Judging Under Political Pressure: An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court

Author(s):  
Nuno M. Garoupa ◽  
Fernando Gomez-Pomar ◽  
Veronica Grembi
Author(s):  
Eszter Bodnár

AbstractCourts conducting constitutional review do not work as ‘ivory towers’ any longer: they are part of the global dialogue on constitutional ideas and thoughts. This dialogue includes an exchange of experiences with fellow constitutional and apex courts, as well as the close observation of developments in foreign constitutional and legal systems, scholarship, and international trends. The Constitutional Court of Hungary has been an active participant in this dialogue since the Court's establishment in 1989, albeit with varying levels of intensity and goals. Moving beyond the often anecdotal observations in this field, the paper aims to conduct a deep analysis of how the Court uses comparative law in its work (during the preparatory phase and the drafting of final decisions) and examines the factors that may influence the Court's practice in this area. Such a clear overview can assist proponents of the use of comparative reasoning to contravene the increasing amount of criticism of the practice's legitimacy and selectivity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-37
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka

Summary The paper deals with the changes in the centralized (Kelsenian) model of constitutional review resulting from a state’s membership of the EU, which unequivocally demonstrates the decomposition of the classic paradigm of constitutional judiciary. The main point raised in the paper is that European integration has fundamentally influenced on the four above-mentioned basic elements of the Kelsenian model of constitutional review of legislation, which are the following: the assumption of the hierarchical construction of a legal system; the assumption of the supreme legal force of the constitution as the primary normative act of a given system; a centralised model of reviewing hierarchical conformity of legal norms; coherence of the system guaranteed by a constitutional court’s power to declare defectiveness of a norm and the latter’s derogation. All its fundamental elements have evolved, i.e. the hierarchy of the legal system, the overriding power of the constitution, centralized control of constitutionality, and the erga omnes effect of the ruling on the hierarchical non-conformity of the norms. It should be noted that over the last decade the dynamics of these changes have definitely gained momentum. This has been influenced by several factors, including the “great accession” of 2004, the pursuit of formal constitutionalization of the EU through the Constitutional Treaty, the compromise solutions adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon, the entry into force of the Charter, and the prospect of EU accession to the ECHR. The CJEU has used these factors to deepen the tendencies towards decentralization of constitutional control, by atomising national judicial systems and relativizing the effects of constitutional court rulings within national legal systems. The end result is the observed phenomenon, if not of marginalisation, then at least of a systemic shift in the position of constitutional courts, which have lost their uniqueness and have become “only ones of many” national courts.


Author(s):  
Nuno Garoupa ◽  
Marian Gili ◽  
Fernando Gómez Pomar

Spanish Constitutional Court – Judicial behaviour – Mixed judicial selection – Empirical testing – Decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court, 1980-2018 – Judicial background – Government – Senate – Congress – Spanish Judicial Council – Invalidation of statutes –Dissent opinions – Shaping politicisation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 56-65
Author(s):  
Iulian Rusanovschi ◽  

On 17.03.2020, the Parliament declared a state of emergency on the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova for the period March 17 - May 15, 2020. By the same Decision, the Parliament delegated the Commission for Exceptional Situations with the right to implement a series of measures to overcome the epidemiological situation in the country. However, in the conditions of a functioning Parliament and despite the clear and exhaustive texts of the Constitution, the Commission for Exceptional Situations amended during the state of emergency the Contravention Code, which is an organic law. The amendments specifically concerned the procedure and terms for examining infringement cases brought in connection with non-compliance with the measures adopted by the Commission for Exceptional Situations and the Extraordinary Commission for Public Health. In the conditions in which an organic law can be modified only by the Parliament, it is obvious the unconstitutionality, at least partial, of the Disposition no. 4 of 24.03.2020 of the Commission for Exceptional Situations, but unfortunately, the Constitutional Court is not mandated with the right to submit to constitutional review the normative acts adopted by the Commission for Exceptional Situations. Under these conditions, the state is obliged to identify solutions in order not to allow an authority to adopt unconstitutional normative acts that cannot be subject to constitutional review.


2016 ◽  
pp. 91-107
Author(s):  
TUDOREL TOADER ◽  
MARIETA SAFTA

The Constitutional Court has ruled that, by adhering to the legal order of the European Union, Romania agreed that, in those areas where exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the European Union, regardless of the international treaties priorly signed, implementation of its obligations arising therefrom is subject to the rules of the European Union. Otherwise, this would result in the undesirable situation where, through bi or multilateral internationally assumed obligations, Member State would seriously affect the Union’s competence and, in practice, would act in its place in the aforementioned areas. For this reason, in the field of competition, any State aid falls within the competence of the European Commission and appeal proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the European Union. Therefore, pursuant to Article 11 para. (1) and Article 148 para. (2) and (4) of the Constitution, Romania applies in good faith the obligations resulting from the Accession Instrument, without interfering with the exclusive competence of the European Union and, by virtue of the compliance clause contained in the text of Article 148 of the Constitution, Romania cannot adopt a legislative act contrary to the obligations assumed as a Member State. All those already highlighted are subject to certain limitations, expressed in what the Court described as “national constitutional identity”.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 22
Author(s):  
Ismail Tafani ◽  
Renata Tokrri

In this study we will try to analyze the foundations of the Constitution as a pillar and as a guarantee for its solidity. The study will also address the need for revision of the constitution as a fundamental element of its existence and continuity. Particular emphasis will be given to the comparison of the constitutions of the most important countries in the world as regards the procedures and limits to the constitutional revision. In this sense, the constitutions of some Balkan Peninsula countries will be analyzed to draw a comparison and analyze the Albanian Constitution as regards the procedure for its revision. The study intends to analyze the procedures for the revision of the Constitution as well as the explicit and implicit limits to these revisions. In the Constitutional revision in Albania in 2016, the role of the Constitutional Court on the control of the constitutional legitimacy of constitutional revision laws was clarified. Formal constitutionality is usually emphasized since the Albanian constitutional reform underlined that the Constitutional Court in Albania could express itself on the constitutionality of the Constitutional revision law only from a formal point of view.   Received: 2 January 2021 / Accepted: 27 February 2021 / Published: 7 March 2021


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