. At their core, each seeks to build a better world based on some universally agreed norms, rules, and practices, backed by effective institutions. International lawyers, even the most positivist of them, have some underlying assumptions about a just world order that predisposes their interpretive methods; legal scholars have incorporated concepts of justice in their work even as their overall pragmatic orientation has limited the nature of their inquiries. Many philosophers, for their part, have engaged with IL to some extent—at a minimum recognizing that legal rules may need to be the vehicles for their own theories of justice, or going a step further to appraise them for their underlying moral content.


Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz

In this chapter I will deal primarily with principles of justice for a particular society, a society whose members share benefits and burdens and regard themselves as cooperating members of that society. This type of justice is called domestic justice, to contrast it with transnational or global justice. Usually it is people in a given nation who constitute a society and regard themselves as belonging to a single economic and political unit. As I mentioned in the discussion of globalized institutions in Chapter 2, federal arrangements such as the US and the EU are possible with subsidiary units with partial autonomy, both economic and political.


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