scholarly journals ANTIDIPLOMACY IN RUSSIA’S POLICIES REGARDING RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS IN THE BALTIC STATES

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik
Keyword(s):  
Economic Pressure ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
Baltic States ◽  
Regional Organizations ◽  
Negative Image ◽  
Hard Power ◽  
Russian Speakers ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
The Baltic

Though Russia is a classic realist power, Russia, as its recent actions in Ukraine reveal, frequently prefers hard power to powers of attraction. In addition to traditional economic pressure and military policy, Russia also employs antidiplomatic tools to influence the Baltic states. Though Russia officially proclaims itself a democratic state, it has been developing a broad spectrum of antidiplomatic methods to legitimise Russia’s interests in post-Soviet spaces inhabited by large numbers of Russian-speakers. The clearest example of these methods appears in Russia’s use of international and regional organizations’ conferences to express and articulate its interests in protecting Russian diasporas—a phenomenon that first appeared in the Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy as part of his efforts to construct a negative image of the Baltic states, affect the Baltic states’ domestic policies, and subtly discredit their governments. Russia is positioning itself as the protector of a Russian diaspora wounded by the Baltic states’ anti-Russian policies.

scholarly journals Russian soft power in the Baltic States through the lens of research: traditions, competition, confrontation

Baltic Region ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 107-124
Author(s):  
Vladislav V. Vorotnikov ◽  
Natalia A. Ivanova
Keyword(s):  
Mass Culture ◽  
Soft Power ◽  
Russian Language ◽  
Ruling Class ◽  
Baltic States ◽  
Hard Power ◽  
Baltic Countries ◽  
Bilateral Relations ◽  
Russian Speakers ◽  
The Baltic

In this article, we aim to analyse the research discourse in the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) as regards Russian soft power, which is considered as hard power, and to compare the theses that dominate this discourse with the actual interactions between Russia and the three states in media, education, and culture. Each Baltic country has built a system of political and legal restrictions to diminish the effect of Russian soft power, which is considered in terms of hard power, i.e. as a threat to national security. The current forms of Russian soft power are becoming less productive in the region and their use in the negative political context of bilateral relations has the opposite effect for Russia – the country loses in reputation and image. The main factor at play is the information content of the Russian-language media space. At odds with the historical and political views of a significant part of the Baltic States’ ruling class, it is becoming the target of counteraction. At the same time, Russian high and mass culture and, partly, educational services are in demand from both Baltic Russian speakers and ethnic Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. Our analysis shows that the views of Baltic researchers that Russian soft power is politics-driven and foreign to the region are exaggerated and biased. In its turn, Russian soft power in the Baltics retains the potential to aid the country’s foreign policy, being a complement to the latter rather than its direct tool.

scholarly journals "Willingness to Defend Estonia: Fostered by Civil-Military Integration and Communication"

2021 ◽  
pp. 35-46
Author(s):  
Ivo Juurvee ◽  
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Military Culture ◽  
Baltic States ◽  
Historical Experience ◽  
Russian Speakers ◽  
Soviet Occupation ◽  
The Baltic ◽  
Effective Integration ◽  
Positive Factor

As a part of the overarching publication “Willingness to Defend Own Country in the Baltic States: Implications for National Security and NATO’s Collective Defence” (2021), the author of this chapter assesses willingness to defend Estonia. The author puts forth several points. While such factors as historical experience, i.e., the Soviet occupation and visibility of NATO Allies, are shared with both Latvia and Lithuania, other reasons are more Estonia-specific. Among these are the effective integration of military and civilian sector, i.e., a mature conscription system, operational reservists’ system, and effective military-civilian communication. Another positive factor is the Nordic, or more specifically Finnish, influence on the Estonian military culture, as well as the governance approach and lifestyle in broader terms. Nevertheless, a notable issue remains – level of willingness is lower among non-Estonians, i.e., Russian speakers.

Baltic States in the European Union

2006 ◽  
pp. 118-132
Author(s):  
R. Simonyan
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Baltic States ◽  
Eu Accession ◽  
Economic Changes ◽  
The Baltic

The article analyzes social and economic changes, which have occurred in the Baltic states after their EU accession. It reveals new tendencies in the development of this new region of the united Europe that plays a significant geostrategic role for Russia.

PARTICIPATION OF UZBEK SOLDIERS IN THE LIBERATION OF THE BALTIC STATES

2020 ◽  
pp. 69-75
Author(s):  
Ilkhomjon M. Saidov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Baltic States ◽  
Socialist Republic ◽  
Soviet Socialist Republic ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Great Patriotic War ◽  
Working Age ◽  
Long Time ◽  
The Baltic ◽  
Soviet Historiography

The article is devoted to the participation of natives of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in the Baltic operation of 1944. The author states that Soviet historiography did not sufficiently address the problem of participation of individual peoples of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, and therefore their feat remained undervalued for a long time. More specifically, according to the author, 40–42% of the working age population of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Such figure was typical only for a limited number of countries participating in the anti-fascist coalition. Analyzing the participation of Soviet Uzbekistan citizens in the battles for the Baltic States, the author shows that the 51st and 71st guards rifle divisions, which included many natives of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, were particularly distinguished. Their heroic deeds were noted by the soviet leadership – a number of Uzbek guards were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In addition, Uzbekistanis fought as part of partisan detachments – both in the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, the Western regions of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and Moldova. Many Uzbek partisans were awarded the medal “Partisan of the Patriotic War” of I and II degrees.

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