The Alcohol Marketing Landscape: Alcohol Industry Size, Structure, Strategies, and Public Health Responses

There are concerns about the accuracy of the health information provided by alcohol industry (AI)-funded organisations and about their independence. We conducted a content analysis of the health information disseminated by AI-funded organisations through Twitter, compared with non-AI-funded charities, to assess whether their messages align with industry and/or public health objectives. We compared all tweets from 2016 from Drinkaware (UK); Drinkaware.ie (Ireland); and DrinkWise (Australia), to non-AI-funded charities Alcohol Concern (UK), Alcohol Action Ireland, and FARE (Australia). Industry-funded bodies were significantly less likely to tweet about alcohol marketing, advertising and sponsorship; alcohol pricing; and physical health harms, including cancers, heart disease and pregnancy. They were significantly more likely to tweet about behavioural aspects of drinking and less likely to mention cancer risk; particularly breast cancer. These findings are consistent with previous evidence that the purpose of such bodies is the protection of the alcohol market, and of the alcohol industry’s reputation. Their messaging strongly aligns with AI corporate social responsibility goals. The focus away from health harms, particularly cancer, is also consistent with previous evidence. The evidence does not support claims by these alcohol-industry-funded bodies about their independence from industry.

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A Framework Convention on Alcohol Control: Getting Concrete about Its Contents

European Journal of Risk Regulation ◽

10.1017/err.2020.73 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 1-11

Author(s):

Robin ROOM ◽

Jenny CISNEROS ÖRNBERG

Keyword(s):

Public Health ◽

World Health ◽

Alcohol Industry ◽

Alcohol Control ◽

The World ◽

Draft Convention ◽

History Of ◽

Supplementary Material ◽

Health Organization ◽

Narcotic Drugs

This article proposes and discusses the text of a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control, which would serve public health and welfare interests. The history of alcohol’s omission from current drug treaties is briefly discussed. The paper spells out what should be covered in the treaty, using text adapted primarily from the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, but for the control of trade from the 1961 narcotic drugs treaty. While the draft provides for the treaty to be negotiated under the auspices of the World Health Organization, other auspices are possible. Excluding alcohol industry interests from the negotiation of the treaty is noted as an important precondition. The articles in the draft treaty and their purposes are briefly described, and the divergences from the tobacco treaty are described and justified. The text of the draft treaty is provided as Supplementary Material. Specification of concrete provisions in a draft convention points the way towards more effective global actions and agreements on alcohol control, whatever form they take.

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Drink, but don't drive? The alcohol industry’s involvement in global road safety

Health Policy and Planning ◽

10.1093/heapol/czaa097 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Connie Hoe ◽

Niloufer Taber ◽

Sarah Champagne ◽

Abdulgafoor M Bachani

Keyword(s):

Public Health ◽

Road Safety ◽

Road Traffic ◽

Expert Interviews ◽

Mixed Methods Approach ◽

The Public ◽

Alcohol Industry ◽

Alcohol Control ◽

Mapping Review ◽

Shed Light

Abstract Drink-driving is a major cause of global road traffic fatalities, yet few countries have laws that meet international best practices. One possible reason is the alcohol industry’s opposition to meaningful policies that are perceived to directly threaten sales. Our primary objectives are to document alcohol industry involvement in global road safety policies and programmes and to critically evaluate the responses of public health and road safety communities to this involvement. Under the guidance of the Policy Dystopia Model, we used a mixed methods approach in which data were gathered from expert interviews and a mapping review of 11 databases, 5 watchdog websites and 7 alcohol industry-sponsored initiatives. Triangulation was used to identify points of convergence among data sources. A total of 20 expert interviews and 94 documents were analysed. Our study showed that the alcohol industry acknowledges that drink-driving is an issue but argues for solutions that would limit impact on sales, akin to the message ‘drink—but do not drive’. Industry actors have been involved in road safety through: (1) coalition coupling and decoupling, (2) information production and management, (3) direct involvement in policymaking and (4) implementation of interventions. Our study also shed light on the lack of cohesion within and among the public health and road safety communities, particularly with regard to the topics of receiving funding from and partnering with the alcohol industry. These results were subsequently used to adapt the Policy Dystopia Model as a conceptual framework that illustrates the ways in which the alcohol industry has been involved in global road safety. Several implications can be drawn from this study, including the urgent need to increase awareness about the involvement of the alcohol industry in road safety and to build a cohesive transnational alcohol control advocacy alliance to curb injuries and deaths related to drink-driving.

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Exposing the tactics of alcohol companies

European Journal of Public Health ◽

10.1093/eurpub/ckaa165.216 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 30 (Supplement_5) ◽

Author(s):

M Moore AM

Keyword(s):

Public Health ◽

Tobacco Industry ◽

Self Regulation ◽

World Market ◽

Alcohol Policy ◽

Alcohol Industry ◽

Members Of Parliament ◽

The World ◽

Prime Objective ◽

Insight Into

Abstract Background The alcohol industry has taken a page from the tobacco industry play book in an attempt to resist regulation through delay, self-regulation and effective lobbying. The global alcohol industry is constantly seeking to increase sales of harmful products through widespread marketing, the targeting of young people, and resisting regulatory action. Methods An assessment of the number of lobbyists engaged in one form of another to influence members of Parliament in Australia is being conducted to provide an insight into the attempts to influence alcohol policy. This follows a scan of the lobbyists' register by Daube et al in 2018 that found the while the tobacco industry had 20 direct lobbyists and 14 indirect, the junk food industry 33 direct and 13 indirect, the most dominant was the alcohol industry with 43 direct and 23 indirect. A careful re-examination of the register in 2020 is expected to reveal an increase in these numbers. There will also be an examination of the State and Territory registers in an attempt to understand the overall numbers of people specifically attempting to influence governments. Discussion This particular examination is focussed on the Australian Parliament/s. However, the message will be similar world-wide. Companies such as Diageo have a significant share of the world market with net sales, for example, being 25% of scotch, 16% of beer and 11% of vodka. Their “Drinkiq” website claims “Diageo is committed to preventing and reducing alcohol abuse around the world”. However, other business websites illustrate that their prime objective is to sell more alcohol. Presentation The presentation will focus on the importance of countering the efforts of industry in increasing availability of alcohol. It will also provide a series of steps that public health advocates can take in order to persuade governments of the importance of protecting community health through appropriate regulation of the marketing and sales of alcohol. Key messages The alcohol industry seeks to increase sales while arguing it is protecting health. Public health advocates do have the tools to counter approaches by alcohol companies.

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