scholarly journals Another Brick in the Whole. The Case-Law of the Court of Justice on Free Movement and Its Possible Impact on European Criminal Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leandro Mancano

Abstract European Union, and criminal, laws had been interacting in many ways even before explicit competence in criminal matters was acquired by the Union in the Treaty of Maastricht. Such intersections between supranational and national provisions have frequently been handled by the CJEU. In the main, the intervention of the Court is triggered by Member States’ recourse to penal sanctions in situations covered by EU law. In such cases, the CJEU is called upon to strike a complicated balance: it has to deal with Member States’ claims of competence in criminal law, whilst ensuring that that power is used consistently with EU law. By making reference to selected cases, this paper highlights the impact that principles established in the context of the fundamental freedoms can have on EU criminal law.

2021 ◽  
pp. 203228442110276
Author(s):  
Tricia Harkin

The case law of the Court of Justice from 2016 to 2019 on the interpretation of ‘judicial authority’ in Article 6(1) FD-EAW essentially examines whether a public prosecutor can be an issuing judicial authority and if so, how Member States’ systems for issuing EAWs ensure effective judicial protection for the person concerned. For the Advocate General, applying the Court’s ‘rule of law’ jurisprudence, effective judicial protection when deprivation of liberty is involved can only be assured by a body with the highest level of judicial independence, being a court. The Court’s broader approach of including public prosecutors with sufficiency of independence from the executive and requiring their decisions to be amenable to review by a court, when applied in practice arguably falls short of the requisite standard of effective judicial protection. There is also a lack of clarity about access to the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court by public prosecutors acting as judicial authorities. Effective judicial protection and EU cooperation in criminal matters would now be better served by the designation in all Member States of a court as the issuing judicial authority for the FD-EAW. This is against the background of the uniquely coercive nature of the EAW in terms of deprivation of liberty; the differences in Member States’ institutional arrangements for public prosecutors and the post-Lisbon effective constitutionalisation of judicial protection of rights of individuals.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Nic Shuibhne

Abstract This paper examines the growing significance of the ‘territory of the Union’ in EU citizenship law and asks what it reveals about Union citizenship in the wider system of the EU legal order. In doing so, it builds on scholarship constructing the idea of ‘personhood’ in EU law by adding a complementary dimension of ‘place-hood’. The analysis is premised on territory as a place within—but also beyond—which particular legal qualities are both produced by and reflect shared objectives or values. In that respect, the paper offers a comprehensive ‘map’ of Union territory as a legal construct, with the aim of uncovering what kind of legal place the territory of the Union constitutes as well as the extent to which it is dis-connectable from the territories of the Member States. It also considers how Union territory relates to what lies ‘outside’. It will be shown that different narratives of Union territory have materialized in the case law of the Court of Justice. However, it is argued that these segregated lines of reasoning should be integrated, both to reflect and to progress a composite understanding of Union territory as a place in which concerns for Union citizens, for Member States, and for the system underpinning the EU legal order are more consistently acknowledged and more openly weighed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1104-1115
Author(s):  
Stanisław Biernat

AbstractA concern was voiced in commentaries after the PSPP judgment that the BVerfG’s position regarding the refusal to apply in Germany the CJEU judgment as issued on an ultra vires basis might be used in EU Member States infringing the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary in particular. This issue is presented in relation to Poland. The article sets out the constitutional provisions which proclaim openness to European integration, as well as the union-friendly case-law of the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) until 2016. The CT jurisprudence at that time provided, however, for the possibility of refusing to apply EU law in exceptional situations, even though this never happened. Next, the article discusses endeavors of the new Polish authorities since the end of 2015 which drastically breach the rule of law in the field of the judiciary, as well as the measures taken by EU institutions to counteract these adverse phenomena. The Polish authorities argue that the competence to define the legal position of the judiciary has not been conferred on the Union and remains within the exclusive competence of the Member States. Such a stance was also taken by the politically dependent CT in April 2020. The PSPP judgment was therefore welcomed with joy by Polish politicians. There are major differences, however, between the rulings of the BVerfG and those of the Polish CT in its current composition, and the hopes pinned on the PSPP judgment by the Polish authorities are unfounded.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-39
Author(s):  
Kimmo Nuotio

