scholarly journals "Willingness to Defend Estonia: Fostered by Civil-Military Integration and Communication"

Author(s):  
Ivo Juurvee ◽  

As a part of the overarching publication “Willingness to Defend Own Country in the Baltic States: Implications for National Security and NATO’s Collective Defence” (2021), the author of this chapter assesses willingness to defend Estonia. The author puts forth several points. While such factors as historical experience, i.e., the Soviet occupation and visibility of NATO Allies, are shared with both Latvia and Lithuania, other reasons are more Estonia-specific. Among these are the effective integration of military and civilian sector, i.e., a mature conscription system, operational reservists’ system, and effective military-civilian communication. Another positive factor is the Nordic, or more specifically Finnish, influence on the Estonian military culture, as well as the governance approach and lifestyle in broader terms. Nevertheless, a notable issue remains – level of willingness is lower among non-Estonians, i.e., Russian speakers.

Baltic Region ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 107-124
Author(s):  
Vladislav V. Vorotnikov ◽  
Natalia A. Ivanova

In this article, we aim to analyse the research discourse in the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) as regards Russian soft power, which is considered as hard power, and to compare the theses that dominate this discourse with the actual interactions between Russia and the three states in media, education, and culture. Each Baltic country has built a system of political and legal restrictions to diminish the effect of Russian soft power, which is considered in terms of hard power, i.e. as a threat to national security. The current forms of Russian soft power are becoming less productive in the region and their use in the negative political context of bilateral relations has the opposite effect for Russia – the country loses in reputation and image. The main factor at play is the information content of the Russian-language media space. At odds with the historical and political views of a significant part of the Baltic States’ ruling class, it is becoming the target of counteraction. At the same time, Russian high and mass culture and, partly, educational services are in demand from both Baltic Russian speakers and ethnic Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. Our analysis shows that the views of Baltic researchers that Russian soft power is politics-driven and foreign to the region are exaggerated and biased. In its turn, Russian soft power in the Baltics retains the potential to aid the country’s foreign policy, being a complement to the latter rather than its direct tool.


1979 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-211
Author(s):  
Silvia P. Forgus

The occupation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union in 1940 failed to extinguish feelings of nationalism and patriotism among the native Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian peoples; on the contrary, foreign occupation strengthened their national spirit. Dwelling on the successes and memories of their former independence, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian nationalists continue to denounce the Soviet occupation and resist the policies of communization and Russification practiced by the Soviet regime.


Author(s):  
Yao-Yuan Yeh ◽  

As a part of the overarching publication “Willingness to Defend Own Country in the Baltic States: Implications for National Security and NATO’s Collective Defence” (2021), the author assesses preferences and attitudes in societies regarding wars of necessity and wars of choice, as well as reasoning of individuals in willing or unwilling to defend own countries. The author underlines that the level of willingness to defend own country depends on the nature of a potential conflict that the society in question is about to face – either one of necessity, or as a choice. The former here relates to self-defence against immediate threats while the latter to more distant threats.


Author(s):  
Aleksandra Palkova ◽  

As a part of the publication “Willingness to Defend Own Country in the Baltic States: Implications for National Security and NATO’s Collective Defence” (2021), the author of this chapter assesses willingness to defend Latvia. In Latvia, the willingness level is lower than in Estonia but higher than in Lithuania. That level is neither high nor low in a regional and global context. The author in her chapter names the main categories of reasons that affect the situation. First, a set of detrimental factors – disillusionment with political and economic development and the related widespread distrust in state institutions and politicians. Second is a mixed factor & actor – Russia. Its military conflict with Ukraine, assertive behaviour and negative rhetoric towards Latvia have made a considerable part of the Latvian society feel insecure, whereas another part of the society, mostly Russian speakers, remain more sympathetic to Russia. Third is an impeding mix of physiological and physical factors – complacency resulting from the lack of recent experience of notable conflicts and the lack of military training of most people.


Author(s):  
Māris Andžāns ◽  

As a part of the overarching publication “Willingness to Defend Own Country in the Baltic States: Implications for National Security and NATO’s Collective Defence” (2021), author of this chapter reviews quantitative data on willingness to defend and to fight for own country in the Baltic states. It is an updated version of a fragment from previous scientific publication by the author.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik

Though Russia is a classic realist power, Russia, as its recent actions in Ukraine reveal, frequently prefers hard power to powers of attraction. In addition to traditional economic pressure and military policy, Russia also employs antidiplomatic tools to influence the Baltic states. Though Russia officially proclaims itself a democratic state, it has been developing a broad spectrum of antidiplomatic methods to legitimise Russia’s interests in post-Soviet spaces inhabited by large numbers of Russian-speakers. The clearest example of these methods appears in Russia’s use of international and regional organizations’ conferences to express and articulate its interests in protecting Russian diasporas—a phenomenon that first appeared in the Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy as part of his efforts to construct a negative image of the Baltic states, affect the Baltic states’ domestic policies, and subtly discredit their governments. Russia is positioning itself as the protector of a Russian diaspora wounded by the Baltic states’ anti-Russian policies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 0 (143) ◽  
pp. 217-228
Author(s):  
Іван Васильович Яковюк ◽  
Станіславович Сергій Шестопал

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