APPENDIX B: CONCEPTS AND MEASURES OF LEFT AND CATHOLIC PARTY POWER

2019 ◽  
pp. 724-727
Keyword(s):  
Party Power

Adaptive Partisan Theory

1999 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jac C. Heckelman
Keyword(s):  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Economic Fluctuations ◽  
Adaptive Expectations ◽  
Macroeconomic Variables ◽  
Previous Evidence ◽  
Policy Model ◽  
Partisan Theory ◽  
Incumbent Party ◽  
Party Power

Abstract Previous empirical studies designed to test the rational expectations partisan model of Alesina [1987] have generally looked for changes in real macroeconomic variables following a change in party power (incumbent party loss), whereas the model predicts these variables should fluctuate in a predictable manner even when the incumbent party is reelected. It is shown in this paper that the previous evidence is supportive of a partisan policy model where agents employ adaptive expectations, in which case only changes in party power lead to partisan economic fluctuations of real variables.

Party power limits financial freedom in China

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Content Type ◽  
Power Limits ◽  
Party Power

Headline CHINA: Party power places limits on financial freedom

The Dispute Over a Wuhan Insurrection in 1927

1968 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 108-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsiao Tso-Liang
Keyword(s):  
Power Struggle ◽  
Military Leader ◽  
Civil Strife ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Party Power

As a result of the split between the Communists and the Kuomintang at Wuhan in July 1927, the Nationalists managed to set up a unified régime of their own at Nanking. But T'ang Sheng-chih, the KMT military leader at Wuhan, rebelled against that unified régime. So Nanking decided to send troops to fight him on October 24. This KMT civil strife led immediately to an intra-Party power struggle among the Communists who had been forced underground since July. The Communist struggle took the form of a dispute over a proposed insurrection at Wuhan in the event of T'ang Sheng-chih's defeat.

Constitutional Amendments and Party Power Centralisation in China

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (01) ◽  
pp. 5-13
Author(s):  
Gang CHEN
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Deng Xiaoping ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
State Apparatus ◽  
The Media ◽  
People's Congress ◽  
Party State ◽  
State Separation ◽  
Party Power

In March 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping kick-started his second term at the annual National People’s Congress, which amended the country’s constitution to allow Xi to remain in power beyond his scheduled departure in 2023. Xi’s power consolidation also came with the Party’s reinforced Leninist control of state apparatus at various levels, corporations, civil society, the media and the academia. Party-State reforms in 2018 were a reversal of Party-State separation (dangzheng fenkai) initiated by Deng Xiaoping.

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