European Union (EU) law is known for its strong emphasis on effectivity and more generally for its instrumental character. This is not foreign even to European criminal law, a feature which creates some tension between the EU criminal law and criminal law in the national setting. EU Framework Decisions and Directives often require the Member States to criminalize certain forms of conduct with sanctions that are ‘Effective, Dissuasive and Proportionate’. In this article, I try to show that it would be timely to look at EU criminal law from an alternative point of view, as a more mature law. I call this a legitimacy-based approach. Such a reading would ease some of these tensions. It would also be helpful in developing a criminal policy for the EU, a policy which would be realistic and pragmatic. And it would be easier to look at EU criminal law from the point of view of justice. In order to get there, we need to see where the (current) narrow deterrence argument gets is wrong or one-sided. Some social theory is needed in order to make the point.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Radim Charvát

Abstract The paper addresses the issue whether customs authorities of Member States are entitled to suspend or detain goods in transit (i.e., products directing from one non- Member State to another non-Member State through the EU) and the evolving case-law of the Court of Justice related to this matter. Prior to the judgment in Philips and Nokia cases, a so-called manufacturing fiction theory was applied by some Member State courts (especially Dutch courts). According to this theory, goods suspended or detained by customs authorities within the EU were considered to be manufactured in the Member State where the custom action took place. In the Philips and Nokia judgments, the Court of Justice rejected this manufacturing fiction theory. But the proposal for amendment to the Regulation on Community trade mark and the proposal of the new Trademark directive, as a part of the trademark reform within the EU, go directly against the ruling in the Philips and Nokia cases and against the Understanding between the EU and India.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grazyna Marina Plump

This study deals with a topic that has been matter of debate among the academic community for some time: The competences of the EU in Criminal Law. With the current EU law after Lisbon the basic academic criticism of European Criminal Law, especially the prominent objection of a democratic deficit, is being scrutinized. Thereafter the analysis deals with the EU’s legislative powers in criminal matters. The competences with regard to the harmonization of Criminal Law are examined as well as the EU’s legislative power to define offences via regulations. The work relates the analysis of the current legal basis of European Criminal Law to the fundamental criticism that is voiced especially from the point of view of democratic theory.


Author(s):  
Margot Horspool ◽  
Matthew Humphreys ◽  
Michael Wells-Greco

This chapter focuses on direct actions before the Court of Justice. It is divided into two sections. Section I deals with direct actions relating to public enforcement of EU law between the Commission and Member States (Article 258 of the TFEU) and between Member States (Article 259 TFEU). The financial consequences of failure to remedy infringements are also covered (Article 260 TFEU). Section II deals with actions challenging the legality of binding institutional acts (action for annulment, Article 263 TFEU); action for failure to act (Article 265 TFEU); and the plea of illegality (Article 277 TFEU). It briefly examines the action for damages against EU institutions (Articles 268 and 340(2) TFEU), a Treaty-based action from which parallels can be drawn to the evolution of state liability, through the Court’s case law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 413-429
Author(s):  
Stanisław Biernat

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY SUBJECTED TO REGLAMENTATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE CASE LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EXEMPLIFIED BY CONDUCTING GAMBLINGIn EU law, conducting gambling is classified as the exercise of the freedoms of the internal market, regulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Conducting gambling is not currently regulated or harmonized at EU level, and therefore the regulation of gambling is the competence of Member States. EU law defining acceptable ways of regulating gambling in the Member States is now a judge-made law and the result of the creative jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. So far, the Court has issued dozens of judgments in which it interpreted Treaty provisions proclaiming the freedoms of the internal market in the context of conducting gambling. These judgments provide a direct or indirect assessment of whether national law complies with EU law.


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