scholarly journals The use of comparative law in the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court: An empirical analysis (1990–2019)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eszter Bodnár
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Active Participant ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
International Trends ◽  
Preparatory Phase ◽  
Close Observation

AbstractCourts conducting constitutional review do not work as ‘ivory towers’ any longer: they are part of the global dialogue on constitutional ideas and thoughts. This dialogue includes an exchange of experiences with fellow constitutional and apex courts, as well as the close observation of developments in foreign constitutional and legal systems, scholarship, and international trends. The Constitutional Court of Hungary has been an active participant in this dialogue since the Court's establishment in 1989, albeit with varying levels of intensity and goals. Moving beyond the often anecdotal observations in this field, the paper aims to conduct a deep analysis of how the Court uses comparative law in its work (during the preparatory phase and the drafting of final decisions) and examines the factors that may influence the Court's practice in this area. Such a clear overview can assist proponents of the use of comparative reasoning to contravene the increasing amount of criticism of the practice's legitimacy and selectivity.

The Kelsenian Model of Constitutional Review in Times of European Integration – Reconsidering the Basic Features

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-37
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Centralized Control ◽  
Constitutional Treaty ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Basic Features ◽  
The Eu

Summary The paper deals with the changes in the centralized (Kelsenian) model of constitutional review resulting from a state’s membership of the EU, which unequivocally demonstrates the decomposition of the classic paradigm of constitutional judiciary. The main point raised in the paper is that European integration has fundamentally influenced on the four above-mentioned basic elements of the Kelsenian model of constitutional review of legislation, which are the following: the assumption of the hierarchical construction of a legal system; the assumption of the supreme legal force of the constitution as the primary normative act of a given system; a centralised model of reviewing hierarchical conformity of legal norms; coherence of the system guaranteed by a constitutional court’s power to declare defectiveness of a norm and the latter’s derogation. All its fundamental elements have evolved, i.e. the hierarchy of the legal system, the overriding power of the constitution, centralized control of constitutionality, and the erga omnes effect of the ruling on the hierarchical non-conformity of the norms. It should be noted that over the last decade the dynamics of these changes have definitely gained momentum. This has been influenced by several factors, including the “great accession” of 2004, the pursuit of formal constitutionalization of the EU through the Constitutional Treaty, the compromise solutions adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon, the entry into force of the Charter, and the prospect of EU accession to the ECHR. The CJEU has used these factors to deepen the tendencies towards decentralization of constitutional control, by atomising national judicial systems and relativizing the effects of constitutional court rulings within national legal systems. The end result is the observed phenomenon, if not of marginalisation, then at least of a systemic shift in the position of constitutional courts, which have lost their uniqueness and have become “only ones of many” national courts.

Foreign Relations Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 43-61
Author(s):  
Karen Knop
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
The U.S

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.

Mixed Judicial Selection and Constitutional Review: Evidence from Spain

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Nuno Garoupa ◽  
Marian Gili ◽  
Fernando Gómez Pomar
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Empirical Testing ◽  
Judicial Selection ◽  
Constitutional Review

Spanish Constitutional Court – Judicial behaviour – Mixed judicial selection – Empirical testing – Decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court, 1980-2018 – Judicial background – Government – Senate – Congress – Spanish Judicial Council – Invalidation of statutes –Dissent opinions – Shaping politicisation.

Quasi-constitutional court of human rights for Europe? Comments on Geir Ulfstein

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-185
Author(s):  
WOJCIECH SADURSKI
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Short Comment

AbstractThis short comment offers two additional arguments, missing from Geir Ulfstein’s account, which may bolster the case for constitutionalisation of the ECtHR. The first is about the ‘pilot judgments’ through which the Court addresses systemic deficits in national legal systems and thus ensures a minimal synchronisation of human rights protection throughout the CoE system. The second manifestation of constitutionalisation of the ECHR system is the increasing role of the ECtHR in the implementation of its own judgments. Ultimately, the legitimacy for the constitutional ambitions of Strasbourg Court should be located primarily in the argumentative resources of the court and in its pursuit of ‘public reason’.

Amendment of the Contravention Code or Defiance of the Constitution by the Exceptional Situations Commission?

2021 ◽  
pp. 56-65
Author(s):  
Iulian Rusanovschi ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
State Of Emergency ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Republic Of Moldova ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right ◽  
Epidemiological Situation

On 17.03.2020, the Parliament declared a state of emergency on the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova for the period March 17 - May 15, 2020. By the same Decision, the Parliament delegated the Commission for Exceptional Situations with the right to implement a series of measures to overcome the epidemiological situation in the country. However, in the conditions of a functioning Parliament and despite the clear and exhaustive texts of the Constitution, the Commission for Exceptional Situations amended during the state of emergency the Contravention Code, which is an organic law. The amendments specifically concerned the procedure and terms for examining infringement cases brought in connection with non-compliance with the measures adopted by the Commission for Exceptional Situations and the Extraordinary Commission for Public Health. In the conditions in which an organic law can be modified only by the Parliament, it is obvious the unconstitutionality, at least partial, of the Disposition no. 4 of 24.03.2020 of the Commission for Exceptional Situations, but unfortunately, the Constitutional Court is not mandated with the right to submit to constitutional review the normative acts adopted by the Commission for Exceptional Situations. Under these conditions, the state is obliged to identify solutions in order not to allow an authority to adopt unconstitutional normative acts that cannot be subject to constitutional review.

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