VII. The Limits Of Compensation In Capitalist Firms

2019 ◽  
pp. 125-145
Keyword(s):  
1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-463
Author(s):  
RONALD ROGOWSKI

Harry Eckstein's Theory of Stable Democracy briefly revolutionized thinking about authority structures in nongovernmental organizations but has left little lasting mark. Indeed, the theory failed as an account of stable democracy but, by emphasizing correctly the commonalities between public and private authority, it pointed the way to a general theory of authority in organizations. Such a theory is now emerging, chiefly from work on authority in capitalist firms. It is time for students of politics again to look beyond the state, as Eckstein argued, to the much wider universe of authority relations.


1982 ◽  
Vol 25 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 25-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann Westenholz

It is assumed that it is necessary to change the structure of ownership in order to establish alternative working conditions. The article deals with firms which are owned and controlled by their employees. A companson is made between the organizations of capitalist firms and producer co-operatives in four different respects: participation, learning processes; fundamental con tradictions; general responsibility. The article builds on empirical data from a research project at the Institute of Organization and Industrial Sociology at the Copenhagen School of Economics and Social Science, where a research group, MAREV, has been studying producer co-operatives in Denmark since 1979. Experiences so far have led to some tentative suggestions about the characteristics of producer co-operatives.


Organization ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 626-644 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Storey ◽  
Imanol Basterretxea ◽  
Graeme Salaman

Employee-owned businesses have recently enjoyed a resurgence of interest as possible ‘alternatives’ to the somewhat tarnished image of conventional investor-owned capitalist firms. Within the context of global economic crisis, such alternatives seem newly attractive. This is somewhat ironic because, for more than a century, academic literature on employee-owned businesses has been dominated by the ‘degeneration thesis’. This suggested that these businesses tend towards failure—they either fail commercially, or they relinquish their democratic characters. Bucking this trend and offering a beacon—especially in the United Kingdom —has been the commercially successful, co-owned enterprise of the John Lewis Partnership whose virtues have seemingly been rewarded with favourable and sustainable outcomes. This article makes comparisons between John Lewis Partnership and its Spanish equivalent Eroski—the supermarket group which is part of the Mondragon cooperatives. The contribution of this article is to examine in a comparative way how the managers in John Lewis Partnership and Eroski have constructed and accomplished their alternative scenarios. Using longitudinal data and detailed interviews with senior managers in both enterprises, it explores the ways in which two large, employee-owned, enterprises reconcile apparently conflicting principles and objectives. The article thus puts some new flesh on the ‘regeneration thesis’.


2010 ◽  
pp. 13-31
Author(s):  
Bruno Jossa

This paper investigates the funding difficulties of producer cooperatives and the potential risks for their financers. It claims that a cooperative requiring members to underwrite bonds will not automatically cease being an LMF (labour-managed firms), nor run the risk of under-investing. The paper also claims that an LMF-type firm will not necessarily tend to make high-risk investments because the link that binds LMF members to their firm is closer than that between shareholders and capitalist firms. Further claims are advanced and discussed to confute the widespread assumption that LMFs have no way out of their funding difficulties.


2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (03) ◽  
pp. 367-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAN M. PODIVINSKY ◽  
GEOFF STEWART

A long-standing issue in industrial economics is the understanding of the relative prevalence of labor-managed firms (LMFs) and capitalist firms across industries. In proportionate terms, LMF entry tends to be highly concentrated in particular industries. We provide empirical evidence on this by modeling the proportions of industry entrants that are LMFs, using a panel of UK manufacturing industries. Random effects proportions models indicate the role and importance of risk and capital requirements as potential deterrents to LMF entry.


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