Europäische Zentralbank: kontraproduktive unkonventionelle Geldpolitik und der Euro-Wechselkurs / European Central Bank: counter-productive unconventional monetary policy and the exchange rate

ORDO ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ansgar Belke
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Quantitative Easing ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
European Central ◽  
The Exchange Rate ◽  
Europäische Zentralbank

ZusammenfassungDie EZB sollte der Versuchung widerstehen, die Deflationsgefahr in der Eurozone durch zusätzliche Varianten unkonventioneller Geldpolitik (z.B. „Quantitative Easing“) zu bekämpfen. Was in den USA oder in Großbritannien geklappt haben mag, wird in der Eurozone nicht funktionieren. Es besteht gar die Gefahr einer Deflationsspirale, wie dieser Beitrag zeigt. Eingebettet werden die Argumente in die aktuelle Debatte um den „zu starken“ Euro.

scholarly journals Unconventional monetary policy of the European Central Bank: A brief recapitulation

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Ilona Skibińska-Fabrowska
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
European Central ◽  
National Bank

<p>The financial and economic crisis that has hit many economies in recent years has significantly increased the activity of central banks. After using the standard instruments of conducting monetary policy, in view of the obstruction of monetary impulse transmission channels, they reached for non-standard instruments. Among them, asset purchase programs played a signifciant role. The European Central Bank (ECB) launched the largest asset purchase programme (APP) of this type in 2014 and expired in December 2018. The aim of the undertaken activities was to improve the situation on the financial market and stimulate economic growth. The article reviews the literature and results of research on the effects of the program and indicates the possibility of using the ECB’s experience in conducting monetary policy by the National Bank of Poland.</p>

scholarly journals Complexity, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy: Can the ECB Avoid the Unconventional Becoming the ‘New Normal’?

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Hartwell
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Structural Change ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Unresolved Issue ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
New Normal ◽  
European Central

Abstract Worries about Italy and the unresolved issue of euro governance – coupled with uncertainty surrounding Brexit – means that the European Central Bank (ECB) may already be facing its next crisis in the euro area. Unfortunately, the ECB is still fighting the last war, deploying the tools of unconventional monetary policy to address lingering problems while unable institutionally to address needed structural change. This paper looks at the ECB as an institution amongst institutions and shows how even more unconventional approaches will not help to bolster the economy of the euro area. Indeed, given the complexity of money, the effects of expectations, and continued uncertainty, expanding the ECB’s unconventional arsenal is likely to have deleterious consequences across Europe.

scholarly journals Polityka pieniężna Europejskiego Banku Centralnego w odpowiedzi na kryzysy lat 2008–2020

Studia BAS ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (67) ◽  
pp. 71-85
Author(s):  
Danuta Adamiec
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Policy Tools ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
European Central ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Future Policy ◽  
The Eu

The article explores the reaction of the European Central Bank (ECB) to two major economic crises that the EU had to face in the last two decades: the financial crisis which began in 2008 and the latest crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Although causes underlying both crises were ultimately different, the response of the ECB was based on the same unconventional monetary policy tools. The author analyses the similarities and differences between both of these crises, as well as the ECB’s reaction to them, drawing attention to a shift in the ECB’s monetary policy towards unconventional tools and consequences of such a shift for the position and future policy directions of the ECB.

The European Central Bank

2020 ◽  
pp. 150-175
Author(s):  
Vivien A. Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Public Perceptions ◽  
Structural Reform ◽  
Quantitative Easing ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
European Central

Chapter 6 discusses the ECB’s pathway to legitimacy, as it moved from following “one size fits none” rules to doing “whatever it takes” in monetary policy. The chapter begins with the ECB’s sources of power, based in its autonomy as a central bank and its leaders’ charismatic qualities, and with its grounds for throughput legitimacy. These largely depend upon ECB accountability to technical forums, since it has minimal formal accountability to political forums (only to the European Parliament), although it has informally increased its accountability through dialogue with political leaders. The chapter follows with a discussion of the Janus-faced public perceptions of the ECB’s governance of the euro during the crisis, split between views of the ECB as hero saving the euro or as ogre imposing austerity and structural reform while railroading countries into programs. As hero, the chapter details ECB President Mario Draghi’s increasingly flexible reinterpretation of his mandate, hid “in plain view” as he transitioned from his predecessor’s “credibility” discourse to a “stability” discourse and from denials of the ECB being a lender of last resort (LOLR) to coming very close to one through quantitative easing (QE). As ogre, the chapter delineates the ways in which ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet coerced vulnerable countries into harsh conditionality programs and Draghi made his active interventions a quid pro quo for austerity and structural reform, as well as the ECB’s initial inefficacy; the continuing orthodoxy of its ideas, especially in contrast to the IMF; and its role in the Troika.

The ECB’s quantitative easing programme as a constitutional game changer

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-107
Author(s):  
Klaus Tuori
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Public Sector ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Quantitative Easing ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Central

The European Central Bank started its quantitative easing programme in 2015 in order to support euro area financial conditions and ultimately increase inflation. The controversial Public Sector Purchase programme has resulted in central bank purchases of government bonds in the magnitude of €2.1 trillion and the Eurosystem (the European Central Bank and the national central banks) become the largest creditor to the euro area Member States. The constitutional framework of the European Central Bank did foresee such a programme, which also makes it potentially problematic for the European Central Bank’s accountability. The underlying source for constitutional concerns is the European Central Bank’s exceptional independence, which could be justified with a narrow central banking model, but becomes problematic when the European Central Bank’s influence on the society becomes more multifaceted, which blurs the borderlines between monetary policy and other economic policies. The specific constitutional concerns related to the Public Sector Purchase programme and accountability are highlighted by three claims: (a) With the Public Sector Purchase programme, the European Central Bank takes deeper inroads to the society than with traditional monetary policy; (b) Through the Public Sector Purchase programme, the European Central Bank became the largest creditor to Member States it was not allowed to finance; and (c) The Public Sector Purchase programme can lead to conflicts between the price stability objective and financial stability.

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