Conclusion

Author(s):  
Lucas A. Powe

This chapter concludes that the book has discussed Texas's influence on all the doctrinal areas of modern constitutional law, showing that constitutional cases litigated by and in the state capture the major themes of the relation of law and politics in the entire country. In addition to representing all doctrinal areas of constitutional law, Texas cases revolve around the major issues of the nation, from race to wealth and poverty to civil liberties and the relationship of the states and the federal government to war. This conclusion summarizes some of those important cases, including City of Boerne v. Flores, an exercise in judicial review striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as it applied to states; Texas v. Johnson (flag burning); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust (railroad rates); Lawrence v. Texas (homosexual sodomy); and Roe v. Wade and Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt (abortion).

1993 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary L. McDowell

In recent years the debate over the nature and extent of judicial power in the United States has been dominated by questions concerning moral theory, unwritten constitutions, and natural law. In a significant sense, the contemporary discussion is but the continuation of the theory of judicial review first put forth by Edward S. Corwin in 1910–1911; it was this theory that the “higher law background” of American constitutional law derived from the dicta of Sir Edward Coke's opinion in Bonham's Case (1610) that was given its most complete expression in Corwin's famous two-part article in the Harvard Law Review in 1928–29. The fact is, the influence of Coke's opinion in Bonham's Case came from within the scholarly world; its significance stems not from history but from the historians; it was largely Corwin's creation. This paper seeks to correct the record and to show the deficiencies of Corwin's understanding about the relationship of the “higher law” to the American Constitution.


1983 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 7-8
Author(s):  
John F. Kozlowicz

The political science undergraduate curriculum has long included courses dealing with substantive aspects of the law. At one time the traditional constitutional law course served as an introduction to the relationship of law and politics. More recently courses such as civil liberties, criminal justice, judicial process, and law and society have become frequent political science offerings. While these and other courses teach students procedural and substantive aspects of the law, many such courses contain student research components as a learning device.Too often, however, political science/ public law training has ignored teaching about the uses of resources for legal research. Students are often directed to the law section of the library to face a batch of new and bewildering resource materials. As a result, Unfamiliar or seemingly intimidating materials such as Shephard's or law digests were often ignored or improperly used by students.


Author(s):  
Natalie R. Davidson ◽  
Leora Bilsky

In comparative constitutional law, the various models of judicial review require courts to examine either the substantive content of legislation or the procedure through which legislation was passed. This article offers a new model of judicial review – ‘the judicial review of legality’ – in which courts review instead the forms of law. The forms of law are the ways in which law communicates its norms to the persons who are meant to comply with them, and they include generality, clarity, avoidance of contradiction, and non-retroactivity. Drawing on recent writing on the jurisprudence of Lon Fuller, this article argues that Fuller’s linking of the forms of law to a relationship of reciprocity between government and governed can ground judicial review and that such review provides a missing language to address important legislative pathologies. Moreover, through an analysis of recent developments in Israel, the article demonstrates that the judicial review of legality targets some of the key legal techniques of contemporary processes of democratic erosion which other models of judicial review struggle to address, all the while re-centring judicial review on the lawyer’s craftsmanship and thus reducing problems of court legitimacy. This article therefore offers a distinctive and normatively appealing way for courts to act in troubling times.


Author(s):  
V.E. Zvarygin ◽  
A.S. Kondakov

The main problems and philosophical issues of countering religious extremism, as well as emerging issues of religious philosophy and metaphysics are revealed. A comprehensive analysis of the problem of religious extremism in various aspects is carried out from the standpoint of law, philosophy, political science, psychology, sociology. The philosophical essence of religious extremism is established as a violation of socially acceptable behavior and established relations. Variants of human behavior after interaction with traditional religion and new religious movements are considered. Levels of destructiveness of religious extremism, methods and ways of counteracting it are revealed. The essence of states controlled by extremist-minded leaders is analyzed. It is noted that in most scientific works the problematic issues of manifestations of religious extremism are studied in the context of political, legal and socio-philosophical manifestations, as well as from the relationship of religious philosophy and metaphysics, and when defining the concept of religious extremism the main emphasis is made on principles of law and politics with application of base categories of ideology.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Crowe

The role of implications in Australian constitutional law has long been debated. Jeffrey Goldsworthy has argued in a series of influential publications that legitimate constitutional implications must be derived in some way from authorial intentions. I call this the intentionalist model of constitutional implications. The intentionalist model has yielded a sceptical response to several recent High Court decisions, including the ruling in Roach v Electoral Commissioner that the Constitution enshrines an implied conditional guarantee of universal franchise. This article outlines an alternative way of thinking about constitutional implications, which I call the narrative model. I argue that at least some constitutional implications are best understood as arising from historically extended narratives about the relationship of the constitutional text to wider social practices and institutions. The article begins by discussing the limitations of the intentionalist model. It then considers the role of descriptive and normative implications in both factual and fictional narratives, before applying this analysis to the Australian Constitution. I argue that the narrative model offers a plausible basis for the High Court’s reasoning in Roach v Electoral Commissioner.


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